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Dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations are core features of psychopa-
thology. According to various (disorder specific) psychological models, these cognitive 
processes underlie the development, maintenance, and relapse of many disorders. 
The general aim of this dissertation is to advance the present understanding of the 
role of dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations in psychopathology. 
Three features characterize this dissertation. First, the role of dysfunctional automatic 
associations and interpretations was examined as a correlate, predictor and causal 
risk factor of psychopathology. Such a structured investigation is crucial when aiming 
to disentangle the specific contribution of dysfunctional automatic associations and 
interpretations to the development, course, and modification of psychopathology. 
Second, different types of psychopathology, and different kinds of samples (risk and 
clinical samples), were examined. This is important because dysfunctional automatic 
associations and interpretations could be considered as a cognitive vulnerability that 
many types of psychopathology share. As such, examining different types of psycho-
logical disorders, and at different stages, might provide valuable information regarding 
the presence as well as the specificity of dysfunctional automatic associations and inter-
pretations. Third, a variety of paradigms were used to assess dysfunctional automatic 
associations and interpretations, ranging from more direct to indirect approaches. 
This was motivated by current discussion about whether or not direct and indirect 
approaches should be regarded as complementary, and as such measure different types 
of processes. 
In the following pages, two dual process models will be described, providing the 
theoretical framework for the conducted studies. After that, a newly developed dual 
process model of abnormal behavior will be presented. Via this dual process model of 
psychopathology, I will explain how such a model could lead to a better understanding 
of dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations in psychopathology. 
Next, I will describe how dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations 
can be assessed and modified, followed by a step-wise procedure of how to investigate 
them in a structured way. After that, an overview will be given of what is known and, 
most importantly, what is needed in order to truly advance the present understanding 
of dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations in psychopathology. The 
introduction ends with the outline of my dissertation, including a presentation of the 
research questions that served as the motivation for conducting the studies included. 
Finally, a note regarding the term dysfunctional automatic associations and inter-
pretations which will be used throughout this dissertation. ‘Automatic’ only relates to 
the term associations as the assessed interpretations are considered as a rather explicit 
construct. ‘Dysfunctional’, however, relates to both associations and interpretations.
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A BRIEF INTRODUCTION
Evaluating and assigning meaning are fundamental parts of our everyday human life. 
We try to explain things. We appraise and define. We try to make sense of what we en-
counter. The creation of an idiosyncratic reality is the result of this mental activity. At 
the root of the act of evaluating and interpreting lies memory. That is, past experiences 
can affect our interpretations in the here and now. 
Let me illustrate this with a very recent personal example. During a dinner with col-
leagues, we were updating each other on how thing were going. I was telling them 
about my latest study on alcohol-related interpretation biases. I also talked about my 
attempts to describe my type of research to my family. One of my colleagues suggested 
that ‘Mars’ might be a very accessible and straight forward example to explain what 
ambiguous stimuli were and what kind of processes I was examining. I was confused: 
‘But why, Mars is not an ambi…’. Looking at the faces of my colleagues, I decided not 
to finish my sentence. Yes, Mars is a chocolate bar but also a planet and the god of war 
during the ancient Roman culture. However, these alternatives did not come to my 
mind. So, what went wrong, and so quickly and so automatically? 
The answer lies in my past. My chocolate-related past. When encountering the ambigu-
ous stimulus ‘Mars’ many positive associations became active, ranging from ‘sweet 
– soft – smooth’  to ‘makes me happy – this is what I need right now – this will never 
disappoint me’. Given the activation of this chocolate-related memory schemata, I was 
doomed and had no other choice than interpreting the ambiguous stimulus ‘Mars’ in 
a chocolate-related manner. 
An important element of this example is the automaticity with which I processed the 
ambiguous stimulus. Most of the time such efficiency is beneficial. In addition, we 
often manage to control the corresponding behavioral responses. However, automatic 
associations and interpretations as well as the elicited behavioral responses can become 
very dysfunctional. This clearly affects an individual’s quality of life and, in the worst 
case, might contribute to the development of a psychological disorder. Hence, inves-
tigating dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations will always be an 
important research target in clinical science, and therefore is the general topic of the 
present dissertation. In the following pages, two dual process models will be presented 
that help us to understand automatic associations and interpretations, once for normal 
and once for abnormal behavior. 
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DUAL PROCESS MODELS 
Normal behavior
Many dual process models of normal behavior (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; 
Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004) consists of three main elements. 
First, they explain how information is processed through a fast and effortless processing 
style (i.e., associative processing). Second, they explain how information is processed 
when an individual has the motivation and/or cognitive resources to engage in a 
more effortful and reflective processing style (i.e., propositional processing). Third, 
they explain when which processing style is likely to occur and what kind of behavior 
is then produced. 
Following the rationale of dual process models, overt human behavior should be regard-
ed as the output of the interplay between associative and propositional processing. 
What does this mean exactly? The following explanations base on the dual process 
model of Strack and Deutsch (2004, see Figure 1), however, many other models share 
these assumptions.
 
Figure 1. Summary of the dual process model of normal behavior (based on Strack & Deutsch, 2004)
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Associative processing is responsible for fast, effortless, and automatic processing of an 
internal or external stimulus. In addition, it does not require any cognitive resources. 
The foundation for associative processing is memory, which is thought to operate as 
an associative network: Associations are activated automatically and their activation 
spreads out to other parts of the associative network. This also involves the activation of 
behavioral schemata, which in turn activate a behavioral response. This occurs uninten-
tionally and outside an individual’s control or awareness. In contrast, propositional 
processing is responsible for a slow, effortful and reflective processing of an internal 
or external stimulus. However, such processing only occurs if an individual is moti-
vated and/or has the cognitive resources as well as the time to do so. In addition, 
propositional processing can be easily disturbed, for example, if the individual is 
aroused or in a bad mood. Propositional processing involves reasoning and is a rule-
based. The information needed for this type of processing is intentionally accessed. A 
‘noetic decision’, i.e., a decision generated by using the human intellect, is the explicit 
output of this processing style. The noetic decision is followed by an explicit behav-
ioral decision. For this purpose, behavioral schemata become active, which in turn 
activate a behavioral response. Propositional processing also makes use of the output 
generated by associative processing, i.e., it evaluates this information based on logical 
inferences. As such, propositional processing is generally concerned with validating 
information. During associative processing, however, the activated associations are 
not evaluated. 
According to many dual process models, associative processing is the default mode. 
However, in fact the interplay of both propositional and associative processing is con-
sidered to be responsible for behavior as the input of propositional processing is 
mainly provided by associative processing. Important to note here is that propositional 
and associative processing can be conflicting. For example, automatically activated 
associations can be rejected during propositional processing. On the other hand, 
automatically associations can overrule propositional processing. These operational 
properties do not lead to major negative consequences for our daily human life. When 
thinking back to the Mars example, the most dysfunctional behavioral response would 
have been that I would have been unable to resist the chocolate dessert standing in front 
me (and maybe that of my neighbor), despite my clear knowledge about its calories. 
However, there are examples during which the operational features of associative and 
propositional processing do have major negative consequences, namely in the context 
of psychopathology. 
Chapter 1
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Abnormal behavior
To elucidate the specific contribution of cognitive factors such as dysfunctional auto-
matic associations and interpretations to the development, maintenance, and relapse 
of psychopathology, clinical psychology has relied heavily on information processing 
theories put forward by cognitive psychology. Examples of particular historical 
importance, ranging from general to disorder specific models, are: attribution theory 
(Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1972; Weiner, 1986); appraisal theory (Lazarus, 1991); 
associative network theories (Anderson, 1983; Anderson & Bower, 1973; Collins & 
Quillian, 1969; Collins & Loftus, 1975);  Bower’s mood and memory associative network 
model (Bower, 1981); the integrative model of cognition and emotion proposed by 
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, and Mathews (1997); Beck’s schema theory (for depression: 
Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; for anxiety: Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985); or 
the cognitive model of panic disorder (Clark, 1986). 
During recent years, dual process models of normal behavior (e.g., Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), which have their 
origin in social and personality psychology, have started to receive increasing attention 
from clinical psychology. Researchers from various psychological backgrounds have 
used the underlying principles of dual process models to understand the cognitive 
vulnerability to engage in and maintain abnormal behavior. To the best of my knowledge, 
there are four currently published disorder specific dual process models, namely in 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996), depression 
(Beevers, 2005), addiction (Wiers et al., 2007) and anxiety (Ouimet, Gawronski, & 
Dozois, 2009). Given the eclectic nature of this thesis, i.e., the role of dysfunctional 
automatic associations and interpretations across different types of psychopathology, 
however, a general dual process model of psychopathology was needed. Hence, I 
developed such a model, with the dual process model of anxiety (Ouimet et al., 2009) 
serving as the main inspiration. However, please note that the dual process model of 
psychopathology proposes a bi-directional link between associative and propositional 
processing and behavior (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). In addition, the model has a specific 
focus on associations and interpretations, and thus other relevant processes such as 
attention or mood are not discussed in detail. Throughout the description of the dual 
process model of psychopathology, fear of spiders will be used as an example to illustrate 
the model’s operational properties.
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Figure 2. The dual process model of abnormal behavior with a specific focus on dysfunctional 
automatic associations and interpretations (based on Ouimet et al., 2009, and Strack & Deutsch, 
2004)
The dual process model of abnormal behavior (see Figure 2) has the same underlying 
rationale as dual process models of normal behavior. There are two cognitive processing 
styles that guide an individual’s overt behavior, namely associative processing and 
propositional processing. Given their operational properties, associative processing 
can be considered as ‘bottom up processing’, whereas propositional processing can be 
considered as ‘top down processing’. As stated before, associative processing implies 
that an internal or external stimulus is processed unintentionally, quickly and auto-
matically, without making use of cognitive resources. In addition, the activation and the 
course of the activation occurs outside an individual’s control or awareness. Associative 
network theories (Anderson, 1983; Anderson & Bower, 1973; Collins & Quillian, 
1969; Collins & Loftus, 1975) offer the theoretical underpinning for the associative 
processing style. The key element to understand the operational properties of associative 
networks is memory. In fact, associative networks are memory systems. Within such 
systems, the world as well as inner states are represented as memory schemata. A 
memory schema, in turn, consists of associative connections between nodes. A node 
can be roughly defined as an information unit. On an operational level, the activation 
of a memory schema proceeds as follows: One or more relevant nodes become(s) 
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activated, depending on whether the threshold needed for this activation is reached. 
The activation then spreads to (an) other related node(s), at a rate proportional to the 
strength of the associative connection between the nodes, and again taking into 
consideration the required threshold for this diffusion. This is called ‘spreading 
activation’ (Collin & Loftus, 1975). The strength between associative connections can 
change through experiences and learning. The accessibility of a memory schemata in-
creases the more often it has been activated (also called ‘Hebb’s rule’; Hebb, 1949). As 
such, activation is a matter of ‘associative strength’. 
Figure 3 gives an example of this spreading activation: When an individual suffering 
from fear of spider discovers a black spot on the ceiling, many negative associations 
are automatically activated, including disorder-congruent associations such as ‘fear’ 
or ‘uncontrollable’, as well as more general negative ones such as ‘dusty’ or ‘dirt’. 
However, as the disorder-congruent associations are the strongest, i.e., the most 
accessible ones, these associations ‘win’ and the corresponding ‘spider’ memory 
schemata is in charge. As a consequence, motivational tendencies are activated, which 
in turn activate a disorder-congruent response. This can be a behavioral, cognitive, 
emotional, or physiological response. In case of a spider fearful individual, behavioral 
avoidance, fear, an increased heart beat and sweating are likely consequences (for 
similar reasoning, see Le Doux, 1995).
 
 
Figure 3. A spider fear network (modeled based on associative network theories, Anderson, 
1976; Anderson & Bower, 1973; Collins & Quillian, 1969; Collins & Loftus, 1975)
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During propositional processing, an internal or external stimulus is processed in a 
slow, effortful and reflective manner. Hence, explicit (valenced) associations and/or 
interpretations of the perceived stimulus are generated. These explicit associations 
and interpretations can influence each other and are also affected by the output of 
associative processing. Next, the available explicit information is validated, i.e., the 
individual examines whether it is true or false. Based on the outcome of this validation, 
a behavioral decision is made, which in turn activates a response. In the context of fear 
of spiders, the following could have happened: If a spider fearful individual detects a 
spider, automatic as well as explicit spider-related associations (e.g., scary, disgusting) are 
activated, as well as more explicit healthy associations (e.g., small, harmless). Due to the 
individual’s fear of spiders, fear-related associations are regarded as valid and the healthy 
associations are rejected. Hence, avoidance is the most likely behavioral response. 
As already mentioned when integrating the Mars example, automatic processing is not 
per se harmful. In fact, it can be very adaptive and helpful during our daily human 
life. However, there are instances where automatic associations and interpretations as 
well as the elicited behavioral responses are dysfunctional. The previous example illus-
trated this very nicely and explained how a spider fearful individual can misevaluate 
a spider: Despite the individual’s awareness of the irrational nature of his/her fear, the 
spider was regarded as something fearsome. However, the presence of the feared object 
is not always required. A spider fearful individual might automatically misinterpret a 
black dot as something spider-related and thus dangerous. Due to the subsequent 
avoidance behaviors, such a misinterpretation cannot be corrected and might even be 
reinforced. Dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations may also be posi-
tively valenced. For instance, the ambiguous stimulus ‘shot’ might automatically activate 
positive associations such as ‘relaxing’ or ‘pleasant’ in an individual who consumes 
alcohol frequently. An alcohol-related interpretation of that cue is the consequence, 
and ordering a vodka rather than a coke a likely behavioral response. Again, this 
behavioral response reinforces the misinterpretation, possibly triggering a negative 
spiral. These assumptions are consistent with many cognitive (disorder specific) psy-
chological models, and they are empirically supported by a range of research in clinical 
psychology (for review, see e.g., Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Roefs et al., 2011).
The ease and the rapidity with which dysfunctional associative networks are formed 
seems a crucial element in the development of a psychological disorder. Moreover, 
experiencing dysfunctional associations and interpretations occurs automatically, 
i.e., they are unintentional, very fast and out of the individual’s control. Being unable 
to deactivate and to correct dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations 
through explicit cognitions also plays a substantial role. Moreover, dysfunctional 
automatic associations and interpretations are often affective in nature, and many 
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18
forms of psychopathology are characterized by emotion dysregulation. These latter 
issues might be particularly important for the maintenance of a psychological disorder, 
and could (partly) explain why psychological disorders can be so persistent. In addition, 
dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations could be an explanation of 
some patient’s therapy resistance or relapse: Most interventions target explicit cognitions 
and this might not necessarily impact dysfunctional automatic associations and 
interpretations. As such, dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations 
remain unchanged and still have a negative influence. Therefore, advancing the under-
standing of the role of dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations in 
psychopathology is important from a theoretical perspective. In addition, it is important 
from an applied perspective as it could help to improve current interventions which 
thus could stop the ‘psychopathological downward spiral’. However, in order to do so, 
measures are needed to assess dysfunctional automatic associations and interpreta-
tions in a valid and reliable manner. This topic will be addressed next. 
MEASURING DYSFUNCTIONAL AUTOMATIC  
ASSOCIATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS
Traditionally, questionnaires or ratings scales have been applied very frequently to 
assess associations and interpretations. Applying such a measurement procedure 
involves an individual being asked directly about the concept of interest. Unfortunately, 
however, using such ‘direct measures’ bears many disadvantages. First, self-report 
measures may not measure the fundamental processes underlying dysfunctional 
automatic associations and interpretations such as their uncontrollability. Thus, 
self-report measures may not be suited to predict abnormal behavioral patterns. 
Second, self-report measures are sensitive to undesired side effects such as demand 
and attribution biases (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Third, they depend on what an 
individual is willing to report. Fourth, the individual may not have an accurate 
judgment of his/her associations and interpretations.
As a result of these limitations, performance based measures started to receive 
increasing interest. Such measures can be defined best as ‘indirect measures’ (De 
Houwer, 2006). Unlike direct measures, indirect measures are supposed to provide an 
index of the concept of interest via behavior. That is, the individual’s reaction towards 
the stimulus is used to infer the concept of interest. During the past years, dysfunctional 
automatic associations and interpretations have been studied intensively by means of 
indirect measures. Two general classes of tasks have been used to assess associations and 
interpretations: reaction-time (RT) tasks and open-ended memory tests. A frequently 
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used RT task is the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 
1998), measuring the relative associative strength between two concepts. Participants 
are asked to sort words or pictures into four categories by means of two response keys: 
two categories represent a target concept (e.g., spider vs. butterfly), and two categories 
represent two poles of an attribute dimension (e.g., fearsome vs. positive). Given this 
operationalization, clinically observed phenomena and/or the specific prediction of 
cognitive models thus provide the direct input for the tasks’ contents. During an IAT, 
each target category is paired with both attributes. As such, categorization times are 
an index of the associative strength between the disorder-relevant target concept and 
valenced attribute dimensions, respectively. Put differently: The performance during the 
task is the product of the individual’s automatic reaction towards the target stimulus. 
Word association tasks are also very popular instruments. During such tests, partici-
pants are asked to give their first, mostly time-limited, interpretation to a variety of 
ambiguous cues. Interpretation in this context means that participants are supposed 
to give their first thought in response to the ambiguous cues. These cues are either 
disorder-related or unrelated and differ in their complexity. Homographs provide a 
very good example in this context. A homograph is a word for which the written form 
has more than one meaning, for example, a disorder-related and disorder-unrelated 
meaning (e.g., ‘shot’: an alcoholic drink or a gunshot). Here, it is expected to find dis-
order-congruent interpretation biases (e.g., alcohol-dependent patients would interpret 
the homograph ‘shot’ as being alcohol-related compared to non-dependent control 
patients) and/or a positive correlation between the number of disorder-congruent 
interpretations and levels of symptomatology (e.g., individuals who drink a lot generate 
more alcohol-related interpretations than those who drink less). An overview of fre-
quently used RT tasks and open-ended memory tests can be found in the Appendix, 
for the assessment of dysfunctional automatic associations as well as interpretations. 
Despite their popularity, however, also indirect measures have been criticized. The 
most important criticism is the low reliability of many tasks (e.g., Bosson, Swann, & 
Pennebaker, 2000; Reinecke, Becker, & Rinck, 2010). Second, whether indirect mea-
sures indeed measure automatic cognitions is still not entirely clear and also depend 
on the understanding of the processes which are assumed to cause the outcome 
of indirect measures (De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009). To 
conclude, there is (and probably will always be) a debate about the validity, reliability, 
generalization, and interpretation of direct as well as indirect measures. However, 
they can nevertheless provide important insights regarding the role of dysfunctional 
automatic associations and interpretations in psychopathology. As De Houwer et al. 
(2009) state: The most important thing is to select the best paradigm given the specific 
research question. 
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CHANGING DYSFUNTIONAL AUTOMATIC  
ASSOCIATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS
In parallel to developing measures to assess dysfunctional automatic associations and 
interpretations, researchers started to investigate whether it is possible to modify 
such processes. According to many (disorder-specific) cognitive models, there is a 
bi-directional link between the vulnerability to develop a psychological disorder 
and dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations. As such, dysfunctional 
automatic associations and interpretations should change in step with levels of psy-
chopathology, and vice versa (see also Figure 2 for this bi-directionality). In order to 
examine this causal link, paradigms that had initially been used to assess dysfunctional 
automatic associations and interpretations were transformed into ‘training paradigms’. 
That is, participants are exposed to an experimentally established contingency 
between a disorder-relevant target and a response, with the aim of modifying the 
participants’ information-processing style via learning of the trained contingency 
(Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009). 
Conditioning paradigms offer fruitful approaches for the modification of dysfunc-
tional automatic associations. By means of an evaluative conditioning (EC; cf. De 
Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001) paradigm, Houben, Schoenmakers, and Wiers 
(2010), for example, aimed to modify alcohol-related associations and drinking be-
havior. EC can be defined best as an affective learning paradigm. It implies that the 
evaluation of a stimulus (conditioned stimulus; CS) changes after it has been paired 
with a positively or negatively valenced stimulus (unconditioned stimulus; US+ or 
US-), and that this change in evaluation of the CS is in accordance with the valence of 
the US it had been paired with. In the EC paradigm as used by Houben et al. (2010), 
participants were instructed to look for irrelevant target pictures that were presented 
among many other pictures. In the experimental condition, beer-related pictures 
(CSs) were always paired with negative words and pictures (USs). The control condition, 
however, did not include these pairings. Subsequently, beer-related associations and 
craving for beer were assessed (in a pretended second study). In addition, actual 
drinking behavior was assessed, namely during a bogus taste test at the lab and during 
the week following the study. Results demonstrated that participants in the experi-
mental condition, compared to participants in the control condition, showed stronger 
negative associations towards beer. Moreover, they reported less craving and consumed 
less beer during the taste test as well as during the week following the conditioning. 
Such an EC paradigm has also been used in the domain of anxiety. Here, Clerkin and 
Teachmann (2010) tested whether automatic rejection associations could be modified 
into more functional ones, and whether this had a beneficial effect on levels of anxiety. 
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Results showed no direct conditioning effect on levels of state nor anticipation anxiety 
(participants had to do a public speaking task). However, those whose rejection asso-
ciations were trained into more functional ones were more likely to finish a public 
speaking task. 
As of yet, there are only few studies targeting the direct modification of dysfunctional 
automatic associations (for more examples, see e.g., Sportel, de Hullu, de Jong, & Nauta, 
2013; Kerkhof, Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, & Hermans, 2011). However, the opposite is 
true with regard to studies aiming to modify dysfunctional interpretations. Here, 
Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) conducted pioneering work in the area of Cognitive 
Bias Modification – Interpretation (CBM-I) in the context of social anxiety. Their 
CBM-I comprised socially ambiguous scenarios that ended with a to-be-completed 
word fragment, such that the meaning of the scenario remained ambiguous until the 
final word fragment was resolved. Participants’ task was to finish each scenario by 
completing the word fragment, and these words produced an outcome consistent 
with either a functional or dysfunctional interpretation, depending on the training 
condition (CBM-I positive or CBM-I negative). Results showed that the training was 
successful: Participants in the positive CBM-I responded faster to positive word frag-
ments whereas participants in the negative CBM-I responded faster to negative word 
fragments. To test whether such a training-congruent interpretation style would also 
generalize, participants completed a recognition test. During this test, participants 
were presented with novel socially ambiguous scenarios, each followed by a set of 4 
related sentences. Participants had to rate how close in meaning each sentence seemed 
to the original sentence. Results indeed showed a generalization effect: Participants in 
the positive CBM-I gave higher similarity ratings for positive than for negative sentenc-
es, and vice versa for participants in the negative CBM-I condition. Most noteworthy, 
self-reported anxiety was affected in a training-congruent manner, providing first 
evidence for the causal link between emotions and dysfunctional interpretations. 
Many follow-up and replication studies followed after these encouraging findings, 
initially, mainly in the area of social anxiety but later also in other anxiety disorders 
as well as depression (cf. Koster et al., 2009; and for a meta analysis and reviews, see 
e.g., Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Hertel & Mathews, 2011; MacLeod & Mathews, 2012). 
To conclude, important insights regarding the development of psychopathology can 
be gained not only from the assessment of dysfunctional automatic associations and 
interpretations, but also from studies that aim to modify them. Such computerized 
training procedures not only have potential theoretical use, but also potential clinical 
applications. They offer promising new treatments opportunities. Most importantly, 
however, such training paradigms have the potential to modify processes which are 
not per se targeted by explicit interventions such as Cognitive Therapy (CT), namely 
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dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations. However, also CBM-I 
techniques are not without critique and there are still many questions to be 
addressed. For example, it has to be shown that changes in symptomatology are 
indeed mediated by a change in bias and that other biases are also affected by CBM-
I. Furthermore, effects of prolonged CBM-I training across different contexts have 
to be investigated (for more information, see e.g., MacLeod, Koster, & Fox, 2009). 
Nevertheless, research has clearly shown that dysfunctional automatic associations 
and interpretations can causally influence levels of psychopathology, and there is 
accumulating evidence of the therapeutic effects of CBM-I. 
DYSFUNCTIONAL AUTOMATIC ASSOCIATIONS AND 
INTERPRETATIONS: CORRELATE, PREDICTOR OR 
CAUSAL RISK FACTOR 
In part one of this Introduction, the dual process model of abnormal behavior with a 
specific focus on dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations was intro-
duced as a general model of psychopathology. In part two, an overview was provided of 
how to asses and to modify dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations, 
including a brief critical discussion. Although these previous elaborations cover impor-
tant ‘ingredients’ when aiming to advance the understanding of the role of automatic 
cognitive processes in psychopathology, something is clearly missing: A procedure of 
how to investigate the specific contribution of dysfunctional automatic associations 
and interpretations regarding the development and modification of psychopathology 
in a structured way.
Kraemer et al. (1997) provides such a procedure, i.e., a stepwise approach to examine 
the psychopathologic typology of a risk factor. According to Kraemer et al., ‘A risk 
factor is a measurable characterization of each subject in a specified population that 
precedes the outcome of interest and which can be used to divide the population into 
2 groups (the high-risk and the low-risk groups that comprise the total population)’ (p. 
338). Moreover, Kraemer et al. (1997) put forward five requirements to evaluate a risk: 
1. A clear and complete definition of the outcome whereby the outcome is measured 
in a reliable and valid manner; 2. A definition of the population including an appro-
priate sampling of the population; 3. A definition of the risk factor whereby the risk 
factor defines a characteristic preceding the outcome, measured in a reliable and valid 
manner; 4. The application of analytic approaches to identify the high- and low risk 
group and the demonstration of a statistically significant difference in risk between the 
two groups; 5. The application of analytic approaches to demonstrate the existence of 
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clinically significant or policy significant differences in risk between the two groups. 
In case these requirements are fulfilled, the process of defining the psychopathologic 
typology of a factor can start. Figure 4 offers a schematic representation of the necessary 
steps for this endeavor. To provide concrete research examples within each step, the 
potential causal role of dysfunctional interpretations in social anxiety will be used as 
an illustration (partly modeled based on Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). 
 
 
Figure 4. The process of a structured investigation of a risk factor (adapted model from Kraemer 
et al., 1997)
The first step is to show that the factor is associated with the outcome. Put differently, 
it should be established that the factor is a correlate. For example, in research a high-risk 
group/a group suffering from a type of psychopathology may be compared to a low-
risk group/a group not suffering from psychopathology. The typical expectation 
would be to find disorder-congruent interpretations in the former group. However, 
these should be weaker or even absent in the latter group. Hence, when a group of 
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highly socially anxious individuals and a group of low socially anxious individuals 
would be presented with ambiguous open-ended scenarios, one would expect the 
former group to generate more threat-related interpretations than the latter group.
The second step is to demonstrate that the factor precedes the outcome. In Kraemer 
et al.’s model (1997), one then talks about a risk factor. An equivalent would be 
‘predictor’. As such, an incremental and predictive validity study would be needed, 
showing that dysfunctional interpretations are predictive of psychopathological be-
havior/psychopathology. In addition: dysfunctional interpretations should predict 
psychopathological behavior/psychopathology beyond already established risk factors. 
A longitudinal epidemiologic study including two assessment time points would provide 
insight into this matter. At time point one, a large (community) sample would be  asked 
to complete a test battery including an assessment of dysfunctional interpretations 
relevant in social anxiety. In addition, at time point one and two, a diagnostic interview 
should be conducted. What one would expect is that the dysfunctional interpretations 
assessed at time point one are predictive for developing social anxiety disorder at time 
point two. Moreover, dysfunctional interpretations should retain their predictive sig-
nificance, even after controlling for well established risk factors such as gender, trait 
anxiety, or psychopathology at time point one. 
During step 3, the malleability of the factor is targeted. That is, it has to be clarified 
whether the factor can change or whether it can be changed. If both types of changes 
are impossible, the factor should be regarded as a fixed marker. Prototypical fixed 
markers are gender or ethnicity. However, in case change is possible, the factor should 
be regarded as a variable risk factor. For the purpose of research, one could take a sample 
of individuals scoring medium to high on social anxiety. By means of a Cognitive Bias 
Modification – Interpretation (CBM-I) training, half of the group would train to 
interpret ambiguous social situations in a positive way (positive group), the other half 
would train to interpret ambiguous social situations in a negative way (negative 
group). Before and after the training, participants’ interpretations towards ambiguous 
social scenarios are assessed. One would expect to find a pre-training interpretation 
bias in both groups, i.e., both groups should interpret the ambiguous scenarios as 
rather negatively. However, this bias would be supposed to change congruently after 
the CBM-I, implying that the positive group should show a reduction in bias, whereas 
the negative group should show an increase in bias.  
Step 4 describes how to continue examining the variable risk factor. This involves the 
manipulation of the variable risk factor, followed by examining whether this then has 
an effect on the outcome. Here, two expectations are possible: The manipulation of 
the variable risk factor can result in an increase or decrease in psychopathological behav-
ior/psychopathology. If the manipulation of the risk factor is indeed followed by a 
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change in psychopathological behavior/psychopathology, the variable risk factor 
should be regarded as a causal risk factor. The previous CBM-I example forms an ade-
quate base to illustrate this step. However, what is now needed is an assessment of psy-
chopathological behavior/psychopathology, in this case, an assessment of levels of so-
cial anxiety. A frequently used option here is to put participants in a highly stressful 
situation after CBM-I, e.g., a performance task such as giving a speech about a topic 
participants are not familiar with but which will be judged later. Participants’ level of 
social anxiety would be assessed after the CBM-I training (i.e., before the speech) and 
after the speech. In this study, one would expect training-congruent changes in inter-
pretation bias to occur post training. In addition, one would expect the positive group 
to show less anxiety after the training than the negative group. Finally, the positive 
group should also show less anxiety after the stress task than the negative group, i.e., 
they should recover more easily. Ideally, the variation in anxiety on the stress task 
should be mediated by the change in bias which has been manipulated by means of 
CBM-I. However, even without mediation, these findings would show that the in-
duced interpretation bias leads to bias-congruent changes in anxiety (i.e., psycho-
pathological behavior), and as such would provide evidence that the bias could be re-
garded as a causal risk factor. 
Another option to obtain insight in the potential causal nature of a risk factor is to 
conduct a clinical study whereby the treatment’s effect on dysfunctional interpretations 
is investigated. In this example, the treatment should be regarded as the manipulation. 
In the context of social anxiety example, one would need a study which assesses dys-
functional interpretation before and after Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT). First, 
one would expect to find a reduction in symptoms of social anxiety and dysfunctional 
interpretations after CBT. Second, and most optimally, one would expect to find that 
the reduction in levels of social anxiety was mediated by the change in interpretation 
bias. Given the quasi-experimental nature of this design, however, causality could not 
necessarily be claimed. 
If the manipulation of the variable risk factor has no effect on the outcome, it should 
be called a variable marker. This means that the variable risk factor should be regarded 
as a correlate, which might have the potential of being a causal risk factor. In case of 
the CBM-I example, this would mean that the training changed the interpretation 
bias accordingly. However, the groups would not have differed in their level of social 
anxiety following the training, nor would there be a mediation effect of the change in 
bias in levels of social anxiety. 
To conclude, this stepwise approach provides a very thorough and clearly defined 
procedure to study the role of dysfunctional automatic associations and interpreta-
tions in psychopathology. Of note, it can not only be used to identify risk factors for 
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developing psychopathology, it can be used also to identify risk factor involved in 
remission, recovery, and relapse. As such, strategies for prevention, treatment, and 
maintenance can benefit from this procedure. 
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE PRESENT THESIS
The assessment and also the modification of dysfunctional automatic associations 
and interpretations is a field that has been increasingly recognized during the past 
few years. On the one hand, studies have demonstrated that it is possible to examine 
these processes using a variety of assessment instruments that each provide unique 
insights into psychopathology and the factors maintaining it. On the other hand, the 
finding that dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretation may be directly 
modified and that this has a beneficial effect on levels of psychopathology is exciting 
for both theory and treatment development
However, there are still many issues that need to be resolved. These include general 
issues as well as issues that are specific of a certain type of psychopathology and/or 
the way dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretation have been examined 
within a type of psychopathology. First, research in some domains is still dominated 
by the application of self report measures. However, as noted earlier, this confers 
many disadvantages. Hence, the application of indirect measures might be beneficial 
here. Second, testing the sensitivity of variations of well-established indirect measures 
is crucial in order to substantiate and extend previous findings. In line with this, it 
would be also important to find out whether such newly developed indirect measures 
are unique predictors of dysfunctional behavioral patterns. Third, extension and 
replication studies are needed to robustly demonstrate the existence of dysfunctional 
automatic associations and interpretations across different measures. Fourth, variables 
related to dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations need to be tested, 
for example by means of correlational or moderation analyses. Fifth, there are many 
studies assessing the role of dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations 
in risk samples. However, as findings obtained in risk samples do not always match 
those obtained in clinical samples, more research including patients is needed. Sixth, 
once it has been found that dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations 
are a correlate of (levels of) psychopathology, prospective studies should follow to 
examine whether they are also predictive of (levels of) psychopathology (Kraemer et 
al., 1997). Seventh, many cognitive models postulate that dysfunctional automatic 
associations and interpretations contribute to the development of psychopathology. 
However, only experimental investigations can provide evidence for such a causal 
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link by manipulating dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations. There 
are promising first findings in social anxiety, depression and addiction, but much 
more research is needed to substantiate the models’ assumptions. 
These open questions raise a number of issues for further research. In the next section, 
I will give a brief outlook of the contribution of my dissertation to each of these issues.
FOCUS AND OUTLINE OF THE PRESENT THESIS
The general aim of the present thesis is to further advance the understanding of the 
role of dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations in psychopathology. 
Therefore, I will present 9 studies which: 1. Assessed dysfunctional automatic associa-
tions and interpretations to investigate their roles as correlates (Chapters 2-7), predictor 
(Chapter 8) and causal risk factors (Chapters 9 and 10) of psychopathology; 2. Were 
conducted with different types of psychopathology (eating pathology, Chapter 2; 
anxiety, Chapter 3, 8, 9 and 10; alcohol misuse and dependency, Chapter 4, 5, 6, and 
7), and including at risk (Chapters 4 and 5) as well as clinical samples (Chapters 3, 6 and 
7); 3. Made use of various paradigms ranging from more direct to indirect approaches. 
Given these features, the present dissertation will provide an in-depth examination of 
psychopathological associations and interpretations across different levels of different 
types of psychopathology, making use of state-of-the-art research paradigms.
Chapters 2-7 focus on the role of dysfunctional automatic associations and interpre-
tations as a correlate of (levels of) psychopathology. The study in Chapter 2 reports 
the first attempt to assess dysfunctional automatic associations in the context of the 
‘thin ideal internalization’ indirectly. A stimulus response compatibility task (SRC; 
Mogg, Bradley, Field, & De Houwer, 2003) was applied whereby undergraduate female 
students were asked to categorize pictures of models as either thin or chubby by moving 
a manikin figure either towards or away from the pictures. Here, the reaction time 
needed to execute the manikin’s movement served as index of the associative strength 
between movement and picture type, respectively. 
Chapter 3 describes two studies whereby automatic associations towards spiders were 
investigated. The central aim of these studies was to test the sensitivity of a newly 
developed variation of the Single Target Implicit Association Test (STIAT; Wigboldus, 
Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2004), namely a STIAT including a task irrelevant in-
struction. Furthermore, the study examined whether the performance on this adapted 
STIAT version was a better predictor of fear responses than self-report. In Study 1, 
spider-fearful individuals versus non-fearful controls were tested, and Study 2 compared 
spider enthusiasts to non-fearful controls. 
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The studies of Chapter 4-7 were conducted in the area of alcohol misuse and abuse. 
Chapter 4 and 5 involve risk populations, namely drinking students. The main aim of 
these studies was to obtain more insight in the role of alcohol-related interpretations 
by providing a more ecologically valid and holistic assessment compared to previous 
studies. Hence, both studies employed a scenario based approach. In the study of 
Chapter 4, heavy and light drinking male student were asked to complete open-ended 
ambiguous scenarios, which were either alcohol-related or neutral in context. The 
continuations participants generated were used as a bias index. The study in Chapter 
5 also used a scenario based approach. However, this was operationalized as an encoding 
recognition task, i.e., participants were presented with ambiguous scenarios and were 
asked to rate possible interpretations of these scenarios in a second phase. Unlike the 
previous study, this study included a balanced distribution of scenarios related to 
positive and negative reinforcement drinking. In addition, female drinking students 
were also tested and measures of levels of executive control and prospective drinking 
were included. 
The studies of Chapter 6 and 7 were conducted with clinical samples of alcohol– 
dependent and control patients, and also investigated alcohol-related associations 
and interpretation. Hence, these studies generally aimed to replicate the previous 
findings obtained in risk samples. The study in Chapter 6 was an extension of the 
study in Chapter 4 to a clinical sample. Therefore, we employed a scenario task and 
tested whether alcohol-dependent patients, compared to a patient control group, 
would show an alcohol-related interpretation bias. The study in Chapter 7 employed 
a priming task and focused on the assessment of dysfunctional automatic alcohol- 
related associations. Positive and negative affective words served as primes and alcohol 
and soda words as targets, respectively. It was investigated in how far particularly 
negative affective primes impact the categorization of alcohol targets. In addition, the 
moderating role of depressive symptoms and executive control was investigated. 
Chapter 8 addresses the role of dysfunctional interpretations as a predictor of psycho-
pathology. Hence, it includes a prospective study in the context of panic disorder. 
This study tested whether a panic-related interpretation bias at time point one would 
be predictive of panic onset at time point 2. 
Finally, Chapter 9 and 10 describe studies aiming to investigate the causal role of 
(dys)functional interpretations. Therefore, two analogue experimental studies in the 
context of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) were conducted, testing the effect 
of positive versus negative reappraisal training (CBM-App training). The study in 
Chapter 9 tested the effect of such CBM-App training after participants had been 
exposed to highly distressing film clips. The study in Chapter 10 tested the reversed 
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order, i.e., first CBM-App and then exposure to highly distressing film clips. Both 
studies included three distinct outcome measures, namely: (a) post-training appraisals 
of novel ambiguous scenarios, (b) differences in trauma-related cognition, and (c) 
intrusive memories. 
In summary, by investigating dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations 
across different types and levels of psychopathology and by using various kinds of 
tasks, this dissertation aims to provide an in-depth examination of their role in psy-
chopathology. 
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Measuring thinspiration and fear of fat indirectly:  
A matter of approach and avoidance
AbstrAct
The concepts ‘thinspiration’ and ‘fear of fat’ are crucial regarding the development and 
maintenance of body image disturbances and eating pathology. This study aimed to 
advance our current understanding of these two motivational concepts. Unlike previous 
studies that have primarily relied on self report measures to investigate thinspiration and 
fear of fat, we applied an indirect measure, namely a Stimulus Response Compatibility (SRC) 
task. During our SRC task, undergraduate female students were instructed to symboli-
cally approach and avoid pictures of thin and chubby models. Hence, the participants’ 
reaction times during the SRC task provided an index of the automatic affective and 
motivational valence of the models. Results showed that participants were faster to ap-
proach than to avoid thin models, however, there was no difference in approach-avoidance 
responses regarding chubby models. Analyses revealed that the approach-avoidance 
responses were related to important eating-related, cognitive schemata, e.g., the partici-
pants’ level of drive for thinness, thin-ideal internalization, body dissatisfaction and 
their weight control behaviors. These findings clearly support the application of an indirect 
measure such as the SRC task in order to examine the concepts thinspiration and fear 
of fat, and highlight the need for further research that validates and extends current 
results. 
This chapter is based on: 
Woud, M. L., Anschutz, D. J., Van strien, t., & becker, E. s. (2011). Measuring 
thinspiration and fear of fat indirectly: A matter of approach and avoidance. Appetite, 
56, 451-455.
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 INTRODUCTION
People tend to argue that physical attractiveness is a matter of personal preferences, 
however, the Western media has produced and consistently perpetuates a stereotypical 
image of femininity that is dominated by thin ideal representations. This media pro-
totype of the ideal female has created a high societal pressure to be thin which can 
contribute to the development of body image disturbances and eating pathology 
among young women (e.g., Grabe, Ward, & Hyde, 2008). According to Stice, Schupak-
Neuberg, Shaw, and Stein (1994), the relationship between eating pathology and media 
exposure is mediated by the internalization of these thin beauty ideals. Thin ideal 
internalization is a psychological process that emerges when women assimilate the 
thin-ideal and its associated standards into their worldview, and execute particular 
behaviors to approximate towards these ideals (Thompson & Stice, 2001). According 
to Bordo (1993), the impact, or better pressure of this process shapes females bodies 
and minds more and more. 
The concepts thinspiration and fear of fat are important in this context. The former 
implies that women are eager to approach an idealized thin identity, whereas the latter 
implies that women are eager to avoid the acquisition of a stigmatized over-fat identity 
(Dalley & Buunk, 2009). As such, both concepts are compatible with the two motiva-
tional orientations described by the regulatory-focus theory (Higgins, 1997), which 
postulates that individuals are either motivated to approach a desired end-state (i.e., 
promotion focused) or are motivated to avoid shortfalls (i.e., prevention focused). Both, 
thinspiration and fear of fat, are diagnostic criteria for eating disorders such as bulimia 
or anorexia (American Psychological Association, 2000). Therefore, we have seen a 
surge of research efforts towards a better understanding of how these motivational 
concepts contribute to the development and maintenance of dysfunctional dieting 
behaviors and eating-related attitudes. Findings from Thompson and Stice (2001), for 
example, suggest that dieting behavior might be driven by the desire to approach a 
thin beauty ideal. However, there is emerging evidence indicating that dieting behavior 
is rather driven by the desire to avoid the stigmatized over-fat identity (e.g., Ackard, 
Croll, & Kearney-Cooke, 2002; Dalley & Buunk, 2009; Mussap, 2007). Dalley and Buunk 
(2009), for example, required participants to complete questionnaires measuring the 
participants’ perceived similarity with thin and over-fat prototypes. Results showed 
that those who reported an increased perception of similarity to over-fat prototypes 
perceived these prototypes as more unfavorable, and were more likely to be involved 
in frequent dieting behaviors. Similar findings have been reported by Ackard et al. 
(2002), who have proposed an association between an avoidance motivation and dys-
functional behaviors and eating attitudes. 
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Research into thinspiration and fear of fat has generally relied on self-report measures, 
and although e.g., questionnaires have well-established predictive validity and are 
important research instruments, they contain several limitations. Self-report or direct 
measures are assumed to be prone to biases initiated by social desirability, demand 
characteristics, or self-presenting strategies (see De Houwer, 2006). Given these limi-
tations, it is important to complement self-report measures when studying cognitive 
schemata associated with thinspiration and fear of fat. Hence, indirect measures might 
provide an important tool to supplement direct measures. Unlike direct measures, 
indirect measures do not directly ask individuals to reveal their thoughts or attitudes. 
Instead, most of these tasks are performance measures, and cognitions or attitudes 
are inferred from systematic differences in reaction times (RTs). This provides specific 
advantages, for example, it offers the possibility of studying cognitions and attitudes 
over which people cannot easily exert cognitive control and which are less accessible 
via self-report, but that nevertheless influence human behavior. 
Regarding the research related to eating pathology, body image disturbances or thin-
ideal internalization, a variety of indirect measures have been used. To illustrate, 
Ahern, Bennett, and Hetherington (2008) employed an Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) to study automatic attitudes to the ultra-thin 
ideal in a non-clinical sample. The IAT is a categorization task which provides a 
method for indirectly assessing the relative strength of associations between concepts 
(see Greenwald et al., 1998, for a detailed description). By means of the IAT, Ahern 
and colleagues (2008) investigated whether young women who hold more positive 
automatic associations towards underweight models do also report higher levels of 
eating disorder symptoms. Results showed that women who automatically associated 
underweight with positivity scored higher on drive for thinness. Moreover, this relation-
ship was stronger for those women who indicated that the media is an important outlet 
for them regarding the societal standards of the thin ideal. Besides the IAT, other 
indirect measures like the dot probe paradigm (e.g., Rieger et al., 1998; Shafran, Lee, 
Cooper, Palmer, & Fairburn, 2007), the Stroop task (for a review, see Dobson & 
Dozois, 2004; Lee & Shafran, 2004), the affective priming paradigm (e.g., Roefs et al., 
2005) or the visual search task (e.g., Smeets, Roefs, Van Furth, & Jansen, 2008) have been 
applied very successfully, as they provided unique information that could not have been 
gathered by self-report measures. As such, indirect measures are very attractive, 
additional research instruments that can help to increase our understanding of the 
functional relationship between cognitive processes and the etiology and maintenance 
of eating pathology. 
The present study sought to expand self-report procedures in order to test the suit-
ability of an indirect measure in the context of thinspiration and fear of fat. Therefore, 
Chapter 2
36
we applied a modified version of a Stimulus Response Compatibility (SRC) task, intro-
duced by Mogg, Bradley, Field, and De Houwer (2003). Findings from a long line of 
research have demonstrated that affective stimuli automatically trigger compatible, 
behavioral dispositions: A negative stimulus activates avoidance tendencies, whereas 
a positive stimulus activates approach tendencies (e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1999; Neumann 
& Strack, 2000). Similar findings were obtained by De Houwer, Crombez, Baeyens, 
and Hermans (2001). They instructed participants to execute symbolic approach and 
avoidance movements towards positive and negative words by moving a manikin 
figure either towards or away from the word stimuli. Results showed the expected 
compatibility effects: Response times to categorize positive words were faster if the 
required response was a symbolic approach movement rather than a symbolic avoid-
ance movement, and the opposite was true for negative words. In the area of addiction 
research, the SRC task has been applied very successfully in studies on nicotine 
dependence. For instance, Mogg et al. (2003) demonstrated that smokers are faster 
than non-smokers to make an approach response to smoking-related pictures than to 
make an avoidance response (see also e.g., Bradley, Field, Mogg, & De Houwer, 2004; 
Field, Mogg, & Bradley, 2005). Hence, the SRC task can be described as an indirect 
measure of the affective and motivational valence of stimuli. 
In our version of the SRC task, undergraduate female students were asked to categorize 
pictures of models as either thin or chubby by moving the manikin figure either towards 
or away from the pictures. As such, our SRC task provides an indirect measure of the 
models’ favorability as the response time participants need to initiate an approach or 
avoidance movement can be regarded as an index of the affective and motivational 
valence of the models. For this reason, we think that this is an ecologically valid 
operationalization of the concepts thinspiration and fear of fat: An approach bias 
towards thin models (i.e, approach responses are faster initiated than avoidance 
responses) represents the first concept, whereas an avoidance bias towards chubby 
models (i.e., avoidance responses are faster initiated than approach responses) repre-
sents the latter concept. Making use of pictorial stimuli when applying an indirect 
measure has been very successful in this area of research (e.g., Ahern et al., 2008; 
Shafran et al., 2007; Smeets et al., 2008), further validating our method. As recent 
evidence suggests that particularly avoidance oriented processes are related to eating 
pathology (e.g., Ackard et al., 2002; Dalley & Buunk, 2009; Mussap, 2007), we expect 
an avoidance bias towards chubby models to occur. In order to gain more insight 
between the approach-avoidance responses and their relation to eating-related, 
cognitive schemata, we assessed participants’ level of drive for thinness, thin-ideal 
internalization, body dissatisfaction and their weight control behaviors. Finally, we 
also investigated the relation between these valenced responses and participants’ BMI. 
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METHOD 
Participants
A total of 108 female students of the Radboud University of Nijmegen participated 
in this study.1 The mean age of the participants was 20.1 years (SD = 1.95) and their 
average body mass index (BMI = weight/height²) was 22.56 (SD = 3.1).
Materials & Procedure
Stimulus Response Compatibility (SRC) task 
The SRC task was administered first. Pictures of 10 models served as experimental 
stimuli. These original 10 model pictures were used for the category thin. Pictures for 
the category chubby were a manipulation of the thin pictures, they were stretched 20% 
so that the models looked plump. This resulted in a total set of 20 experimental stimuli. 
In each trial of the SRC task, a picture of either a thin or a chubby model appeared in 
the centre of the screen. In addition, a manikin figure was displayed either below or 
above the picture. Participants were instructed to move the manikin figure either 
towards or away from the picture by making use of the keys ‘2’ (manikin moved 
downwards) and ‘8’ (manikin moved upwards) on the numeric part of the keyboard. 
The SRC task consisted of two blocks with two different stimulus-response assign-
ments: One block required participants to move the manikin towards chubby models 
(positive approach movement) and to move the manikin away from thin models 
(negative avoidance movement), whereas the other block required participants to 
move the manikin away from chubby models (negative avoidance movement) and 
towards thin models (positive approach movement). The latency between picture 
onset and the participant’s response served as the dependent variable. All participants 
completed both blocks, however, the order of blocks was counterbalanced across 
participants. Within each block, the manikin appeared below the picture on 50% of 
the trials, and above it on the other 50%. When the manikin appeared below the 
picture, 50% of the trials required a down response, whereas the other 50% required 
an up response, and the same was true when the manikin appeared above the picture. 
The manikin position and picture type varied randomly over trials. Each block was 
preceded by 8 practice trials. During the test trials, each experimental picture was 
presented twice, implying that each block contained 40 test trials. The whole SRC task 
contained 96 trials.
1 Some participants of this sample also participated in the study of Anschutz, Engels, Becker, and Van Strien (2009).
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Questionnaires 
Following the SRC task, the Eating Disorder Inventory-II (EDI-II; Garner, 1991), the 
Sociocultural Attitudes Towards Appearance Questionnaire (SATAQ; Thompson, 
Van den Berg, Roehrig, Guarda, & Heinberg, 2004), and the Dutch Eating Behaviour 
Questionnaire (DEBQ; Van Strien, Frijters, Bergens, & Defares, 1986) were admin-
istered. Regarding the EDI, we used the drive for thinness and body dissatisfaction 
subscales in order to assess cognitions related to preoccupation with weight and 
satisfaction with various weight-related parts of the body. The drive for thinness sub-
scale comprises 7 statements (e.g., ‘I am preoccupied with the desire to be thinner.’). 
Participants respond to them on a 6-point Likert Scale anchored at the extremes with 
1 (‘never’) and 6 (‘always’). Cronbach’s α for this sample was .87 (M = 2.5, SD = .91). 
The body dissatisfaction subscale includes 9 items (e.g., ‘I think that my thighs are too 
large.’), and participants rate how often they agree with each statement according to a 
6-point Likert scale ranging from ‘always’ to ‘never’. In this sample Cronbach’s α was 
.88 (M = 3.1, SD = .99). The thin-ideal internalization subscale of the SATAQ was 
administered to examine the level of internalization of societal sanctioned standards 
of appearance. This subscale comprises 9 statements (e.g., ‘I would like my body to 
look like the people who are in the movies.’), and the response options range from 1 
(‘totally disagree’) to 5 (‘totally agree’). Cronbach’s α for this sample was .92 (M = 2.6, 
SD = .85). Finally, the restraint subscale of the DEBQ was applied to measure the 
tendency to eat less than desired. This subscale includes 10 items (e.g., ‘Do you delib-
erately eat less in order not to become heavier?’), with response categories ranging from 
1 (‘never’) to 5 (‘very often’). In this sample Cronbach’s α was .93 (M = 2.6, SD = .84). 
Following the questionnaires, participants’ weight and height were measured. Finally, 
all participants were debriefed and thanked for their time. 
RESULTS
Stimulus Response Compatibility (SRC) task
To correct for the potential effects of outlier reaction times (RTs), the means reported 
below are means of medians (see also Figure 1). The RT data from incorrect trials 
were discarded (7.1% of the data). Two participants had to be excluded as 25% of 
their responses were incorrect, leaving a final sample of 106 participants. 
The 2 (Movement: Approach, Avoidance) x 2 (Model Type: Thin, Chubby) Repeated 
Measure ANOVA revealed a main effect of Model Type: F(1,105) = 44.05, p < .001, 
η² = .3, and a main effect of Movement: F(1,105) = 59.52, p < .001, η² = .36. More 
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importantly, the Movement x Model Type interaction was significant: F(1,105) = 9.52, 
p < .01, η² = .08. Post-hoc comparison (paired sample t-tests) indicated that participants 
showed an approach bias towards thin models, i.e., their approach responses were 
faster than their avoidance responses (approach: M = 929.93, SD = 185.61 vs. avoidance: 
M = 1067.75, SD = 265), t(105) = 6.85, p < .001. However, no significant differences 
were found regarding the approach-avoidance responses towards chubby models: 
t(105) = 1.05, p = .135.
   
 
Figure 1. Mean RTs of Stimulus Response Compatibility (SRC) task
Correlations
For the correlational analysis, we calculated two difference scores, one for approach-
avoidance responses towards thin models (thin avoidance – thin approach), and one for 
approach-avoidance responses towards chubby models (chubby avoidance – chubby 
approach). As such, a positive difference score for thin models means that approach 
responses towards thin models were faster than avoidance responses, whereas a nega-
tive difference score for chubby models means that avoidance responses away from 
chubby models were faster than approach responses. The rational to calculate difference 
scores between approach and avoidance per picture type is that this is the most meaning-
ful variable, not approach- or avoidance-time per se (cf. Nosek & Sriram, 2007). 
Table 1 illustrates the correlation of these difference scores with the questionnaire sub-
scales and BMI. First of all, it shows that a faster approach of thin models is associated 
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with a faster avoidance of chubby models. Besides, a faster approach of thin models is 
marginally significant related to a higher score on thin ideal internalization. However, 
there is no relationship between the difference score for thin models and the other 
subscales (i.e., drive for thinness, body dissatisfaction, restraint eating) or BMI. Regar-
ding the avoidance of chubby models, results show that faster avoidance is associated 
with a higher score on drive for thinness. Moreover, the avoidance of chubby models is 
related to higher scores on restraint eating, thin ideal internalization, body dissatis-
faction and BMI. Finally, we also examined if these correlations differ significantly 
from each other. Results showed that drive for thinness, restraint eating, thin ideal 
internalization and body dissatisfaction correlated significantly higher with the 
avoidance of chubby models than with the approach of thin models (p < .01 for the 
first three comparisons, and p < .05 for body dissatisfaction). However, no significant 
difference was found for BMI (p > .05). 
Table 1. Correlation of difference scores with EDI-II, SATAQ, DEBQ scales & BMI.
Chubby 
models
Drive for 
thinness
Body dis-
satisfaction
Restraint 
eating
Thin ideal 
internalization
BMI
Thin 
models
-.42** .11 .08 .16 .17 .0
Chubby 
models
- -.27** -.23* -.25* -.22* -.24*
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, italics: marginal significance
When repeating the correlational analysis and controlling for BMI the result pattern 
generally remains the same. A faster approach of thin models is associated with a faster 
avoidance of chubby models (r = -.44, p < .001). The drive for thinness subscale is not 
significantly correlated with the RTs of approaching thin models (r = .12, p > .05), 
however, it is related to a faster avoidance of chubby models (r = -.2, p < .05). Besides, 
both difference scores are marginally associated with restraint eating (thin models: 
r = .17, p = .08; chubby models: r = -.18, p = .08). The thin ideal internalization sub-
scale is marginally related to approaching thin models faster (r = .17, p = .08), and 
significantly related to avoiding chubby models faster (r = -.22, p < .04). Finally, both 
difference scores are not associated with body dissatisfaction (thin models: r = .1, p > .05; 
chubby models: r = -.14, p > .05). 
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DISCUSSION
The current study examined the two concepts thinspiration and fear of fat by employing 
a unique version of a stimulus response compatibility (SRC) task. Participants symboli-
cally approached and avoided models that were depicted with either a thin or a chubby 
body image. Based on previous findings supporting the notion that avoidance oriented 
processes are related to eating pathology, we expected an avoidance bias towards 
chubby models to occur. However, results showed that participants had an approach 
bias towards thin models. Correlational analyzes demonstrated that the approach-
avoidance responses were related to important eating-related, cognitive schemata such 
as drive for thinness, restraint eating, thin ideal internalization, body dissatisfaction 
and to the participants’ BMI. 
Unexpectedly, the findings on the SRC task seem to indicate that the concept thinspi-
ration was more manifested in our sample than the concept fear of fat. Results showed 
that the participants’ approach responses towards thin models were faster than their 
avoidance responses, whereas the RTs of their approach-avoidance responses towards 
and away from chubby models were not significantly different. This suggests that a 
thin model represented a positive stimulus, which might have resulted in an automatic 
activation of a valence congruent motivation, i.e., approach. 
Interestingly, we found that the SRC performance was associated with eating-related, 
cognitive schemata assessed via several self-report measures (i.e., the EDI-II, the SATAQ 
and the DEBQ) and the participants’ BMI. A fast avoidance response away from 
chubby models was related to a high preoccupation with weight-related concerns (i.e., 
drive for thinness) and with a high level of internalized, societal sanctioned standards 
of appearance (i.e., thin ideal internalization). Moreover, these RTs were positively 
related to the participants’ level of unhappiness with their body shape (i.e., body 
dissatisfaction), and also to the tendency to eat less (i.e., restraint eating) and to the 
participants’ BMI. The approach responses towards thin models, however, were unre-
lated to any of the questionnaire subscales with the exception of marginal significance 
with the thin ideal internalization scale. Finally, a faster approach of thin models was 
accompanied by a faster avoidance of chubby models. Summarizing these findings, it 
appears that thinspiration and fear of fat are closely correlated, although they do seem 
to represent two distinct concepts (see Levitt, 2003), and that specifically the avoidance 
of chubby models is related to dysfunctional, eating-related cognitions and BMI. 
There are two principal phenomena to be considered from the current study. The 
results of the SRC task demonstrated that the majority of participants exhibited an 
approach bias towards thin models. Thus, thin models were perceived as positive and 
desirable. This supports the notion put forward by Thompson and Stice (2001), who 
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postulate that the desire to approach the extreme thinness is the dominant motivational 
concept when it comes to the engagement in and execution of dysfunctional eating-
related cognitions and behaviors. This is partly corroborated by our correlational data, 
as favoring thin models is marginally associated with a high score on thin ideal inter-
nalization. However, finding that the avoidance of chubby models is correlated with 
dysfunctional, eating-related, cognitive schemata and BMI leads to a more cautious 
interpretation of these former conclusions. In fact, our results also confirm findings of, 
for example, Dalley and Buunk (2009), who argue that dieting is driven by a motivation 
to avoid an unfavorable fat identity rather than by a desire to approach a thin ideal. 
This claim is predominately supported by our finding that avoiding chubby models 
faster corresponds to a higher score on restraint eating. Similarly, conclusions of Ackard 
et al. (2002) seem to be supported as well. Likewise, their sample consisted of young, 
normal weight women and also their results showed that problematic eating behavior 
and negative, eating-related attitudes were associated with avoidance strategies (but 
see also e.g., Bellew, Gilbert, Mills, McEwan, & Gale, 2006; Mussap, 2007).  
Although our results are encouraging, our conclusions should be treated with some 
reservations. There are at least two limitations that should be addressed. First, we did 
not pilot the pictures, implying that we do not know if participants clearly evaluated 
the models as either thin or chubby, respectively. Second, showing images of chubby 
women might not be regarded as an adequate representation of the concept fear of fat, 
so pictures of obese women might have been more valid. Therefore, we cannot rule 
out that these pictures were actually evaluated as neutral, which seems plausible when 
taking into account that the body shape of our female students is more likely to be 
closer to the chubby picture type than the thin picture type. Consequently, not finding 
a difference with respect to the approach-avoidance responses towards chubby models 
could be explained by the fact that this manipulation was not potent enough to arouse 
avoidance. 
The present research provides new and valuable insights into the thinspiration versus 
fear of fat discussion. The application of an indirect measure was successful, as the 
SRC task was sensitive enough to detect differences in the participants’ motivational 
disposition towards the model pictures. Besides, these differences were associated 
with dysfunctional, eating-related cognitive schemata. The fact that this was found 
among a group of young, normal-weight women further strengthens the importance 
of these findings. However, more research should be conducted to validate our results, 
to improve instruments to identify women at risk, and to extend our current knowledge 
of what motivates women to develop and to maintain eating disturbances. Our method 
might provide a very innovative starting point, so research in this field should be pre-
mised on the motivational orientation of ‘approach’ rather than ‘avoidance’.   
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3
Task-irrelevant spider associations affect  
categorization performance
ABSTRACT
In two studies, the Single Target Implicit Association Test (STIAT) was used to investigate 
automatic associations towards spiders. In both experiments, we measured the strength of 
associations between pictures of spiders and either threat-related words or pleasant words. 
Unlike previous studies, we administered a STIAT version in which stimulus contents was 
task-irrelevant: The target spider pictures were categorized according to the label ‘picture’, 
irrespective of what they showed. In Study 1, spider-fearful individuals versus non-fearful 
controls were tested, Study 2 compared spider enthusiasts to non-fearful controls. Results 
revealed that the novel STIAT version was sensitive to group differences in automatic 
associations towards spiders. In Study 1, it successfully distinguished between spider-fearful 
individuals and non-fearful controls. Moreover, STIAT scores predicted automatic fear 
responses best, whereas controlled avoidance behavior was best predicted by the FAS (German 
translation of the Fear of Spiders Questionnaire). The results of Study 2 demonstrated 
that the novel STIAT version was also able to differentiate between spider enthusiasts and 
non-fearful controls. 
This chapter is based on: 
Woud, M. L., Ellwart, T., Langner, O., Rinck, M., & Becker, E. S. (2011). Task-irrelevant 
spider associations affect categorization performance. Journal of Behavior Therapy 
and Experimental Psychiatry, 42, 309 – 316. 
Chapter 3
48
INTRODUCTION
Cognitive models of anxiety disorders (e.g., Barlow, 1988; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 
1985; Eysenck, 1992; Foa & Kozak, 1986) assert that cognitive processes play an 
important role in the maintenance and etiology of anxiety. A particularly important 
and central characteristic of anxiety disorders is a bias in interpreting stimuli as 
harmful (e.g., Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). As a result, harmless stimuli are experienced 
as dangerous and are associated with irrational beliefs. An anxiety disorder that is 
characterized by such strong irrational beliefs affecting behavior is spider anxiety. 
Typically, the patient’s underlying dysfunctional associations are difficult to control 
and occur unintentionally, something often referred to as implicit effects. However, as 
an exact definition of the term implicit is currently under debate (see e.g., De Houwer, 
2006; De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009; Moors & De Houwer, 
2006), we refer to these effects as automatic, stressing the unintentionality and lack of 
control as central operational features. 
For spider phobia and spider anxiety, a variety of indirect, performance-based tasks have 
been applied to study (dysfunctional) automatic spider associations. The first measure 
to be used to assess automatic spider associations was the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Teachmann, Gregg, and Woody 
(2001), for example, demonstrated that individuals with spider or snake phobia reacted 
faster to pictorial stimuli of their feared animal in combination with negative words 
than with positive words, respectively. Similar findings with the IAT were obtained by 
Ellwart, Rinck, and Becker (2006), who measured associations towards spiders among 
spider-fearful individuals, non-fearful participants, and spider enthusiasts. Notewor-
thy, besides distinguishing between the three groups, automatic spider associations 
measured with the IAT predicted avoidance behavior better than self-reports (for 
more studies applying the IAT, see de Jong, van den Hout, Rietbroek, & Huijding, 2003; 
Huijding & de Jong, 2007; Teachman & Woody, 2003). Although the application of 
the IAT offered new and valuable insights regarding the role of automatic spider 
associations in spider phobia and anxiety, there are two limitations regarding these 
results. First, due to its double-relative nature the IAT assesses the relative strength of 
associations between two targets and two attributes (De Houwer, 2003a). Hence, one 
cannot conclude which target – attribute combination is responsible for the observed 
IAT effects. Second, the IAT requires the presentation of two immanently meaningful 
opposite target categories, something that is hard to define for spiders. 
As an alternative indirect measure circumventing some of the problems of the IAT, 
the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST; De Houwer, 2003b) has been applied to 
study automatic spider associations. Like the IAT, the EAST measures the strength 
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of associations between particular target stimuli and specific, valenced attributes. 
However, due to its task properties, the EAST allows for less relative conclusions 
about the associations between target stimuli and a valence dimension. Assessing 
automatic spider associations, Huijding and de Jong (2005) demonstrated that the 
EAST successfully distinguished between groups of low and high spider-fearful 
individuals (see also Ellwart, Rinck, & Becker, 2005). Moreover, the EAST was the 
best predictor for automatic fear related behavior, outperforming self-reports (see 
also Huijding & de Jong, 2006). Despite being promising, these findings should also 
be treated with caution. In a series of studies, De Houwer and De Bruycker (2007) 
found that measurements taken with the EAST tended to be unreliable. Further, 
Reinecke, Becker, and Rinck (2010) found rather low validity scores for the EAST.
Here, we report two studies that further explore the role of automatic1 spider associa-
tions, by applying an alternative indirect measure not used so far, the Single Target 
Implicit Association Test (STIAT; Wigboldus, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2004).2 
In a typical STIAT, two classes of stimuli are presented: Attribute stimuli and target 
stimuli (e.g., pictures of spiders). Mostly, attribute stimuli have to be classified 
according to their emotional valence, e.g., fear-related versus pleasant. In addition, 
participants have to respond to all target stimuli with one of the buttons already used 
for the attribute stimulus classification. This creates two conditions: One condition in 
which threatening target stimuli require the same response as fear-related attributes 
(compatible condition), and one condition in which threatening target stimuli require 
the same response key as pleasant attributes (incompatible condition).3 Using this 
task, participants frequently exhibit faster responses to targets for compatible trials 
than for incompatible ones, something assumed to indicate the individual degree of 
association between the target and the two attributes. By using a single target category, 
the STIAT does not have the interpretation problems of the double-relative IAT logic. 
Similar to the EAST, the STIAT is assumed to express the relative associative strength 
of the used target with the two attribute categories (but see Rothermund & Wentura, 
2004, for an alternative interpretation). However, compared to the EAST, the STIAT 
seems to exhibit better psychometric properties (Bluemke & Friese, 2008). The task 
used in this study was a variation of the STIAT. In common STIAT versions, the 
1 The authors are aware of the fact that automatic processes embrace a variety of properties. Thus, when arguing that a process is 
automatic, one should specify the particular properties the automatic process is supposed to posses (e.g., effortless, goal-independent, 
involuntary). As it is not clear yet which properties are central to the concept of automaticity (Moors & De Houwer, 2006), and because this 
study did not aim to investigate the concept of ‘automaticity’ itself, we decided to keep the more general phrase of automatic associations.
2 This task is conceptually identical to the Single Category Implicit Association Test (SCIAT; Karpinski & Steinmann, 2006).
3 Please note that for convenience, we use the terms compatible (spider-fear) and incompatible (spider-pleasant) for all participant 
groups, although strictly speaking, they only apply to spider-fearful participants, and might even be reversed for spider enthusiasts.
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contents of the target category is made task-relevant: In this case, participants would 
be required to categorize the targets (e.g., pictures of spiders) according to the label 
spider. This study, however, applied an alternative approach. We made picture contents 
task-irrelevant by requiring participants to categorize the targets according to the label 
‘picture’.
Two aims were central in the first study. First, we sought to test if, analog to the IAT 
and the EAST, this novel STIAT version can successfully distinguish between spider-
fearful individuals and non-fearful controls.4 We expected spider-fearful individuals 
to show larger differences between the compatible and incompatible STIAT blocks 
than non-fearful controls. Our second aim was to assess the ability of our STIAT 
version to predict (specific) fear-related behavior, thereby adding additional evidence 
to earlier promising results showing that indirect measures have good predictive 
power for automatic, spider fear related behaviors (e.g., Ellwart et al., 2006; Huijding 
et al., 2006). Results of studies in other areas of psychology support this aim. Spalding 
and Hardin (1999), for example, demonstrated that self-related anxiety during an 
interview was best predicted by a direct measure of self-esteem, whereas non-verbal, 
experimenter-rated anxious behavior was best predicted by an indirect measure of 
self-esteem (see also Asendorpf, Banse, & Mücke, 2002; Egloff & Schmuckle, 2002). 
In the second study, we compared spider enthusiasts to non-fearful controls to further 
corroborate the application of our STIAT version. Spider enthusiasts keep spiders as 
domestic animals, making it plausible to assume that they have positive rather than 
neutral or negative associations towards spiders. We expected our STIAT version to 
be sensitive to these group differences, and to reflect the differential automatic asso-
ciations towards spiders. 
Additionally, both studies together provide an interesting perspective on two concur-
ring frameworks, making rather different predictions about automatic associations 
towards spiders. In the first, Karpinski and Hilton (2001; see also Fazio & Olson, 
2003; Olson & Fazio, 2004) argue that automatic associations (as measured with the 
IAT) reflect cultural stereotypes or extrapersonal associations rather than individual 
ones. The second framework is the preparedness principle often used to explain the 
onset of anxiety disorders from an evolutionary point of view (Cook & Mineka, 1990; 
Mineka & Öhman, 2002; Öhman & Mineka, 2003; Seligman, 1971). According to this 
principle, all humans have innate, negative associations towards spiders or do learn 
such associations quickly. A consequence of both theories is that spider-fearful indi-
viduals, spider enthusiasts, and non-fearful controls should exhibit the same negative 
4 The authors are aware of the fact that our task comprises elements of a STIAT as well as elements of an EAST. Our decision to de-
scribe it as a variation of a STIAT is based on the fact that it makes use of a blocked presentation, which is a typical feature of a STIAT.
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associations towards spiders. However, if our predictions are correct, it would provide 
empirical support for the position of Greenwald and colleagues who describe the IAT 
as a measure that is sensitive to automatic expressions of individual associations (e.g., 
Greenwald et al., 1998, 2002). 
Study 1
METHOD
Participants
About 800 undergraduate students of Dresden University of Technology completed a 
short screening questionnaire (Spider Anxiety Screening, SAS; Rinck et al., 2002) to 
assess fear and avoidance of spiders as well as possible distress. Students with extreme 
scores on the SAS were invited for a diagnostic interview. To diagnose spider fear and 
possible other disorders, a trained clinical psychologist interviewed participants us-
ing the ‘Mini-DIPS’ (Margraf, 1994), a German adaptation of the ‘American Anxiety 
Disorders Interview Schedule-Revised’ (ADIS-R; DiNardo, Brown, & Barlow, 1994). 
The ‘Mini-DIPS’ allows for the diagnosis of anxiety disorders, affective disorders, 
substance-related disorders, somatoform disorders, and eating disorders, and a 
screening of psychotic disorders. Finally, 58 students were selected and participated 
in this study. This sample included 29 individuals with no fear of spiders (non-fearful 
controls) and 29 spider-fearful individuals. The control group consisted of 26 women 
and 3 men with a mean age of 21.8 years (SD = 2.0). The distribution of women and men 
was the same for the spider-fearful individuals, and their mean age was 21.7 years (SD 
= 1.9). The degree of spider fear was assessed with the Spider Fear Questionnaire (FAS; 
Rinck et al., 2002). This is the German version of the ‘Fear of Spiders Questionnaire’ 
(FSQ; Szymanski & O’Donohue, 1995). In addition, all spider-fearful participants ful-
filled criterion A to D of the DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) 
for specific phobia, and some of them also fulfilled criterion E (i.e., spider phobia 
interferes significantly with person’s daily routine, occupational functioning, or social 
life, or the person is markedly distressed about having the phobia). All participants 
received course credit or were paid a modest fee for their participation in the study.
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Single Target Implicit Association Test (STIAT; Wigboldus et al., 2004)
Fear-related words and pleasant words served as attributes during the STIAT. We 
used fear-related words rather than general negative words as we were particularly 
interested in fear-specific associations. The attribute words consisted of 10 clearly 
anxiety-related words (e.g., panic, shock, fear) and 10 pleasant words (e.g., happy, 
exaltation, pleasure). These 20 German words had been shown to be unambiguously 
classifiable (‘pleasant’ vs. ‘fear-related’) in pre-tests and previous experiments (Ellwart 
et al., 2006). In German, the two word types did not differ with regard to word frequen-
cy or word length. Ten pictures of spiders were used as target stimuli, also taken from 
Ellwart et al (2006). They were standardized to a16 bit color/5x4 cm format.
As proposed by Wigboldus et al. (2004), the STIAT consisted of a complete sequence 
of five blocks: (a) attribute discrimination, (b) target categorization practice, (c) first 
combined block, (d) reversed target categorization practice, and (e) reversed combined 
block. Each block started with instructions describing the discrimination category 
and the assignment of the response keys (left vs. right). The procedure started with (a) 
the attribute discrimination block, in which participants had to categorize single words 
according to their emotional valence (fear-related vs. pleasant words). Participants 
were asked to press one key (the letter ‘Y’, located in the lower left corner of the German 
keyboard) in response to fear-related words, and the other key (the ‘-’ key located 
in the lower right corner) in response to pleasant words. The stimuli in this block 
consisted of the 10 fear-related attribute words and the 10 pleasant attribute words 
which were presented one after another in a fixed random order. In the second block 
(b), pictures were introduced to practice responses to targets. Half of the participants 
were told to press the left key (‘Y’ key) in response to all pictures, and the other half was 
told to press the right key (‘-’ key) in response to all pictures. In this practice block, 5 
pictures consisting of unidentifiable colored fragments of spiders were presented. It is 
important to note that participants were not told to categorize targets according to 
their contents (spider), but simply to decide whether something was presented. 
The following first combined block (c) was a combination of target and attribute dis-
crimination in which target pictures and attribute words appeared in a mixed random 
order. Figure 1 shows a sample trial from this block: A spider picture is shown in the 
center of the screen, and the correct response is to press the left key. The labels at the 
top of the screen indicate that the same response is correct for fear-related words, 
whereas pleasant words require pressing the right key. In this block, 160 items were 
presented: Each of the 10 pictures appeared 4 times, the 10 words which required the 
same response were also shown 4 times each, and the 10 words which required the 
opposite response were presented 8 times each. Because pictures are assigned to only 
Task-irrelevant spider associations affect categorization performance
53
one key during combined blocks, there are fewer responses on the opposite key. To 
balance this mismatch of responses by the left and right key, attributes assigned to 
the opposite side of the pictures were presented twice as often, resulting in an equal 
number of left and right responses in each of the combined blocks.
During the following reversed target discrimination block (d), participants were intro-
duced to a reversal of the response assignment for pictures. Participants who had 
pressed the fear-related key in response to spiders now had to respond with the pleasant 
key, the other half of the participants vice versa. This block consisted of 10 fragment 
pictures. The final reversed combined block (e) combined the unchanged attribute 
discrimination with the reversed target discrimination. This is illustrated in the second 
part of Figure 1: Again, a spider picture was shown in the center of the screen, and 
now the correct response was to press the right key. The same was true for pleasant 
words, whereas fear-related words required pressing the left key. Analogous to the 
first combined block (c), 160 items were presented. 
Combined Block fear-related    pleasant
(compatible)  picture   
   
   • left key   right key •
Combined Block fear-related   pleasant 
(incompatible)      picture
   • left key   right key •
 
Figure 1. Depiction of sample trials in the combined blocks (compatible and incompatible) of 
the STIAT. 
To control for the sequence of the combined blocks, half of the participants started 
with the compatible block followed by the incompatible block, and the other half vice 
versa. Each of the presented stimuli remained on the computer screen until participants 
pressed one of the two possible response keys. All stimuli (black lettered words and 
colored pictures) were presented vertically and horizontally centered against a light 
grey background. During each trial, reminder labels (appropriate category names 
positioned in the top left and top right corner of the screen) remained visible. Within 
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each block, stimuli appeared in the same fixed random order for each participant. 
Each stimulus was preceded by a fixation cross presented for 500 ms and was shown 
until a response was made. After incorrect responses, a black ‘X’ appeared in the 
center of the screen for one second. The experiment was programmed in RSVP 
(Williams & Tarr, no date) and implemented on a Macintosh Performa 5100. In total, 
it took participants about 15 minutes to complete the STIAT.
Behavioral Assessment Test (BAT)
After the STIAT, all participants were asked to take a Behavioral Assessment Test 
(BAT) in which they had to approach a living spider. The test consisted of 4 phases, and 
the average heart rate during each phase was measured using a mobile pulse meter, 
operated by a trained experimenter. During the first baseline phase, heart rate was 
assessed while participants where standing in the laboratory completing an unrelated 
questionnaire for about 3 minutes. During the following anticipation phase, they 
where informed that they had to go into the neighboring room where a spider was 
located. During this phase, participants were standing as well. Before actually approach-
ing the spider, they where asked to look at a picture of the spider, anticipating the up-
coming confrontation. During the following confrontation phase, they were asked to 
actually open the door of the neighboring room and approach the spider as quickly 
and closely as possible. The spider was a 7 cm long tarantula positioned about 5 meters 
away from the door in a closed terrarium. When participants indicated that they wanted 
to stop the approach, the remaining distance between the participant and the spider 
as well as the duration of the approach attempt was registered. Because participants 
could avoid the spider either by approaching it slowly (affecting time) or by stopping 
far away from the spider (affecting distance), approach speed was calculated, taking 
both time and distance into account. To this end, we divided the distance covered 
during approach by time. Then, the final cool down phase followed. Participants were 
asked to leave the room and were invited to take a rest in the laboratory for 3 minutes.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually. The study started with the diagnostic interview 
(Mini-DIPS) to select participants, followed by the FAS. Afterwards, all participants 
completed the STIAT. The session closed with the BAT, after which participants were 
thanked and debriefed. 
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RESULTS
Fear Questionnaire
As expected, spider-fearful individuals and non-fearful controls differed greatly in 
their FAS scores (spider-fearful individuals: M = 71.9, SD = 11.7; controls: M = 2.7, 
SD = 3.5; t(56) = 30.61, p < .001). Please note that this difference is inflated because 
participants were selected according to their SAS questionnaire scores, which have 
been found to correlate as highly as r = .90 with FAS scores (Rinck et al., 2002).
Single Target Implicit Association Test (STIAT)
Only data of the two combined blocks were used and only RTs of correct responses 
were analyzed. Reaction times below 300 ms or above 3000 ms were recoded to 300 ms 
and 3000 ms, respectively. Regarding the incompatible block, 2.2% of the data was 
below 300 ms and one RT was above 3000 ms. Regarding the compatible block, 4% of 
the data was below 300 ms, and none above 3000 ms. We used log-transformed latencies 
in our analyzes. From them, we calculated mean RTs for spider pictures in the com-
patible block (spiders requiring the same response as fear-related words) and in the 
incompatible block (spiders requiring the same response as pleasant words) for each 
participant. Non-transformed means and their standard deviations are presented in 
the left part of Table 1.
The STIAT RTs were analyzed with a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA including the between- 
subjects factors Group (spider-fearful vs. non-fearful) and Block Sequence (compatible 
block before incompatible vs. vice versa), and the within-subjects factor STIAT Block 
(compatible vs. incompatible block). There was a significant main effect of Block, 
showing that the incompatible block yielded longer RTs than the compatible one, 
F(1,54) = 9.67, p < .01, η2 = .15. Moreover, the interaction of Block and Group, F(1,54) 
= 8.65, p < .01, η2 = .14, indicated that the difference between blocks was larger for 
spider-fearful individuals than non-fearful controls (80 ms vs. 8 ms). Neither the main 
effect of Block sequence nor any interaction with this factor approached significance, 
all F(1,54) < 1, indicating that the order of the combined blocks had no influence on 
performance. 
A STIAT score was calculated for each participant as the average latency for spider 
pictures in the compatible block minus the average latency in the incompatible block. 
Thus, negative STIAT scores signal negative associations towards spiders and positive 
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scores signal positive associations, respectively. These STIAT scores are reported in 
the lower left part of Table 1. STIAT scores significantly differed between spider-fearful 
individuals and non-fearful controls, as shown by the interaction mentioned above. 
Moreover, the spider-fearful individuals’ STIAT score of -80 ms differed significantly 
from zero (t(28) = 3.36, p < .01), while the controls’ score of -8 ms did not (t(28) = .57, 
p = .57).
Table 1. Mean RTs (in ms) for compatible and incompatible blocks and STIAT effects.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Spider 
fearfuls
Non-fearful
controls
Spider 
enthusiasts
Non-fearful
controls
Block and effect M SD M SD d M SD M SD d
Compatible 502 56 585 79 581 108 595 85
Incompatible 582 121 593 100 566 99 629 115
STIAT effect -80 128 -8 70 .80 15 62 -34 59 .88
BAT: Approach speed and heart rate
As expected, the two groups’ speed when approaching the spider differed significantly. 
Compared to non-fearful controls, spider-fearful individuals avoided the spider by 
approaching it more slowly (spider-fearful individuals: M = 46.8 cm/sec, SD = 21.4; 
non-fearful controls: M = 82.5 cm/sec, SD = 14.4; t(56) = 7.46, p < .001). Because 
heart rate measures are prone to measurement errors when taken during walking, we 
only included heart rate data measured during baseline and anticipation in the analy-
sis. For practical reasons, however, participants kept wearing the mobile pulse meter 
throughout the BAT. We computed a difference score between heart rate during antici-
pation and baseline (anticipation minus baseline), reflecting the heart rate change 
caused by anticipating the confrontation. Due to technical problems, the data of 3 
participants were missing, so the following analyses are based on 54 participants. 
Heart rates of spider-fearful individuals increased by an average of 4.6 beats (SD = 5.0), 
and those of non-fearful controls increased by 5.3 beats (SD = 4.2). Both increases 
were significantly larger than zero (spider-fearful individuals: t(27) = 4.4, p < .001; 
non-fearful controls: t(26) = 6.49, p < .001), but the two groups did not differ from 
each other in the size of the increase (t(53) < 1).
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Relations between FAS, STIAT and behavior
Table 2 displays relations between FAS, STIAT scores, and behavioral fear measures. 
We found significant correlations of the STIAT scores with self report (FAS), with 
controlled behavior (approach speed), and with automatic behavior (heart rate increase 
from baseline to anticipation). The directions of the correlations are fully in line with 
our predictions: Having more negative automatic spider associations in the STIAT 
was associated with more self-reported fear of spiders on the FAS, with slower approach 
of spiders, and with a larger heart rate increase during anticipation. Interestingly, the 
latter did not correlate with self-reported anxiety.
Table 2. Correlations between STIAT scores, FAS, BAT speed and heart rate change in 
Experiment 1.
FAS BAT speed Heart rate 
change
STIAT Score -.41** .45***  -.30*
FAS - -.72*** -.10
BAT speed -  .00
Note: All correlations were calculated with log-transformed STIAT scores.
 *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
To test whether STIAT scores can explain additional variance in automatic behavior 
(heart rate change) and controlled behavior (BAT approach speed) beyond that 
explained by questionnaires, we calculated separate hierarchical regressions for the 
two behavioral measures (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006). In both analyses, we first 
included only FAS as predictor, and added STIAT scores and FAS x STIAT interaction 
scores in the second step. All predictors were centered before inclusion.
For approach speed, the model containing only the FAS explained 52% of the variance, 
F(1,56) = 61.43, p < .01. Adding the STIAT and FAS x STIAT interaction significantly 
improved the explained variance to 58%, p < .05, with regression coefficients of -0.49 
(p < .01), 6.0 (p = .75), and 0.90 (p = .05) for the FAS, STIAT, and interaction term, 
respectively, F(3,54) = 24.94, p < .01. Importantly, the significant interaction means 
that the predictive value of the STIAT in the model depended on the actual FAS score. 
Consequently, we tested the simple slopes of the STIAT for different FAS levels (Aiken 
& West, 1991), namely FAS scores one SD above (73.4) and one SD below (1.6) the 
average. This showed that the STIAT predicted approach speed beyond FAS when 
FAS scores were high, b = 6.33, p < .02, but not when FAS scores were low, b = -4.34, 
p = .41. Participants approached the spider particularly slowly when they showed 
Chapter 3
58
both high self-reported fear of spiders on the FAS and stronger negative associations 
with spiders in the STIAT.
For heart rate change, the FAS-only model explained merely 1% of variance and was 
non-significant, F(1,53) = .55, p = .46. Adding the STIAT and the interaction term led 
to a significant increase in explained variance by 15%, p < .01, and an overall significant 
model, F(3,51) = 3.03, p < .04. However, different from controlled behavior, heart rate 
change as an indicator of automatic behavior was significantly predicted only by the 
STIAT, b = -11.91, p < .03. There was no significant FAS x STIAT interaction, b = 0.02, 
p = .86, and only a marginal effect of the FAS, b = -0.03, p < .07. This is most noteworthy 
because variance in FAS scores, but not in STIAT scores, was artificially inflated by 
pre-selecting participants.
DISCUSSION
The results of Study 1 show that the novel STIAT version is able to assess automatic 
fear associations towards spiders. It successfully detected group differences between 
spider-fearful individuals and non-fearful controls, as only spider-fearful individuals 
showed longer RTs on the incompatible block than the compatible one. As expected, 
spider-fearful individuals scored significantly higher than non-fearful controls on the 
FAS, and STIAT and FAS scores correlated significantly. Investigating their role as 
possible predictors of relevant behavior, i.e., controlled avoidance behavior (speed in 
approaching a spider) and automatic, physiological arousal (heart rate increase during 
anticipation of the approach test), the results demonstrated that both measures have 
differential predictive power: STIAT scores were the better predictor of anticipatory 
heart rate increase, whereas FAS scores were the best predictor of approach speed. 
The finding that our novel STIAT version has predictive power for automatic fear 
responses further corroborates its application. Moreover, this result is in line with 
results reported by Huijding and de Jong (2005, 2006), who found that another indirect 
measure, the EAST, best predicted automatic fear responses. Thus, our results support 
the assertion that indirect measures maybe particularly useful for predicting automatic 
aspects of behavior (see also Asendorpf et al., 2002), as these tasks leave little room 
for deliberative reflection about a response and directly tap into involuntary aspects 
of behavior. 
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Study 2
Study 2 was conducted to provide further evidence for the usefulness of our novel 
STIAT version. Second, we aimed to investigate if spiders are generally evaluated in a 
negative way. Therefore, we compared spider enthusiasts to non-fearful controls, 
assuming that they should differ in their STIAT performance. We expected that spider 
enthusiasts will show faster RTs than non-fearful controls on incompatible blocks (when 
spiders require the same response as pleasant words), reflecting positive automatic as-
sociations towards spiders (see Footnote 2). The reason for this hypothesis is the fact that 
spider enthusiasts keep spiders as domestic animals, implying that they might have 
positive associations towards spiders rather than negative ones. Empirical evidence for 
this hypothesis comes from findings by Ellwart et al. (2006), who demonstrated differen-
ces in a standard IAT between spider enthusiasts and non-fearful controls.
METHOD
Participants
Spider enthusiasts and non-fearful controls participated in this study. Both groups 
were recruited through newspaper and internet advertisements. All of them were 
screened by means of the SAS to assess fear and avoidance of spiders as well as possible 
distress. Those who scored < 4 were invited to take part in the study. For spider en-
thusiasts, an extra criterion was applied: They should keep at least one spider as a 
domestic animal. As an additional measure of fear of spiders, the FAS was administered 
to all participants. They were also screened for mental disorders (e.g., depression or 
anxiety disorders) and for alcohol or drug consumption during the last 24 hours. 
After this screening procedure, a final sample of 14 spider enthusiastic individuals 
and 14 non-fearful controls remained. The spider enthusiastic sample included 4 
women and 10 men with a mean age of 31.0 (SD = 11.8), the control sample included 
5 women and 9 men with a mean age of 30.9 (SD = 10.6).
Materials and Procedure
The procedure of Study 2 differed slightly from Study 1, because we did not include 
any behavioral measures. However, with regard to the materials and procedure of the 
remaining tasks, Study 2 mirrored Study 1.
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RESULTS
Fear Questionnaire
As expected, spider enthusiasts and non-fearful controls did not differ from each 
other on the FAS (spider enthusiasts: M = 5.4, SD = 4.3; non-fearful controls: M = 3.9, 
SD = 4.3; t(26) = .92, p = .37).
Single Target Implicit Association Test (STIAT)
Response latencies, error rates and STIAT effects were computed and analyzed as 
before. The means and standard deviations of these RTs are presented in the right part 
of Table 1.
A 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was used to analyze the STIAT RTs, including the between-subjects 
factors Group (spider enthusiast vs. non-fearful) and Block Sequence (compatible 
block before incompatible vs. vice versa), and the within-subjects factor STIAT Block 
(compatible vs. incompatible block). Results revealed a significant interaction of Block 
and Group, F(1,24) = 4.62, p < .05, η2 = .16, implying that the difference between 
blocks was more positive for spider enthusiasts than for non-fearful controls. There 
was no effect of Block Sequence, F(1,24) < 1. The spider enthusiast’s STIAT score was 
slightly positive (15 ms), but did not differ significantly from zero, t(13) = .92, p = .37. 
The non-fearfuls’ STIAT score was significantly negative (-34 ms), t(13) = 2.2, p = .05. 
These STIAT scores are reported in the lower right part of Table 1.  
DISCUSSION
The results of Study 2 support the application of this novel STIAT version to assess 
group differences in automatic associations towards spiders. We found significant 
differences between spider enthusiasts and non-fearful controls, implying that the 
two groups differed in their performance between the two STIAT blocks. These 
results suggest that this STIAT was sensitive to individual rather than extrapersonal 
associations. When examining the two groups more closely, we found that the STIAT 
scores of non-fearful controls differed significantly from zero, indicating negative 
automatic association towards spiders. STIAT scores of spider enthusiasts were slightly 
positive, but did not differ significantly from zero. An adequate explanation for this 
finding might be a lack of statistical power, as both samples contained only 14 participants 
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each. This seems plausible, as we did find a significant interaction between group and 
block. Regarding the direct measure of fear of spiders, the two groups did not differ on 
their FAS scores. As we compared spider enthusiasts to non-fearful controls, this is a 
finding we expected. 
General diScuSSion
The present study was designed to advance our understanding of automatic spider 
associations. It involved testing spider-fearful individuals, non-fearful controls, and 
spider enthusiasts. In order to investigate automatic, spider-related associations, we 
used a Single Target Implicit Association Test (STIAT; Wigboldus et al., 2004). Unlike 
previous STIATs, however, we made picture contents task-irrelevant instead of letting 
participants react to the dimension of interest (i.e., spider). Two aims were central in 
the current study: First, we wanted to test if this novel STIAT version would be sensitive 
to differences in individual, automatic spider-related associations. Second, we wanted 
to investigate if the novel STIAT version had specific power in predicting controlled 
and automatic aspects of fear-related behavior. 
With regard to the first research aim, the results of Study 1 and 2 provide empirical 
support for the useful application of the current STIAT version, as it successfully 
detected differences in spider associations between spider-fearful individuals and 
non-fearful controls (Study 1) and between spider enthusiasts and non-fearful controls 
(Study 2), respectively. Comparing these findings with previous studies that used 
target-attribute categorization tasks to assess automatic associations towards spiders 
(e.g., the IAT), our findings mirror previous results (Ellwart et al., 2006; Huijding & 
de Jong, 2007; Teachman et al., 2001; Teachman & Woody, 2003). However, the inter-
pretation of our findings is more straightforward. First, the STIAT measures the 
strengths of (valenced) associations with a single target category, implying that less 
relative conclusions can be drawn than from an IAT. This advantage is inherent to an 
EAST as well, however, the STIAT seems to have better psychometric properties than 
the EAST (Bluemke & Friese, 2008). Thus, although the relativity problem remains 
when making use of a STIAT due to the fact that two attribute dimensions are used, 
the extent to which spiders are associated with fearful versus pleasant words can be 
measured, independently of the associations of another target category. Theoretically, 
this comes quite close to the procedure underlying the Brief Implicit Association Test 
(Brief IAT) that has been introduced recently by Sriram and Greenwald (2009). Like the 
IAT, the Brief IAT comprises two blocks with four categories and the corresponding 
stimulus-response mappings. However, the Brief IAT has substantially fewer trials. 
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Moreover, participants are instructed to focus on only two of the category-response 
mappings instead of four. Thus, it tries to manage the participants’ strategy by manipu-
lating their “associative focus that allows the subjects’ performance to be determined 
primarily by a single association” (Sriram & Greenwald, p. 293). As such, the Brief IAT 
resembles the STIAT at a theoretical level (i.e., measuring single associations) and 
might also be an interesting paradigm in this context. A second advantage of applying 
a STIAT when aiming to measure automatic spider associations is the fact that it is 
independent of whether the particular target category has a natural opposite or not.   
The second research aim was to investigate if the STIAT version used here has specific 
predictive value regarding automatic, fear-related behavior. In a recent review, Friese, 
Hofmann, and Schmitt (2009) concluded that indirect measures are particularly suc-
cessful when it comes to the prediction of behavior that is associated with automatic 
processes (for similar conclusions, see Asendorpf et al., 2002; Egloff & Schmuckle, 
2002; Gschwender, Hofmann, & Schmitt, 2008; Olson & Fazio, 2003). This notion is 
supported by our findings. We found the STIAT to be a better predictor of heart rate 
increase during the BAT than the used self-report measure (i.e., the FAS), providing 
additional evidence that indirect measures may be especially useful in predicting 
(fear-related) behavior. These findings are also in line with earlier results by Huijding 
and de Jong (2005, 2006) and Ellwart et al. (2006), who reported that indirect measures 
predicted automatic, fear-related behavior best. Hence, this strengthens the view that 
what is measured by automatic association measures like the STIAT in fact corresponds 
to those initial associations that are supposed to underlie automatic fear reactions. 
Our results also provide further insight regarding the question what the associations 
measured by indirect tasks do reflect. Here, we observed reliable group differences 
between spider fearful individuals, non-fearful individuals, and spider enthusiasts. 
This is neither compatible with an interpretation of automatic association as cultural 
stereotypes (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001), nor with the preparedness principle (Cook & 
Mineka, 1990; Mineka & Öhmann, 2002; Öhman & Mineka, 2003; Seligman, 1971), 
according to which every human being has automatic, negative associations towards 
spiders. Hence, our results further support Greenwald and colleagues’ assumption 
that (ST)IAT effects reflect automatic expressions of individual associations.
To summarize, our novel STIAT version revealed an interesting set of results which 
are in line with earlier findings, but also lead to new empirical questions. To illustrate, 
one question could be which specific (ST)IAT element activates the spider anxiety 
schemata. The core idea of such categorization tasks is that pairings of targets and 
attributes that are strongly associated are categorized faster because they refer to 
concepts that are strongly accessible within the same schema. Hence, spider-fearful 
individuals are faster during compatible blocks (e.g., spider pictures combined with 
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fear-related words) than during incompatible ones (e.g., spider pictures combined 
with pleasant words). However, apparently this is not unconditional: While Teachman 
and Woody (2003) found differences between high and low spider-fearful individuals in 
a picture-word IAT, the word IAT of de Jong et al. (2003) yielded no group differences. 
A possible explanation for these contradictive findings is that pictures may be more 
powerful than words (see also Ellwart et al., 2005). This seems even more plausible in 
light of our results. They revealed the expected RT patterns in performance, even 
though the task instructions made it unnecessary to activate the fear schema. Taken 
together, it seems that not only the stimulus material itself is important, but also its 
combination with the task instructions.
The outcome of our second research question (i.e., the predictive value of the STIAT) 
highlights another topic that needs further research. Our results and those of others 
clearly demonstrate that indirect measures are very useful when it comes to the 
prediction of specific (fear-related) behavior. This is particularly relevant in a clinical 
context. For instance, indirect measures may be helpful when trying to predict treatment 
success and its maintenance after treatment. Moreover, indirect measures may offer 
insights into the mechanisms of change during treatment. As of yet, few studies have 
been conducted to address this topic, and there is a continued need to investigate this 
issue more thoroughly (for a recent overview, see Roefs et al., 2011).
Although the current study provides promising findings, at least two limitations should 
be addressed. First, we did not include a neutral baseline condition (e.g., showing 
neutral pictures) or a comparison condition (e.g., showing normative positive and 
negative pictures) in the STIAT. Therefore, the variance in individual scores might 
not only represent differences in reactions to pictures of spiders but also differences of 
general positive-negative response asynchronies. Possibly, spider-fearful participants 
react more quickly to negative stimuli in general. To control for such effects and in 
order to improve interpretability, future studies should include these two additional 
conditions, and should also include other spider-specific associations such as disgust. 
Second, it cannot be ruled out that participants recoded our instructions in the STIAT. 
Instead of categorizing the targets as pictures they might have categorized them 
as spiders. In the current task version, this was neither necessary nor helpful, but 
certainly possible. As a consequence, the target contents would not have been task-
irrelevant anymore, implying that the current task actually generated less automatic 
effects. To control for this, future research should use different types of pictures. A 
follow-up study that would also include pictures comprising a strong positive associ-
ation would make recoding of the pictures impossible.
Despite these limitations, we believe that the present results clearly extend our current 
knowledge of the role of automatic processes in spider phobia. First, the current 
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STIAT version was capable of detecting specific group differences. According to its 
methodological and psychometric properties, it seems to be a better alternative to 
earlier tests like the IAT or EAST, respectively. Second, the STIAT was predictive 
of automatic, fear-related behavior, further emphasizing the predictive validity of 
indirect measures. Hence, we hope that our findings may be valuable and inspiring 
for further research.
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4
‘Getting into the spirit’: Alcohol-related  
interpretation bias in heavy drinking students
ABSTRACT
Alcohol misuse is characterized by patterns of selective information processing. The present 
study investigated whether heavy-, compared to light-drinking students, show evidence 
of an alcohol-related interpretation bias to ambiguous, alcohol-related cues. Towards 
this aim, participants were asked to create continuations for ambiguous, open-ended 
scenarios that provided either an alcohol-related or neutral context. Results showed that 
heavy-drinking students generated more alcohol continuations for ambiguous alcohol-
related scenarios than light-drinking students. This result was independent of the coding 
method employed, with an interpretation bias found when continuations were coded by 
either participants themselves or by two independent raters. 
This chapter is based on:
Woud, M. L., Fitzgerald, D. A., Wiers, R. W., Rinck, M., & Becker, E. S. (2012). ‘Get-
ting into the spirit’: Alcohol-related interpretation bias in heavy drinking students. 
Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 26, 627–632.
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INTRODUCTION
Research on implicit, cognitive processes related to alcohol misuse and abuse has 
repeatedly demonstrated patterns of selective information processing (e.g., Wiers et 
al., 2007). These processes can be divided roughly into three categories: attentional 
processes, automatically activated approach tendencies, and alcohol-related implicit 
memory associations (Stacy & Wiers, 2010). Implicit memory associations are typically 
assessed by means of two sorts of tasks: reaction time paradigms and open-ended 
memory association tasks. The Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, 
& Schwartz, 1998) is a prominent example of a reaction time task (for an overview, 
see Houben, Nosek, & Wiers, 2010). Various measures have been developed to probe 
open-ended memory associations (e.g., Ames, Franken, & Coronges, 2006). The 
present study aims to advance our understanding of cognitive processes similar to 
those captured by memory association tasks, thus we describe them in more detail. 
According to Stacy and colleagues (e.g., Ames & Stacy, 1998; Stacy, Ames, & Grenard, 
2006; Stacy, 1995, 1997), open-ended memory association tasks can be used as a 
measure of implicit memory associations without directly mentioning the targeted 
behavior (Stacy et al., 2006).1 Participants are asked to give their first, mostly time-
limited, association to a variety of ambiguous cues that are either alcohol-related 
or unrelated. Single ambiguous word cues (e.g., ‘draft’) as well as simple ambiguous 
situations (e.g. ‘Friday night’) or ambiguous phrases containing affective components 
(e.g., ‘feeling good’) have been used. Cues have also been combined (e.g., ‘Friday 
night-feeling good’). Generally, the number of alcohol-related memory associations 
generated in response to ambiguous cues is positively related to actual alcohol use. 
Most noteworthy, this relationship is independent of potential correlates with these 
variables (e.g., friends’ alcohol use). Additionally, it has been shown that word asso-
ciation tasks are better predictors of future alcohol use after controlling for previous 
use, relative to other more explicit measures (e.g., Stacy, 1997, Kelly, Masterman, & 
Marlatt, 2005; Thush et al., 2007). Regarding the underlying mechanism of these tasks, 
it is thought that ambiguous alcohol-related cues implicitly activate alcohol-related 
memory schemata that are established and strengthened during repeated alcohol use. 
Closely related associations become more accessible which then “easily bias one’s 
train of thought, interpretations, and decisions” (Stacy, 1997, p. 70). Word association 
tasks are the most widely used approach in basic memory research (Stacy et al., 2006). 
The aim of the present study was to more firmly establish biased interpretational 
1 Please note that the term ‘implicit’ in this context refers to conceptualizations such as ‘spontaneous’ and ‘automatic’ rather than 
‘unconscious’ (see e.g., Moors & De Houwer, 2006)
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processes. Unlike previous studies we compared two extreme groups: heavy-drinking 
versus light-drinking students. We only included male students as findings suggest 
that heavy and/or problematic alcohol use is more prominent among male university 
students (Ham & Hope, 2003). We applied a paradigm that has, to the best of our 
knowledge, not been used in alcohol research so far: Instead of making use of single 
cues or phrases, we used more complex cues, namely open ended, ambiguous scenarios. 
These scenarios were either alcohol-related or neutral in context. In order to tap into 
emotional, cognitive, and social themes that are associated with (excessive) alcohol 
consumption, the Inventory of Drinking Situation (IDS; Annis, 1982) questionnaire 
served as a basis for the contents of the alcohol-related scenarios. As such, the sig-
nificance of this scenario-based approach is first that it comprises a high ecological 
validity. Second, it offers a better understanding of idiosyncratic dispositions in 
sensitivity to the activation of alcohol-related associations, as the scenarios themselves 
(i.e., the context) represent an important cue which does or does not activate an 
alcohol-related memory association (Krank & Wall, 2006). 
In the present study, participants were asked to interpret open-ended scenarios and 
generate continuations based on their own interpretation of the ambiguous situation. 
Studies investigating the role of interpretation biases in anxiety disorders (Hertel, 
Brozovich, Joormann, & Gotlib, 2008) and eating pathology (Cooper, 1997) support 
the general validity of this method in psychopathology research. To illustrate, Hertel 
et al. (2008) used open ended, ambiguous scenarios to investigate interpretation biases 
in generalized social phobia. In line with cognitive models of social phobia, socially-
phobic individuals generated less positive interpretations than non-anxious controls. 
Based on previous findings in the alcohol literature, we expected that heavy-drinking 
students, compared to light-drinking students, would exhibit an alcohol-related 
interpretation bias. Therefore, we predicted that heavy drinkers would produce more 
alcohol-related continuations for ambiguous, alcohol-related scenarios than light 
drinkers. The presence of an alcohol-related interpretation bias was tested by means 
of two different rating methods: Participants rated their own responses and two 
independent raters coded the continuations. The former approach was inspired by 
the work of Frigon and Krank (2009), suggesting that self-coding may be a beneficial 
tool in reducing ambiguity during coding due to the more accurate nature of this 
method. The validity of this approach is supported by their findings that self-coded 
scores were highly correlated with and predictive for future alcohol use, respectively. 
Finally, it is a very efficient approach as it less time consuming than external coding. 
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METHOD
Recruitment  
The initial sample included 67 male students of the Radboud University who were 
recruited via flyers and posters. An initial screening questionnaire was sent out via 
e-mail (inclusion criteria: male, university student, age 18-28 years). Heavy-drinking 
students were selected to drink 20 or more standard alcoholic drinks per week (a 
standard drink contains approximately 15 ml of pure ethanol in the Netherlands), 
and to have had at least five or more standard glasses of alcohol at one sitting during 
the past 2 weeks (binge). Light-drinking students were required to drink 8 or less but 
at least 1 standard alcoholic drink per week without a binge in the past two weeks (for 
similar criteria, see Wiers, Rinck, Dictus, & van den Wildenberg, 2009). If inclusion 
criteria were met, participants were invited to take part in the study. 
Measures and Materials
Time-Line-Follow-Back questionnaire (TLFB; Sobell & Sobell, 1992)
Alcohol use was measured with an adapted version of the TLFB questionnaire (Wiers, 
Hoogeveen, Sergeant, & Gunning, 1997). Participants were required to sum up for 
every day of the past week, how many and what kind of standard alcoholic drinks 
they had consumed, and how many drinks they would typically drink on an average 
day (assessed for all 7 days). In addition, they indicated the number of occasions on 
which they had drunk five or more standard glasses of alcohol during the previous 2 
weeks. 
Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT; Saunders, Aasland, Babor, De la   
Fuente, & Grant, 1993)
The AUDIT is a self-report questionnaire that measures alcohol use, symptoms of 
alcohol dependence and alcohol-related problems. It comprises a multiple-choice 
answering format and consists of 10 questions (first three related to alcohol use, 
remaining seven with alcohol-related problems).
Rutger Alcohol Problem Index (RAPI; White & Labouvie, 1989)
The RAPI is a 23-item self-report instrument assessing problems and problematic 
situations involving alcohol for adolescents and young adults (e.g., not being able to 
study for an exam because of a hangover). Participants indicated on a 5-point Likert 
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scale how often they had experienced each problem (0 = never up to 4 = more than 10 
times). 
Scenarios
All scenarios were piloted to ensure that they allowed for different interpretations. 
Each scenario described a typical student life situation (e.g., at the university, being 
with friends, joining a party). Regarding the alcohol-related scenarios, the following 
risk factors of the IDS (Annis, 1982) served as themes for their specific contents: urge 
and temptation, negative emotions, social pressure, pleasant times with others, conflict, 
physical discomfort, and pleasant emotions. For example, the factor pleasant times 
with others was used to create the following scenario: “At the festival. You and your 
friends are attending a festival. You want to have a big night out. So you and your 
friends are quickly going to the …”. Neutral scenarios included situations like this: 
“New class. You changed to another class at university. Everyone already knows each 
other, so you introduce yourself. Your new classmates will probably find you very …”.2 
A booklet contained 14 ambiguous, alcohol-related scenarios (2 per risk factor), and 
10 ambiguous, neutral scenarios. Each scenario started with a title and contained 
three lines. The final line ended abruptly and was followed by an empty line on which 
participants were instructed to write down a continuation. Each scenario was printed 
on a single page. In order to control for carry-over effects, six different booklets with 
a different scenario order were created. The order of booklets was counterbalanced 
across participants.
Self coding task
Participants were asked to code whether their continuation belonged to particular 
categories. There were four main categories (i.e., drugs, activity, emotion, people), 
and each main category had several subcategories. However, of interest was only the 
main category drugs, including the subcategories alcohol, nicotine, marihuana and 
not applicable
Procedure
Following informed consent, participants received a booklet containing the open-
ended scenarios. They were asked to read each scenario carefully and to write down 
their first, spontaneous continuation. They were instructed not to continue to the 
next scenario until completing each continuation. After the last scenario, a funneled 
2 A full overview of all scenarios can be received on request via e-mail by contacting the first author.  
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debriefing followed in which participants were asked whether they recognized 
particular topics in the scenarios and whether they had an idea about the task’s aim. 
Subsequently, the categorization task was administered in which participants had to 
go back to the first scenario of their booklet and code each continuation by means of 
the four categories. Then, the TLFB, AUDIT and RAPI were administered. Finally, 
participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.
Independent rating of scenario continuations
Two trained research assistants blind to participant group coded the continuations in 
two different ways: 1. Conservative approach with only unambiguous alcohol-related 
continuations coded (e.g., contained a mention of beer, wine), 2. Liberal approach 
including more ambiguous, alcohol-related continuations that were suggestive of an 
alcohol-related interpretation (e.g., mentions going to a bar). The two raters first 
coded all scenarios individually, then discussed their interpretations and agreed on 
a consensus in case of a mismatch. Finally, a mean conservative and a mean liberal 
consensus score of alcohol-related continuations was obtained for each participant. 
Both inter-rater reliabilities were high: r = .96 (p < .001) for the conservative coding, 
and r = .99 (p < .001) for the liberal coding. Regarding the neutral scenarios, the 
independent raters did not report any alcohol-related continuations, implying that 
they had a 100% agreement.
RESULTS
Data cleaning and participant characteristics
Based on the TLFB, 16 participants were removed from further analysis as they did 
not meet inclusion criteria during testing: Three potential heavy and 13 potential 
light drinkers were excluded, leaving a final group of N = 25 heavy drinkers (Mage = 
22.12, SD = 2.03) and N = 26 light drinkers (Mage = 21.62, SD = 2.12). The TLFB results 
of the remaining sample showed that heavy drinkers had a significantly higher weekly 
alcohol consumption than light drinkers, t(49) = 13.36, p < .001 (heavy drinkers: M = 
33.9, SD = 11.44, range 21-61.25; light drinkers: M = 3.61, SD = 1.66, range 1-7.5). 
Furthermore, heavy drinkers reported a mean of 4.88 (SD = 1.2) binges during the 
previous weeks whereas light drinkers reported no binges. Finally, heavy-drinking 
students scored significantly higher than light-drinking students on both the AUDIT 
and the RAPI: AUDIT: t(49) = 9.31, p < .001 (heavy drinkers: M = 16.28, SD = 4.41, 
range 9-23; light drinkers: M = 6.42, SD = 3.05, range 1-13), RAPI: t(49) = 5.64, p < .001 
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(heavy drinkers: M = 17.28, SD = 5.54, range 7-28; light drinkers: M = 7.46, SD = 6.81, 
range 0-26). 
Scenario task  
In order to test whether both groups received an equal number of booklet versions 
we executed a chi-square test. The analysis revealed that this was the case: χ²(5) = 4.88, 
p = .431.
Self coding
For alcohol-related scenarios, heavy-drinking students more often classified their 
continuations as belonging to the subcategory alcohol than light-drinking students, 
t(49) = 5.46, p < .001, d = 1.52 (heavy drinkers: M = .31, SD = .11; light drinkers: M = .15, 
SD = .1). Regarding the outcome of the neutral scenarios, heavy-drinking students 
more often classified their continuations as belonging to the subcategory alcohol than 
light-drinking students, t(49) = 3.57, p = .001, d = 1 (heavy drinkers: M = .23, SD = .13; 
light drinkers: M = .11, SD = .11) (see Figure 1). 
Independent ratings
As the independent raters did not report any alcohol-related continuations for neutral 
scenarios, the analyses were only conducted for the alcohol-related scenarios. The 
scores of the independent raters showed the same pattern as the participant self 
coding: The conservative consensus score revealed that heavy-drinking students 
generated more alcohol continuations for alcohol scenarios than light-drinking 
students, t(49) = 5.03, p < .001, d = 1.44 (heavy drinkers: M = .34, SD = .13; light 
drinkers: M = .16, SD = .12), and the same was true for results of the liberal consen-
sus score, t(49) = 4.83, p < .001, d = 1.31 (heavy drinkers: M = .41, SD = .15; light 
drinkers: M = .22, SD = .14) (see Figure 1).3
 
 
3 These analyses were repeated including the group of participants that was initially excluded on the basis of their classification as light 
or heavy drinker at the time of testing. On all dependent measures, heavy-drinking students generated more alcohol continuations 
than light-drinking students:  (1) Self ratings for alcohol scenarios: t(65) = 4.66, p < .001, d = 1.24 (heavy drinkers: M = .3, SD = .11; 
light drinkers: M = .17, SD = .1);  (2) Self ratings for neutral scenarios: t(65) = 3.2, p = .002, d = .8 (heavy drinkers: M = .22, SD = .13; 
light drinkers: M = .12, SD = .12); (3) Conservative consensus score for alcohol scenarios: t(65) = 4.88, p < .001, d = 1.17 (heavy drinkers: 
M = .33, SD = .12; light drinkers: M = .19, SD = .12); and (4) Liberal consensus score for alcohol scenarios: t(65) = 4.32, p < .001, d = 1.03 
(heavy drinkers: M = .4, SD = .15; light drinkers: M = .25, SD = .14). 
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Figure 1. Mean alcohol continuations per scenario type and coding method. Error bars represent 
standard errors. Please note that independent raters did not report any alcohol-related contin-
uations for neutral scenarios. 
 
Correlational analysis
Table 1 shows the correlations between interpretation bias per scenario type and coding 
method employed (i.e., self-coding, external conservative and liberal coding), alcohol 
use, symptoms of alcohol dependence and alcohol-related problems (i.e., TLFB, AUDIT 
and RAPI). Analyses revealed positive correlations between all variables (except for 
self-coding neutral scenarios and RAPI), implying that the more alcohol continuations 
were generated, the higher the level of alcohol consumption, symptoms of alcohol 
dependence and alcohol-related problems. Correlation coefficients can be interpreted 
as moderate until high.  
Table 1. Correlations of interpretation bias per scenario type and coding method with TLFB, 
AUDIT and RAPI scores. Please note that independent raters did not report any alcohol-related 
continuations for neutral scenarios.
Interpretation bias TLFB AUDIT RAPI
1. Self coding alcohol scenarios .59** .56** .38**
2. Self coding neutral scenarios .57** .4** .15
3. Rater liberal coding alcohol scenarios .60** .54** .4**
4. Rater conservative coding alcohol scenarios .56** .51** .33*
* p < .05, ** p < .01
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Alcohol scenarios
Self coding
Neutral scenarios
Rater coding
conservative
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Awareness check 
Twenty students were aware of the goal of the task and 13 students reported having a 
vague idea about the goal. However, there was no significant correlation between 
being aware (‘2’), having a vague idea (‘1’) and not aware (‘0’) and the participants’ 
self coding of alcohol scenario continuations, r = .07, p = .623, and neutral scenarios, 
r = .1, p = .497, or the independent raters’ conservative consensus score of the alcohol 
scenarios, r = .04, p = .759, and their liberal consensus score, r = .09, p = .536. 
DISCUSSION
The present study investigated whether heavy-drinking students show evidence of an 
alcohol-related interpretation bias. We used ambiguous alcohol-related versus neutral 
scenarios and asked heavy and light-drinking students to generate a continuation 
for each scenario. Continuations were coded by two independent raters and by the 
participants themselves in order to improve the codings’ accuracy (Frigon & Krank, 
2009). Results showed that heavy-drinking students generated more alcohol-related 
continuations to the former type of scenario than light drinking students, i.e., they 
interpreted ambiguous alcohol-related scenarios more often in an alcohol-related 
manner. This was true across all three coding methods. However, self-coded scores 
were lower than both the raters’ conservative and liberal scores. This finding contrasts 
with previous findings using similar methods (see Frigon & Krank, 2009; Krank, 
Schoenfeld, & Frigon, 2010). An explanation that could account for this result is that 
participants themselves have the most unique access to the meaning of their continu-
ations. Interestingly, participants also coded some of their continuations on neutral 
scenarios as alcohol-related whereas the independent raters did not. There are at least 
two explanations here: One may be that this simply points to a lack of task compliance 
from the participants. A second one may be that participants took the entire context 
into consideration while coding: As all scenarios described typical student life situations, 
alcohol or its consumption could have somehow played a role. Speculatively, heavy 
drinkers may have had a general tendency to endorse an alcohol-related interpretation 
when confronted with these potential, alcohol-related contexts, implying that a response 
bias could account for this result. Finally, correlational analyses revealed that all types 
of bias indices were associated positively with the level of alcohol consumption, 
symptoms of alcohol dependence and alcohol-related problems. Hence, a stronger bias 
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is related to a higher level of alcohol use and alcohol-related problems. These results 
suggest that our scenarios tap into similar, alcohol-related concepts as assessed via 
the used self-report measures, and therefore could be regarded as additional support 
for the application of our scenario task. 
To summarize, our findings mirror those obtained with memory association tasks 
(e.g., Ames & Stacy, 1998; Stacy, 1995, 1997). Our results can be explained with the same 
rationale as those of memory association tasks. During the processing of ambiguous 
alcohol-related scenarios, alcohol-related memory schemata which were established 
and strengthened during previous experiences with alcohol became active. As a result, 
alcohol-related associations became more accessible, implying that conceptually similar 
responses were elicited (i.e., alcohol-related interpretations). It is likely that the ambiguous 
alcohol-related scenarios in our study activated alcohol-related memory schemata in 
both heavy- and light-drinking students. However, results suggest that alcohol-related 
associations were stronger in heavy-drinking students due to their higher level of alcohol 
consumption. Hence, heavy-drinking students interpreted the ambiguous alcohol-related 
scenarios more often in an alcohol-related manner compared to light-drinking students. 
Although the present study shows promising findings, some limitations should be 
considered when interpreting these results. First, approximately 40% of the participants 
became aware of the task’s goal (which can also happen during an RT-based association 
task, see De Houwer, 2006). Hence, they could have chosen to censor their first asso-
ciations and to respond with different associations. This rather high awareness score 
could be due to the high number of alcohol-related scenarios employed in the task 
that were not matched in quantity with neutral situations. In contrast, during memory 
associations task, a few ambiguous, alcohol-related cues are presented amongst many 
different, non-alcohol related ambiguous cues. However, the awareness score did not 
correlate with the bias index making it highly unlikely that our findings are simply the 
results of demand effects. Second, the outcome of the correlational analyses of bias 
indices and alcohol-related self-report measures should be treated with caution: Due 
to the fact that the TLFB scores which we used to define our extreme groups are highly 
correlated with AUDIT and RAPI, it is very likely that the reported correlations are 
inflated. Third, our sample size was rather small. Moreover, we only included male 
participants, reducing the generalizability of our results. Therefore, follow-up studies 
are needed that replicate the present findings with a larger sample. In addition, such a 
sample should include both (heavy drinking) male and female participants to further 
validate the paradigm. Finally, we cannot rule out that we measured the tendency to 
interpret scenarios in an alcohol-related way rather than an actual interpretation bias, 
so future research may consider using reaction time based approaches to overcome this 
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limitation.4 For example, participants could be instructed to make speeded, lexical 
decisions about the final word of a scenario (alcohol/not alcohol). In that case, reaction 
times would serve as an index of the interpretation bias as they directly reflect the 
associative strength of the assessed association. Another promising line of future 
research would be to investigate whether an alcohol-related interpretation bias is 
associated with an alcohol-related memory bias, for example, by asking participants 
to recall their continuations (e.g., Hertel et al., 2008). Results of Franken, Rosso, and 
van Honk (2003) demonstrated that abstinent alcoholics exhibited an alcohol-related 
memory bias to alcohol cues, and that this bias was positively related with a craving 
for alcohol. Linking this research to interpretation biases in active drinkers may be 
fruitful in furthering our knowledge in this field. 
To conclude, we found that heavy-drinking students, compared to light-drinking 
students, exhibit an alcohol-related interpretation bias. Due to the novelty of this 
scenario-based approach in the context of alcohol research our results might provide 
an inspiring starting point for further investigations. From a clinical perspective, this 
paradigm could provide useful in the diagnosis of alcohol-related problems and in 
the identification of potential risk situation after treatment, including the advantage of 
applying a rather indirect method which is less prone to biased self report. Finally, this 
task may also serve as a base for developing a ‘cognitive bias modification’ method (cf. 
Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009) in order to re-train the alcohol-related interpretation bias. 
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Valence-congruent relations between  
alcohol- related interpretation biases and  
drinking motives
ABSTRACT
The aim of the present study was to examine whether negative and positive alcohol-related 
interpretation biases were specifically related to coping and enhancement drinking 
motives, respectively. Furthermore, it was examined whether such interpretation biases 
predict future drinking, especially in individuals with low levels of executive control. 
This was motivated by the scarce and sometimes conflicting empirical evidence on the 
functional relationship between implicit alcohol-related cognitions and drinking motives. 
In the present study, an adapted version of the Encoding Recognition Task (ERT) was 
applied to measure alcohol-related interpretation biases in male and female students. 
Participants were asked to read ambiguous alcohol-related scenarios. During a subsequent 
recognition phase, participants then had to interpret these scenarios. Coping motives were 
a unique predictor of the tendency to interpret negatively valenced, ambiguous alcohol-
relevant situations in an alcohol-related manner. Similarly, enhancement motives were 
a unique predictor of the tendency to interpret positive ambiguous alcohol-relevant 
situations in an alcohol-related manner. However, executive control did not moderate the 
prediction of prospective drinking by the two types of alcohol-related biases. We conclude that 
the latter result is most likely due to features of the ERT. The current findings further advance 
our understanding of the functional relation between alcohol-related interpretation biases 
and drinking motives. 
This chapter is based on:
Woud, M. L., Becker, E. S., Rinck, M., & Salemink, E. (2014).Valence-congruent relations 
between alcohol-related interpretation biases and drinking motives. Manuscript submitted 
for publication. 
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INTRODUCTION
According to models of addictive behavior (e.g., Wiers et al., 2007), implicit alcohol-
related memory associations play an important role in alcohol abuse and misuse 
(Stacy & Wiers, 2010). A well-validated paradigm to assess alcohol-related memory 
associations are word association tasks. During these tasks, participants are asked to 
give their first association to a variety of ambiguous cues. For example, single ambiguous 
words (‘draft’) have been used, as well as ambiguous phrases containing affective com-
ponents (‘feeling good’) and open-ended ambiguous scenarios (Ames & Stacy, 1998; 
Stacy, 1997, 1995; Stacy, Ames, & Grenard, 2006; Woud, Fitzgerald, Wiers, Rinck, & 
Becker, 2012). With these tasks, it was repeatedly found that individuals who tended to 
interpret ambiguous information in an alcohol-related manner consumed more alcohol.
Besides such implicit alcohol-related cognitions, explicit ones have also been studied. 
According to Cox and Klinger (1988), two types of affective states are involved in alcohol 
consumption: People either drink to decrease negative affective states (negative reinforce-
ment) or to increase positive affective states (positive reinforcement). A questionnaire 
suitable for detecting individual differences in these drinking motives is the Drinking 
Motives Questionnaire (DMQ; Cooper, 1994). It includes four factors, two of which 
address negative and positive reinforcement drinking, namely coping and enhancement 
drinking motives.
Recently, the functional relationship between implicit alcohol-related memory asso-
ciations and drinking motives has been studied. To illustrate, Salemink and Wiers 
(2013) applied a Word-Sentence Association Paradigm (WSAP; Beard & Amir, 2009) 
and investigated whether negative and positive alcohol-related memory associations 
are specifically related to coping and enhancement drinking motives, respectively. 
During the WSAP, alcohol-related or alcohol-unrelated words were presented, 
followed by an ambiguous sentence involving a negative or a positive affect situation, 
or a neutral control situation. Participants had to indicate whether word and sentence 
were related. Here, coping motives (but not enhancement motives) predicted the 
tendency to associate alcohol-related words with negative affect situations, while 
enhancement motives (and not coping motives) predicted the tendency to associate 
alcohol-related words with positive affect situations. Similarly, Stewart, Hall, Wilkie, and 
Birch (2002) used an affective priming task to show that coping drinkers demonstrated 
an increased activation of alcohol-related concepts when primed negatively, whereas 
enhancement drinkers demonstrated an increased activation of alcohol-related concepts 
when primed positively. Unexpectedly, however, positive primes also activated alcohol-
related concepts in coping drinkers, and neutral primes also activated alcohol-related 
concepts in enhancement drinkers. 
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There are a few other studies on, for example, the relation between alcohol use and 
general implicit outcome expectancies (e.g., Palfai & Wood, 2001; Stacy, 1997), the 
relation between drinking motives, mood, and alcohol-approach tendencies (Ralston, 
Palfai, & Rinck, 2013) or the role of arousal-related implicit alcohol cognitions in heavy 
versus light drinking (Wiers, van Woerden, Smulders, & de Jong, 2002). However, to 
the best of our knowledge, the studies by Salemink and Wiers (2013) and Stewart et 
al. (2002) are the only ones that explicitly investigated the functional relationship 
between implicit alcohol-related associations and drinking motives. This scarcity of 
evidence in combination with the partly inconsistent findings by Stewart et al. (2012) 
motivated the present study. Specifically, we investigated the relationship between 
alcohol-related interpretation biases and drinking motives. The Encoding Recognition 
Task (ERT) was adapted to assess alcohol-related interpretation biases (for a validation 
study in the field of anxiety, see Salemink & van den Hout, 2010). 
The present alcohol-ERT contained ambiguous alcohol-relevant scenarios which were 
inspired by items of the DMQ-R. Half of the scenarios described negative situations 
and the other half described positive ones. First, it was expected that DMQ-R coping 
motives would specifically predict the tendency to interpret negative ambiguous 
situations in an alcohol-related manner, while DMQ-R enhancement motives would 
specifically predict the tendency to interpret positive ambiguous situations in an 
alcohol-related manner. Second, it was expected that alcohol-related interpretation 
biases (IBs) in negative and positive affect situations would be predictive of prospective 
drinking, and that their predictive power would further depend on individual differ-
ences in executive control (EC). More specifically, alcohol-related IBs should predict 
prospective drinking, particularly in individuals with low rather than high levels of EC. 
This latter prediction is in line with recent theorizing that deficits in executive control 
may be a risk factor for, and a consequence of, alcohol abuse and misuse (Koob & 
Volkow, 2010; Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2008; de Wit, 2009). Moreover, Salemink and 
Wiers (2013) showed that implicit alcohol associations in positive affect situations 
were predictive of prospective alcohol use and number of binges, depending on the 
individuals’ level of working memory capacity. 
METHOD
Participants
In total, 119 students of Radboud University Nijmegen participated (inclusion criteria: 
having consumed alcohol in the past week, university student, age 18-28 years). Eleven 
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participants were excluded from all further analyses: Eight did not consume alcohol 
and 3 were tested despite not meeting the age requirement. The final sample (n = 108) 
consisted of 57 females and 51 males with a mean age of 21.2 years (SD = 2.8). 
Self-report measures 
Time-Line-Follow-Back questionnaire (TLFB; Sobell & Sobell, 1992)
During the lab session, alcohol use was measured with an adapted version of the 
TLFB questionnaire (Wiers, Hoogeveen, Sergeant, & Gunning, 1997). Participants were 
asked to sum up for every day of the past week, how many and what kind of standard 
alcoholic drinks they had consumed, and how many drinks they would typically 
drink on an average day (assessed for all 7 days). In addition, they indicated the num-
ber of occasions on which they had drunk five or more standard glasses of alcohol 
during the previous 2 weeks. Alcohol use in the week following the lab session was 
measured with a shorter version, the TLFB online version. Here, participants were 
asked to indicate how many glasses of alcoholic beverages they had consumed during 
each day of the week.
Drinking Motives Questionnaire - Revised (DMQ-R; Cooper, 1994) 
The DMQ-R was used to assess participants’ drinking motives. The DMQ-R is a 
20-item self-report questionnaire assessing the relative frequency of drinking for 
each of the four drinking motives, including a scale ranging from 1 (‘almost never/
never’) to 5 (‘almost always/always’). Of main interest here were the drinking motives 
‘enhancement’ and ‘coping’. 
Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT; Saunders, Aasland, Babor, de la  
Fuente, & Grant, 1993)
The AUDIT is a self-report questionnaire measuring alcohol use and levels of hazardous 
drinking. It comprises a multiple-choice answering format and consists of 10 questions 
(3 related to alcohol use, 7 to alcohol-related problems).
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935)
The classical color-interference Stroop task (card version) was used to measure executive 
control. Participants categorized stimuli according to their print color (yellow, green, 
red, blue and white). On the compatible card, the words ‘yellow’, ‘green’, ‘red’, ‘blue’ 
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and ‘white’ were shown, and the word’s meaning matched its print color. The same 
words were shown on the incompatible card, however, here the word’s meaning did 
not match its print color (e.g., the word ‘red’ was printed in green). Finally, there was a 
card that showed meaningless colored strings of XXX. Each card contained 40 stimuli, 
i.e., 8 stimuli distributed across 5 columns. Each card appeared on the screen after a 
mouse click initiated by the experimenter. As soon as the participant had named 
the last word’s print color, the experimenter clicked again and the card disappeared. 
Reaction times were saved by the computer. Participants’ errors were recorded by the 
experimenter who was blind to the type of card that was presented. 
Encoding Recognition Task (ERT)
To assess the alcohol-related interpretation bias, participants completed the ERT. The 
ERT consisted of two parts. In part one, 24 ambiguous alcohol-related scenarios were 
presented on the computer screen. There were 12 negative and 12 positive scenarios. 
Their contents was modeled on items of the coping and enhancement scales of the 
DMQ-R (Cooper, 1994). Each scenario started with a title and had 3 lines. In the final 
line, a word was missing, and this missing word appeared as soon as the space bar was 
pressed. However, the missing word was presented as a word fragment which partici-
pants were asked to complete. Specifically, participants were instructed to press the 
space bar again as soon as they knew the complete word. Then, they were supposed to 
type in the first missing letter of the word fragment. If correct, the complete word 
appeared on the screen. This procedure was supposed to ensure that participants 
processed the scenario thoroughly (see Table 1 for examples). Every scenario was 
followed by a comprehension question which participants had to answer with ‘yes’ or 
‘no’. Finally, participants were asked to indicate on a seven-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (‘not at all’) to 7 (‘completely’) how well they had been able to imagine them-
selves in the presented scenario. 
In part two, the original 24 titles from part one were presented randomly, each followed 
by a set of 4 sentences. For each sentence, participants had to indicate how close in mean-
ing the sentence was to the original meaning of the scenario, using a four-point Likert 
scale (1 = ‘not at all’ to 4 = ‘very much’). Of the four sentences, one represented a possible 
alcohol-related interpretation of the original ambiguous scenario (i.e., alcohol-related 
target sentence), and one represented a possible alcohol-unrelated interpretation (i.e., 
alcohol-unrelated target sentence / control sentence). In addition, two more sentences 
were presented. Their contents was broadly similar to the original scenario but did not 
represent a resolution of the ambiguity (i.e., foil sentences). See Table 1 for examples.
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Table 1. Example of a negative and positive scenario during the Encoding Recognition Task (ERT).
Scenario Type Title “Wanting to forget your problems”
Negative Encoding sentence “You are agitatedly walking up and down your 
room. You are very dissatisfied with your 
present situation. Your study loan piles up, you 
failed an exam and now you lost your wallet. 
You just want to forget all your … (pro_lems / 
problems)  
Recognition sentences:
Alcohol-related target “You want to forget all your problems and 
decide to have a few extra drinks tonight.”
Alcohol-unrelated 
target
“You want to forget all your problems and 
decide to go for a long run.”
Foil 1 “You want to forget all your problems and grab 
your jacket.”
Foil 2 “You want to forget all your problems and go 
outside.”
Scenario Type Title “Celebrating your housemate’s birthday.”
Positive Encoding sentence “Your housemate is celebrating his birthday 
and invited many people. The party gets going 
quickly and the atmosphere is great. You want 
to get in the … even more. (m_od / mood).”
Recognition sentences:
Alcohol-related target “You want to get in the mood even more, so 
you get a bottle of beer.”
Alcohol-unrelated 
target
“You want to get in the mood even more, so 
you turn up the music.”
Foil 1 “You want to get in the mood even more, so 
you stand up from the table.”
Foil 2 “You want to get in the mood even more, so 
you turn towards the person sitting next to 
you.”
Procedure
Upon arrival, participants gave informed consent and answered demographic questions. 
This was followed by the Stroop and the ERT. Finally, the three self-report measures were 
administered, i.e., TLFB, DMQ-R, and AUDIT. One week later, participants received 
an email containing a link to complete the online version of the TLFB questionnaire. 
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RESULTS
Alcohol-related interpretation bias in positive and negative affect situations
Correlations between alcohol-related interpretation biases and self-report measures
We computed correlations between the negative and positive alcohol-related IBs 
(scores on alcohol-related target sentences) with coping and enhancement drinking 
motives (DMQ-R scores), alcohol consumption during the past seven days (TLFB lab 
version), level of hazardous drinking (AUDIT scores), alcohol consumption during the 
seven days following the lab session (TLFB online version), executive control (Stroop 
index) and gender (see Table 2). To determine the specificity of these correlations, 
scores on alcohol-unrelated targets (control sentences) and foil sentences for both 
negative and positive affect situations were also included. Regarding correlations with 
the TLFB lab version, one participant was excluded due to an extreme value on this 
measure (> 3 SDs above the group’s mean).
We found that the alcohol-related IB in negative affect situations correlated signifi-
cantly with coping and enhancement drinking motives, levels of alcohol consumption 
during the past seven days, levels of hazardous drinking, and prospective drinking. 
That is, individuals who had a stronger tendency to interpret negative affect situations 
as alcohol-related more often drank in response to negative as well as positive emotions, 
had consumed more alcohol during the past 7 days, showed higher levels of hazardous 
drinking and drank more during the seven days following the lab session. As expected, 
scores on control sentences (i.e., alcohol-unrelated target sentences) in negative affect 
situations did not significantly correlate with any of the self-report measures. The 
alcohol-related IB in positive affect situations correlated significantly with enhancement 
drinking motives, levels of alcohol consumption during the past 7 days, levels of haz-
ardous drinking, and prospective drinking. That is, individuals who had a stronger 
tendency to interpret positive affect situations as alcohol-related more often drank in 
response to positive emotions, had consumed more alcohol during the past 7 days, 
showed higher levels of hazardous drinking and drank more during the seven days 
following the lab session. In addition, there was a marginally significant correlation 
between alcohol-related IB in positive affect situations and coping drinking motives. 
Moreover, as for negative-affect situations, scores on positive-affect control sentences 
(alcohol-unrelated target sentences) did not significantly correlate with any of the self-
report measures. Finally, there was a significant positive correlation between negative 
and positive alcohol-related IBs, implying that individuals who had a stronger tendency 
to interpret negative affect situations as alcohol-related also interpreted positive affect 
situations as such. 
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Table 2. Correlations between alcohol-related interpretation bias in positive and negative affect 
situations, drinking motives, alcohol use (TLFB lab version), alcohol-related problems (AUDIT 
scores), prospective drinking (TLFB online version), executive control (Stroop Index) and gender. 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.
1. ART 
Negative Affect
-
2. ART 
Positive Affect
.70** -
3. AUT 
Negative Affect
.20* .27** -
4. AUT 
Positive Affect
.29** .54** .64** -
5. FS 
Negative Affect
.04 .13 .50** .44** -
6. FS 
Positive Affect
.07 .14 .46** .34** .73** -
7. DMQ-R 
Coping
.27** .16† .16 .05 .04 .06 -
8. DMQ-R  
Enhancement
.25** .25* .05 -.09 .04 -.01 .27* -
9. TLFB I a .31** .27** -.08 -.08 -.08 -.04 .10 .37** -
10. AUDIT .25** .21* -.08 -.13 -.09 .00 .25* .45** .66** -
11. TLFB IIb .34* .22* .03 -.02 -.10 -.10 .16 .43** .72** .67** -
12. Stroop 
Index
.14 -.03 -.13 -.10 -.17† -.06 -.01 .02 -.04 -.09 -.04 -
13. Gender .16 .09 -.19† -.13 -.10 -.07 -.05 .04 .26* .11 .13 .27* -
M 2.12 2.72 2.77 3.00 2.73 2.80 8.69 13.55 12.86 9.99 1.83 10.77 57♀
SD .55 .58 .48 .50 .44 .41 2.91 3.89 8.72 4.18 1.74 5.59 51♂
Note: n = 108 but an = 107 for TLFB I due to one outlier and  bn = 92 for prospective drinking. 
Significances:  †p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .001. ART Negative Affect: Alcohol-Related Target Negative 
Affect Situations; ART Positive Affect: Alcohol-Related Target Positive Affect Situations; AUT 
Negative Affect: Alcohol-Unrelated Target Negative Affect Situations; AUT Positive Affect: 
Alcohol-Unrelated Target Positive Affect Situation; FS Negative Affect: Foil Sentences Negative 
Affect; FS Positive Affect: Foil Sentences Positive Affect; DMQ-R Coping: Coping subscale 
Drinking Motives Questionnaire Revised; DMQ-R Enhancement: Enhancement subscale 
Drinking Motives Questionnaire Revised; TLFB I: Time Line Follow Back lab version; AUDIT: 
Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test; TLFB II: Time Line Follow Back online version (i.e., 
one week follow-up); Stroop Index: RT incompatible – RT compatible; Gender: 0 = female and 
1 = male.
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Prediction of negative and positive alcohol-related interpretation biases
To examine whether negative and positive alcohol-related IBs were specifically 
predicted by coping and enhancement drinking motives, respectively, two regression 
analyses were conducted. All variables were first z-standardized (Aiken & West, 
1991). The negative and positive alcohol-related IBs were used as outcomes in the 
regressions (the scores on alcohol-related target sentences). In each regression, DMQ-R 
enhancement and coping motives, scores on the AUDIT and TLFB lab version, and 
gender were entered as predictors. For the negative alcohol-related IB, three multivariate 
outliers were excluded, and four multivariate outliers for the positive alcohol-related 
IB (based on studentized deleted residuals and Mahalanobis distance). See Table 3 for 
a summary of the regression analyses.
Regarding the prediction of the negative alcohol-related IB, the overall model was signifi-
cant, R²  = .17 (adjusted R²  = .13),  F(5, 99) = 4.08, p < .02. The DMQ-R coping motive 
was a significant predictor, B = .25, SE = .1, p < .02, indicating that individuals who had 
a stronger tendency to interpret negative affect situations as alcohol-related more often 
drank in response to negative emotions. None of the other predictors were significant. 
Regarding the prediction of the positive alcohol-related IB, the overall model was also 
significant, R² = .15 (adjusted R²  = .11), F(5, 98) = 3.45, p < .02. Here, the DMQ-R en-
hancement motive was a significant predictor, B = .21, SE = .11, p < .05, indicating 
that individuals who had a stronger tendency to interpret positive affect situations as 
alcohol-related more often drank in response to positive emotions. The other predictors 
were not significant.10
Table 3. Summary of regression analyses for prediction of alcohol-related interpretation biases
(IBs) in negative and positive affect situations.
Alcohol-related IB
Negative Positive
Model (R2) .17* .15*
Variable (B)
DMQ-R Coping .25* .07
DMQ-R Enhancement .08 .21*
AUDIT .01 -.01
TLFB lab version .24† .23
Gender .22 .11
Note: DMQ-R Coping: Coping subscale Drinking Motives Questionnaire Revised; DMQ-R 
Enhancement: Enhancement subscale Drinking Motives Questionnaire Revised; AUDIT: 
Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test. TLFB lab version: Time Line Follow Back lab version. 
For the gender variable: 0 = female and 1 = male. †p = / <.10 *p < .05; **p < .001.
1 We also conducted two regression analyses with the same predictors and alcohol-unrelated target sentences as the outcome. Here, the
 model was not significant, neither for negative affect situations (R² = .05, F(5,98) = 1.07, p = .382, nor for positive affect situations (R²  = .04, 
F(4,99) = .88, p = .499).
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Prediction of prospective drinking by means of alcohol-related 
interpretation biases, moderated by levels of executive control
 
Manipulation check Stroop task
To test whether participants showed the expected Stroop interference effect, RTs of 
compatible cards were subtracted from RTs of incompatible cards. A positive difference 
score indicates interference by incompatibility of word meaning and print color. The 
average difference score was indeed significantly positive, t(107) = 20.04, p < . 001 (M 
= 10.77, SD = 5.59).
Prediction of prospective drinking
To examine whether alcohol-related IBs predicted future drinking especially in in-
dividuals with low executive control (EC), a multiple moderated regression analysis 
was performed including z-standardized variables (Aiken & West, 1991). The quantity 
of alcohol consumed during the week following the lab session (TLFB online version) 
was used as outcome. As predictors, we entered gender and level of hazardous drinking 
(AUDIT scores) (Step 1), DMQ-R coping and enhancement motives (Step 2), negative 
and positive alcohol-related IBs, executive control (Stroop interference score) (Step 
3), and the Stroop x negative IB and Stroop x positive IB interactions (Step 4). In total, 
92 individuals completed the online TLFB version. Eight participants were identified as 
multivariate outliers (based on studentized deleted residuals and Mahalanobis distance) 
and were excluded. 
As Table 4 shows, all 4 models were significant. However, adding the predictors to the 
model in Step 2, 3, and 4 did not significantly add to the prediction of future drinking. 
In addition, no predictor of primary interest was significant: IB_negative x Stroop, 
B = -.12, SE = .17, p = .47, and IB_positive x Stroop, B = -.06, SE = .2, p = .76. Only the 
alcohol-related IB in negative affect situations was a marginally significant predictor, 
B = .25, SE = .14, p = .08. 
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Table 4. Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting alcohol use at one 
week follow-up.
Prospective drinking
Variable Significance model R2/adjusted R2 R2 change B
Step 1 F(2,83) = 34.33,   
p < .001
.45/.44
  AUDIT .67** 
  Gender .04 
Step 2 F(4,81) =17.81,   
p < .001
.47/.44 .015 
  AUDIT .61**  
  Gender .04
  DMQ-R Coping -.04
  DMQ-R Enhancement .15
Step 3 F(7,78) =10.64,   
p < .001
.49/.44 .02 
  AUDIT .59**
  Gender .06
  DMQ-R Coping -.07
  DMQ-R Enhancement .15
  ART Negative Affect .18
  ART Positive Affect -.07
  Stroop Index -.11
Step 4 F(9.76) =8.54,     
p < .001
.5/.44 .015
  AUDIT .58**
  Gender .06
  DMQ-R Coping -.08
  DMQ-R Enhancement .13
  ART Negative Affect .25†
  ART Positive Affect -.11
  Stroop Index -.1
  Stroop x ART Negative Affect -.12
  Stroop x ART Positive Affect -.06
Note: n = 85. ART Negative Affect: Alcohol-Related Target Negative Affect Situations; ART 
Positive Affect: Alcohol-Related Target Positive Affect Situations; DMQ-R Coping: Coping 
subscale Drinking Motives Questionnaire Revised; DMQ-R Enhancement: Enhancement 
subscale Drinking Motives Questionnaire Revised; Gender: 0 = female and 1 = male; AUDIT: 
Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test; Stroop Index: RT incompatible – RT compatible. †p 
<.10; *p < .05; **p < .001. Deviations in adjusted R2 are due to rounding.  
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DISCUSSION
The present study aimed to identify functional relationships between alcohol-related 
IBs and drinking motives by employing a new alcohol Encoding Recognition Task. 
Correlations revealed that individuals who more often interpreted negative affect 
situations as alcohol-related, drank more often in response to negative and positive 
emotions, had consumed more alcohol during the past week, showed higher levels 
of hazardous drinking, and drank more during the week following the lab session. 
Similarly, individuals who more often interpreted positive affect situations as alcohol-
related, more often drank in response to positive emotions, had consumed more 
alcohol during the past week, showed higher levels of hazardous drinking, and drank 
more during the week following the lab session. Importantly, scores on control 
sentences in both negative and positive affect situations did not correlate with any of 
the alcohol-related self-report measures. Results of the regression analyses further 
specified this pattern: As predicted, DMQ-R coping motives were a unique predictor 
of the tendency to interpret negative ambiguous alcohol-relevant situations in an 
alcohol-related manner, while DMQ-R enhancement motives were a unique predictor 
of the tendency to interpret positive ambiguous alcohol-relevant situations in this 
manner. Finally, the alcohol-related IB in negative affect situations was a trend-level 
significant predictor for prospective drinking. The alcohol-related IB in positive affect 
situations did not predict prospective drinking, and individual levels of executive 
control (EC) did not moderate the predictions.
To summarize, we found a valence-congruent association between alcohol-related 
IBs and drinking motives. This is in line with findings by Salemink and Wiers (2013) 
and Stewart et al. (2002). Hence, the present results replicate and extend previous 
findings. Moreover, we found that individuals who had a stronger tendency to inter-
pret negative affect situations as alcohol-related also drank more often in response to 
positive emotions. Stewart et al. (2002) also reported non-specific effects, as coping 
drinkers were primed by both positive and negative stimuli, and therefore suggested 
that both types of stimuli can activate implicit alcohol-related cognitions. Moreover, 
previous research has shown that situations involving pleasant times with others as 
well as unpleasant emotions predicted DMQ coping scores in students (Carrigan, 
Barton, Samoluk, & Stewart, 1998). Hence, both positive and negative alcohol-related 
cognitions may be activated in individuals who mainly drink alcohol to ameliorate 
affective states. 
The negative alcohol-related IB was also a marginally significant predictor of prospec-
tive drinking when the interaction terms were included in the regression. However, 
the positive alcohol-related IB did not predict prospective drinking, and individual 
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differences in executive control did not moderate this relation. This is not in line with 
our expectations, and there are at least two potential explanations. First, the alcohol-
ERT might not be adequate for assessing implicit alcohol-related associations, i.e., 
spontaneous, unintentional and automatic associations (Moors & De Houwer, 2006). 
Participants read the ambiguous scenarios and interpreted them later. This ‘off-line’ 
measurement does not assess participants’ interpretations immediately, unlike ‘on-line’ 
measurements such as the alcohol-WSAP (Salemink & Wiers, 2013). Hence, the latter 
might be more sensitive to individual differences in executive control. Dual process 
models of addictive behaviors support such an assumption (Wiers et al., 2007), postu-
lating that low levels of executive control are associated with stronger automatic alcohol-
related associations (Grenard, et al., 2008; Thush et al., 2008). A second explanation 
for not finding a moderating role of executive functioning is the fairly homogeneous 
sample we tested. Since they were all university students, the variance in Stroop scores 
was probably reduced.
Of course, the present study is not without limitations. First, we cannot draw causal 
conclusions regarding the relationship between alcohol-related IBs and drinking 
motives, due to the correlational design of the study. Second, our sample involved only 
students. Therefore, we need follow-up studies that involve mixed-gender samples or 
more clinical samples. Moreover, the causal relationship between alcohol-related IBs 
and alcohol consumption is worth investigating. Therefore, experimental studies are 
needed that induce an alcohol-related IB and then test its effect on alcohol consump-
tion. Second, mood induction studies may further advance our understanding of 
alcohol-related IBs. To illustrate, Grant, Stewart, and Birch (2007) showed mood-
congruent effects on implicit alcohol-related concepts after a mood manipulation 
(see also Ralston et al., 2013), and such a relation can also be expected in the present 
context. Finally, investigating whether alcohol-related IBs are associated with other 
cognitive biases (e.g., alcohol-related attention biases) could be very informative. 
To conclude, we found unique and valence-specific relations between alcohol-related 
IBs and drinking motives. However, alcohol-related IBs did not predict prospective 
drinking and we did not find moderation by levels of EC. Our data show that it is 
important to disentangle the functional relationship between valenced alcohol-related 
IBs and drinking motives, and future research is needed to further examine this issue. 
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Alcohol-related interpretation bias in  
alcohol-dependent patients
ABSTRACT
Models of addictive behaviors postulate that implicit alcohol-related memory associations 
and biased interpretation processes contribute to the development and maintenance of 
alcohol misuse and abuse. The present study examined whether alcohol-dependent 
patients show an alcohol-related interpretation bias. Second, the relationship between the 
interpretation bias and levels of harmful drinking was investigated. The sample included 
125 clinically diagnosed alcohol-dependent patients, and 69 clinically diagnosed control 
patients who had either a mood or an anxiety disorder. Participants completed a booklet 
containing 12 open-ended ambiguous scenarios. Seven scenarios were alcohol-relevant, and 
5 were emotionally relevant, i.e., panic- or depression-relevant. Participants were asked 
to read each scenario and to generate a continuation. In addition, the Alcohol Use Disorder 
Identification Test (AUDIT) and Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) were administered. 
Logistic multivariate multilevel analyses revealed that alcohol dependent patients’ 
probability of generating an alcohol-related continuation on all three scenario types was 
higher than that of control patients. Moreover, alcohol-related interpretation biases were 
positively associated with levels of harmful drinking (i.e., AUDIT scores). These findings 
are the first to show that alcohol-dependent patients show an alcohol-related interpretation 
bias which generalizes to other ambiguous emotionally relevant contexts, and therefore ad-
vance our understanding of the role of implicit biased alcohol-related memory associations 
and interpretation processes. 
This chapter is based on:
Woud, M. L., Pawelczak, S., Rinck, M., Lindenmeyer, J., Souren, P., Wiers, R. W., & 
Becker, E. S. (2014). Alcohol-related interpretation bias in alcohol-dependent patients. 
Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research. doi: 10.1111/acer.12334. 
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INTRODUCTION
When reading the word ‘draft’, many readers may start experiencing some discomfort 
because this reminds them of the manuscript which should have been finished weeks 
ago. A problem drinker, however, may interpret this differently, as the word ‘draft’ may 
automatically activate alcohol- related concepts, for example, a ‘draft beer’. According 
to dual-process models of addictive behaviors (e.g., Wiers et al., 2007) such implicit 
biased alcohol-related memory associations are crucial in the development and mainte-
nance of an alcohol dependency. The present study aims to advance our understanding 
of this matter. Therefore, we investigated the role of alcohol-related interpretation biases 
in a clinical sample of alcohol-dependent patients by employing a newly developed 
scenario task. 
Alcohol-related cognitive processes can be roughly divided into two categories. First, 
there are explicit alcohol-related cognitive processes on which pioneering work has 
been conducted by Goldman and colleagues in the area of alcohol expectancies 
(Brown, Goldman, & Anderson, 1980; Goldman, Del Boca, & Darkes, 1999), and by 
Cooper and colleagues in the area of drinking motives (Cooper, 1994; Cooper, Frone, 
Russell, & Mudar, 1995). Second, there are implicit alcohol-related cognitive processes, 
involving processes that are rather ‘spontaneous’ and ‘automatic’ (e.g., Stacy & Wiers, 
2010). According to dual-process models of addiction (e.g., Wiers et al., 2007), both 
explicit and implicit processes play important roles in addiction (for recent meta-
analyses, see Reich, Below, & Goldman, 2010; Rooke, Hine, & Thorsteinsson, 2008). 
Regarding implicit cognitive processes, much research has been focused on the role 
of alcohol-related memory associations. Two general classes of tasks have been used 
to assess these associations: reaction-time tests and open-ended memory tests (for a 
review, see Stacy & Wiers, 2010). We focus here on the well-validated open-ended 
memory paradigms to assess implicit alcohol-related memory associations (e.g., Ames 
& Stacy, 1998; Ames, Sussman, Dent, & Stacy, 2005; Krank, Schoenfeld, & Frigon, 
2010; Stacy, 1995; 1997; and for overviews, see Stacy, Ames, & Grenard, 2006; Stacy & 
Wiers, 2010). During these tasks, participants give their first spontaneous association 
to ambiguous cues that are either alcohol-related or unrelated. A variety of cues have 
been used so far, for example single word cues (e.g., ‘draft’, ‘shot’), ambiguous situations 
(e.g. ‘Friday night’) or open-ended phrases (e.g. ‘When I feel confident and relaxed 
I...’). In addition, phrases including affective components (e.g. ‘Feeling good’), as well as 
compound cues using a combination of ambiguous situations and affective components 
(e.g. ‘Friday night – Feeling good’) have been applied as well. Results have repeatedly 
demonstrated that individuals with high levels of alcohol consumption generate more 
alcohol-related interpretations. Moreover, word association tasks have been shown to 
be better predictors of future alcohol use than explicit measures, even when adjusting 
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for earlier alcohol use (e.g., Kelly et al., 2005; Stacy, 1997; Thush et al., 2007). According 
to associative network accounts (Anderson, 1983; Bower, 1981; Collins & Loftus, 
1975), results of open-ended association tasks can be explained as follows: During the 
processing of ambiguous alcohol-related cues, alcohol-related memory schemata that 
are established during previous alcohol experiences become active. These schemata 
elicit alcohol-related memory associations, and they are particularly strong (i.e., easily 
accessible) in individuals who consume high amounts of alcohol. Hence, heavier drink-
ing individuals generate more alcohol-related interpretations when being confronted 
with ambiguous alcohol-related cues. 
More recently, the word association task approach has been extended to test whether 
open-ended ambiguous scenarios are also able to detect biases in alcohol-related 
memory associations (Woud, Fitzgerald, Wiers, Rinck, & Becker, 2012). This approach 
is a well-established method to assess interpretation biases in mood and anxiety 
disorders (cf. Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Testing the effectiveness of such a scenario-
based approach in research on alcoholism was motivated by findings that alcohol use 
and misuse depend highly on contextual features such as cognitive, social and affective 
states. These states determine how alcohol-related experiences are encoded, and, in 
turn, influence the accessibility of alcohol-related memory associations during later 
retrieval (Krank & Wall, 2006; Krank, Wall, Stewart, Wiers, & Goldmann, 2005). Word 
association tasks can also involve such contextual features, e.g., when compound cues 
are used. However, the scenario-based approach provides a more nuanced context, 
and therefore offers more insight into individual differences in sensitivity to context 
effects. As such, it is a more holistic and ecologically valid approach. This is also true 
when comparing the scenario-based approach with reaction time (RT) tasks used to 
assess alcohol-related memory associations as such RT tasks mostly involve single 
word cues. Furthermore, two studies directly comparing RT and open-ended measures 
found that the latter predicted more variance in addictive behaviors (Ames et al., 
2007; Thush et al., 2007), a finding also confirmed by a meta-analysis (Rooke et al., 
2008). Results of Woud et al. (2012) showed that the scenario-based approach is indeed 
a sensitive paradigm to detect variations in alcohol-related interpretation biases. Heavy- 
and light-drinking male students were asked to complete open-ended ambiguous 
scenarios by writing down their spontaneous continuation (i.e., interpretation) of the 
scenario. Results demonstrated that heavy drinkers exhibited an alcohol-related in-
terpretation bias: They generated more alcohol-related continuations on ambiguous 
alcohol-related scenarios than light drinkers. In addition, the bias index was positively 
related to harmful drinking patterns and alcohol-related problems. 
Given these promising findings, a next step was to investigate alcohol-related inter-
pretation biases in a clinical population. Would patients suffering from a clinically 
diagnosed alcohol dependency show such a bias? This is possible, but not necessary: 
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Research has shown that observations in risk populations do not always match obser-
vations in clinical populations. For example, heavy drinkers show an attentional bias 
towards alcohol (e.g., Field, Mogg, Zetteler, & Bradley, 2004), however, abstaining 
alcohol-dependent patients show an attentional bias away from alcohol (e.g., Noël et 
al., 2006) and patients with a longer duration of the problem show a smaller bias (e.g., 
Loeber et al., 2010). Therefore, the present study aimed to contribute to a better under-
standing of the role of alcohol-related interpretation biases in alcohol dependency, and 
examined whether a sample of alcohol-dependent patients indeed suffer from such a 
bias. To this aim, a newly developed scenario task was used during which participants 
were asked to complete open-ended ambiguous scenarios that were either alcohol-, 
panic-, or depression-relevant. Specifically, they were asked to interpret the scenarios 
and to generate a continuation for each scenario. Participants were alcohol-dependent 
patients and control patients. 
Our first hypothesis was that alcohol-dependent patients would have a greater 
probability of generating alcohol-related continuations on ambiguous alcohol-relevant 
scenarios than control patients. Second, we expected the alcohol-related interpretation 
bias to be correlated with levels of harmful drinking (i.e., AUDIT scores): The higher 
the alcohol-related bias, the higher the AUDIT scores. Regarding the continuations 
on ambiguous emotionally relevant contexts (i.e., panic- and depression-relevant 
scenarios), our hypothesis was exploratory. As these scenarios involve cognitions, 
affective states and bodily symptoms that may be associated with alcohol consumption, 
one could expect that these contextual features serve as primes, and therefore activate 
alcohol-related memory associations (Krank & Wall, 2006; Krank et al., 2005). Hence, 
we expected that alcohol-dependent patients would also have a greater probability to 
generate alcohol-related continuations on ambiguous emotionally relevant contexts, i.e., 
that the bias would generalize to ambiguous panic- and depression-relevant scenarios. 
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 194 patients from the Salus Clinic Lindow, Germany. The sample’s 
mean age was 46.4 years (SD = 8.6), including 103 male and 91 female participants. 
The inclusion criterion for alcohol-dependent patients was a primary diagnosis of 
alcohol dependence. The control patient group consisted of patients with a mood or 
anxiety disorder as a primary diagnosis who did not have a history of alcohol dependence 
or comorbid alcohol dependency. The present sample included 125 alcohol-dependent 
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patients (AP) and 69 control patients (CP). Within the CP group, 45 participants had 
a mood and 24 participants had an anxiety disorder as primary diagnosis.1 
Self report measures
Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test (AUDIT; Saunders, Aasland, Babor, De La 
Fuente, & Grant, 1993). 
The AUDIT is a screening tool for hazardous drinking behavior. It consists of 10 
questions. The first 3 are related to alcohol use and the remaining 7 assess alcohol- 
related problems. Scores for the first 8 questions range from 0 to 4 (0 = ‘never’, 1 = ‘less 
than monthly’, 2 = ‘monthly’, 3 = ‘weekly’, 4 = ‘daily or almost daily’. For questions 9 
and 10 the scoring is 0, 2 and 4 (0 = ‘no’, 2 = ‘yes, but not in the past year’, 4 = ‘yes, 
during the past year’). 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Hautzinger, Bailer, Worall, & Keller, 1994). 
The BDI assesses levels of depressive symptoms. It consists of 21 questions tapping 
into depression-related symptoms. Each question is followed by four statements 
reflecting increasing levels of intensity of a depressive symptom. Statements are scored 
from 0 to 3 and are summed to determine the depression’s severity: 0–9 minimal; 
10–18: mild; 19–29: moderate; 30–63: severe. 
Scenario task 
Four different booklets were used. Each booklet included seven ambiguous alcohol-
relevant scenarios and five panic- or depression-relevant scenarios (booklet 1 and 2 
included two panic- and three depression-relevant scenarios, and vice versa for booklet 
3 and 4). Each booklet contained a unique set of scenarios, so that each scenario was 
used only once. The order of scenarios within each booklet was randomized. 
Each scenario started with a title and contained four lines. The final line ended 
abruptly and was followed by an empty line on which participants were asked to write 
down a continuation. The alcohol-relevant scenarios were a modified version of 
previously used scenarios (Woud et al., 2012). They were adapted to be relevant for male 
1 In order to avoid mis-categorization of participants, the present sample includes only alcohol-dependent patients whose AUDIT score 
was 8 or higher, and control patients whose score was lower than 8 (see Saunders et al., 1993). Regarding the BDI, only participants 
with a score of 1 or higher (across both groups) were included.
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and female adults. The following risk factors of the Inventory of Drinking Situations 
(IDS; Annis, 1982) served as themes for the scenarios: urge and temptation, negative 
emotions, social pressure, pleasant times with others, conflict, physical discomfort, and 
pleasant emotions (for an open-ended phrase task which also based on items of the 
IDS, see Ames et al., 2005). For example, the factor pleasant times with others was 
used to create the following ambiguous alcohol-relevant scenario: “In the park. Your 
friends organized a picnic in the park. You are lying on a large blanket and you are 
having a jolly and cheerful time. You hear a fizzling noise, someone opens a can. You 
think: ‘That’s what I want, too’, so you grab … ”. The contents of the ambiguous panic- 
and depression-relevant scenarios tapped into cognitions, emotional responses and 
bodily responses that are specific for those disorders (Panic-relevant example: “Cup 
of coffee. You are sitting in a café, enjoying a cup of coffee. Your eyes meet those of the 
person sitting at the table next to you. You feel that your heart starts pounding. This 
means that… ”; Depression-relevant example: “At the shop. You are at a shop. You 
want to buy something and you are thinking back and forth. The shop assistant becomes 
impatient and rolls her eyes. You start feeling very insecure because…“). 
For participants, the scenario task was introduced as a questionnaire consisting of 12 
little scenarios. These scenarios were described as situations out of everyone’s daily 
life, including for example pleasant situations with others as well as situations during 
which one feels unpleasant. It was then explained that these scenarios do not have an 
ending yet, and that it is the participant’s task to generate an ending for each scenario. 
It was pointed out that two things are crucial here: Participants were supposed to 1. 
Imagine themselves in the situation even if it did not match perfectly with their own daily 
life, 2. Write down the first ending that crossed their mind. Finally, it was explained 
that these spontaneous answers are important to get to know the patient: The clinical 
environment will be very different compared to their own and familiar home envi-
ronment. Hence, the patients’ answers might provide valuable information regarding 
their habits and spontaneous reactions.
Scoring scenario task
Two trained clinical psychology master students blind to participants’ group coded 
the continuations. The two raters coded all scenarios individually and in a conservative 
way. That is, only unambiguous continuations were coded as being alcohol-related, 
implying that the continuations had to include words such as ‘beer’, ‘wine’ or ‘alcohol’. 
The continuations were coded as binary variables, i.e., an alcohol-related continuation 
was coded with ‘1’ (i.e., present), and an alcohol-unrelated continuation was coded 
with ‘0’ (i.e., absent).2
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Procedure
According to the procedures of the German rehabilitation system, patients who apply 
for patient treatment are extensively diagnosed by either a specialized practitioner or 
an addiction counsellor. All applicants are then checked for their diagnosis and treat-
ment needs by the medical department of the German Pension Fund to be eligible for 
patient treatment. The treatment is entirely voluntary. All patients included in the 
present sample underwent this procedure. In addition, all alcohol-dependent patients 
underwent an alcohol detoxification procedure. The study was conducted two to 
three weeks before the patients started their behavioral cognitive treatment at the 
rehabilitation clinic, i.e., the time period during which participants were waiting for 
their admission approval and the date for their actual admission. During this period, 
the scenario task was sent home to them via mail, introduced as a questionnaire 
participants are supposed to complete prior to their stay at the clinic. Participants 
were informed about the study and that doing the scenario task was completely 
voluntary without any consequences for their treatment. Participants were asked to 
return the booklet via mail, together with the questionnaires.
Within the first week after arrival, a participant’s diagnosis was re-checked by his/her 
therapist. This was based on criteria as formulated in the International Statistical 
Classification of Diseases (ICD-10; WHO, 1992), and also included the administration 
of the AUDIT (Saunders et al., 1993) and BDI (Hautzinger et al., 1994). In addition, 
some participants completed the computerized version of the Composite International 
Diagnostic Interview (CIDI; Robins et al., 1988). The study had the necessary institu-
tional review board approvals. 
RESULTS 
Participant characteristics 
The two patients groups differed significantly on the AUDIT and BDI. Regarding the 
AUDIT, alcohol patients (AP) scored significantly higher than control patients (CP), 
t(192) = 24.59,  p < .001. However, regarding the BDI, AP scored significantly lower 
than CP, t(192) = 3.22, p = .001 (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations). 
2 Raters also coded whether continuations on the three scenarios types (i.e., alcohol-, panic-, and depression-relevant) were panic- or 
depression-related. A continuation was coded as panic-related if it included exaggerated expressions of catastrophic thinking and / or 
worsening of bodily symptoms, whereas a continuation was coded as depression-related if it included expressions of worthlessness, of 
not being good enough, being unable to succeed, self criticism, passivity or guilt. However, due to our main interest in alcohol-related 
continuations involving the corresponding logistic multilevel analysis, these data are not reported nor analyzed.
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Table 1. Demographic data and AUDIT and BDI scores for the two patient groups.
N Gender (m/f) Age AUDIT BDI
Patient group M / SD M / SD M / SD
Alcohol 125 86/39 46.4 (8.6) 25.9 (8) 15 (11.6)
Control 69 17/52 46.3 (8.7) 1.9 (1.9) 20.1 (8.6)
p p < .001 p = .891 p < .001 p = .001
 
Scenario task
Pre analysis check
Before analyzing the scenarios, several aspects of the data were checked. First, we 
inspected missing values by calculating a sum score of missing values for each par-
ticipant. Analyses showed that the two groups did not differ significantly on this 
score, t(192) = .33, p = .742 (AP: M = .22, SD = .53; AP: M = .19, SD = .60). Next, we 
checked the randomization between groups and booklet version, which was successful, 
χ²(3) = 1.31, p = .726. Finally, we checked group differences regarding age and gender. 
Analyses revealed no significant group difference regarding age, t(192) = .14, p = .891. 
However, the two groups differed significantly regarding gender, χ²(1) = 34.82, p < 
.001 (see Table 1 for an overview and means and standard deviations). 
Inter-rater agreement 
Before analyzing the outcome of the scenario task, we examined the inter-rater agree-
ment by means of Cohen’s Kappa. This index was high: ĸ = .89 (p < .001). 
Analysis alcohol-related continuations 
To examine the probability of generating an alcohol-related interpretation on the three 
scenario types (i.e., alcohol-, panic-, and depression-relevant), a logistic multivariate 
multilevel analysis was conducted. The alcohol-related versus alcohol-unrelated 
continuation of both raters served as the dependent variable (‘1’: alcohol-related 
continuation present, ‘0’: alcohol-related continuation absent). Binary-coded dummy 
variables were created for the variables of interest, namely Group (AP, CP), Scenario 
Type (alcohol-, panic-, depression-relevant), Booklet Nr (1, 2, 3, 4) and Gender 
(male, female). The reference categories for the equation were as follows: Group: AP, 
Scenario Type: alcohol-relevant, Booklet Nr: 1, and Gender: male. 
Table 2 gives an overview of the model estimates of the null and full model, respectively. 
The null model is the model without predictors, the full model is the model with all 
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predictors relevant for the present research question. Both models include the responses 
of rater 1 and rater 2. The covariance, i.e., the between rater variance, provides an 
indication of the reliability of the data. Regarding the null model, the random intercept 
estimate is 1.164 for rater 1, and 1.323 for rater 2, and the covariance is 1.24. Regarding 
the full model, the random intercept estimate is .839 for rater 1 and .864 for rater 2, 
and the covariance is .897. The correlation between the raters is r = 1 for both the null 
and full model, respectively. 
Table 2. Overview model estimates logistic multivariate multilevel analysis on scenario task.
Null model
Rater 1 
(SE)
Rater 2 
(SE)
Fixed effects intercept -1.449
(.094)
-1.504 
(.099)
Random effects:
Intercept (rater level) 1.164 1.323
Covariance/Correlation (R1,R2) 1.24/1
Full model
Fixed effects intercept -1.145 -1.250
Parameter 
estimates
(SE)
p Parameter 
estimates
(SE)
P
Patient Group: CP -1.547 
(0.222)
< .0001 -1.883 
(0.237)
< .0001
Panic Scenario -1.624 
(0.193)
< .0001 -1.751 
(0.205)
< .0001
Depression Scenario -1.149 
(0.165)
< .0001 -1.212 
(0.172)
< .0001
Booklet Nr 2 0.431  
(0.247)
= .08 0.431 
(0.247)
= .08
Booklet Nr 3 0.813  
(0.267)
< .0001 0.918 
(0.275)
< .0001
Booklet Nr 4 0.570  
(0.272)
= .04 0.743 
(0.279)
< .0001
Gender: Female 0.177  
(0.200)
= .38 0.154 
(0.203)
= .44
Random effects: 
Intercept (rater level) .839 .864
Covariance/Correlation (R1,R2) .897/1
Note: The reference categories: Group: AP, Scenario Type: alcohol-relevant, Booklet Nr: 1, 
Gender: male. 
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Table 3 gives an overview of the probabilities of generating an alcohol-related continu-
ation, taking into consideration the possible combinations of the variables of interest 
and their corresponding levels (e.g., the probability to generate an alcohol-related 
continuation for female alcohol-dependent participants for alcohol-relevant scenarios 
included in booklet 3). Results showed that the probability of generating an alcohol-
related continuation on the three scenario types (i.e., alcohol-, panic-, depression-
relevant) was always higher for AP than for CP. This pattern was consistent across rater 
1 and rater 2. 
Table 3. Probability of generating an alcohol-related continuation based on the codings of rater 
1 and 2.
Group Scenario Type Booklet Nr Probabilities 
rater 1 
male/female
Probabilities 
rater 2 
male/female
1 AP Alcohol 1 .24/.28 .22/.25
2 AP Alcohol 2 .33/.37 .34/.38
3 AP Alcohol 3 .42/.46 .42/.46
4 AP Alcohol 4 .36/.40 .38/.41
5 CP Alcohol 1 .06/.07 .04/.05
6 CP Alcohol 2 .09/.11 .07/.08
7 CP Alcohol 3 .13/.15 .1/.11
8 CP Alcohol 4 .11/.13 .08/.1
9 AP Panic 1 .06/.07 .05/.05
10 AP Panic 2 .09/.10 .08/.1
11 AP Panic 3 .12/.14 .11/.13
12 AP Panic 4 .10/.12 .09/.11
13 CP Panic 1 .01/.02 .01/.01
14 CP Panic 2 .02/.02 .01/.02
15 CP Panic 3 .03/.03 .02/.02
16 CP Panic 4 .02/.03 .02/.02
17 AP Depression 1 .09/.11 .08/.09
18 AP Depression 2 .13/.16 .13/.15
19 AP Depression 3 .19/.21 .18/.2
20 AP Depression 4 .15/.18 .15/.17
21 CP Depression 1 .02/.02 .01/.01
22 CP Depression 2 .03/.04 .02/.03
23 CP Depression 3 .05/.05 .03/.04
24 CP Depression 4 .03/.04 .03/.03
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Relation between alcohol-related continuations and AUDIT
Regression analyses were performed to evaluate the relationship between alcohol- 
related continuations and AUDIT scores.3 Per rater, a sum score of alcohol-related 
continuations was computed for each scenario type (i.e., alcohol-, panic-, depression-
relevant), and this served as the dependent variable for the particular regression. 
Booklet Nr and Gender were included as control variables. Given the non-normally 
distributed residuals, a Bootstrapping procedure was applied (Sampling Method: 
Simple; Number of Samples: 1000), and the corresponding outcomes are reported 
(i.e., unstandardized coefficients, bias score, p value and confidence interval) (Efron 
& Tibshyrani, 1993).4
Table 4 summarizes the outcome of these analyses, once for rater 1 and once for rater 
2. When considering the entire sample, alcohol-related continuations for all three 
scenario types were positively significantly related with AUDIT scores, and this was true 
across both raters. These results suggest that the more alcohol-related continuations 
were generated, the higher the level of harmful drinking. Regarding the analyses in-
cluding alcohol dependent patients only, the outcomes differ per rater. Regarding rater 
1, results showed that alcohol-related continuations on alcohol- and depression-relevant 
scenarios were positively significantly related with AUDIT scores. However, alcohol-
related continuations on panic-relevant scenarios did not correlate significantly with 
AUDIT scores. Regarding rater 2, results showed that alcohol-related continuations on 
depression-relevant scenarios were positively significantly related with AUDIT scores. 
In addition, alcohol-related continuations on alcohol- and panic-relevant scenarios 
were marginally significantly related with AUDIT scores. 
 
3 Our variables were non-normally distributed so we conducted a regression analysis instead of simply calculating correlations.
4 For the sake of brevity, we only report the outcomes of main interest here.  
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Table 4. Regression analyses including bootstrapping procedure for total group and alcohol- 
dependent patients only (AP) between alcohol-related continuations of rater 1 and rater 2 on 
alcohol-. panic- and depression-relevant scenarios and AUDIT scores.
Rater Model 
summary
B Bias P BCa 95% 
CI
Measures Group Scenario 
type
AUDIT Total:
F(6/188)
Alcohol Rater 1 R2 =  .61     
p < .001
.07 0 < 
.01
.048 - .086
Rater 2 R2 =  .6         
p < .001
.07 -0 < 
.01
.051 - .084
Panic Rater 1 R2 =  .16
p < .001
.01 0 < 
.02
.002 - .010
Rater 2 R2 =  .2
p < .001
.01 0 < 
.01
.005 - .012
Depression Rater 1 R2 =  .27
p < .001
.01 0 < 
.01
.008 - .019
Rater 2 R2 =  .29
p < .001
.01 0 < 
.01
.009 - .019
AP: 
(6/119)
Alcohol Rater 1 R2 =  .62
p < .001
.04 0 = 
.04
.000 - .081
Rater 2 R2 =  .62
p < .001
.04 -0 = 
.06
.003 - .072
Panic Rater 1 R2 =  .19
p < .001
.01 0 = 
.22
-.004 - -.016
Rater 2 R2 =  .21
p < .001
.01 0 = 
.08
-.001 -.015
Depression Rater 1 R2 =  .29
p < .001
.01 0 < 
.02
.002 - .026
Rater 2 R2 =  .31
p < .001
.01 0 = 
.03
.003 - .024
Note: Group: Total: n = 194. AP: n = 125. Gender and Booklet Number were entered as control 
variables. Values that are zero but negative are due to rounding. AUDIT: Alcohol Use Disorder 
Identification Test; R2: Adjusted R2; B: Unstandardized Coefficient; Bias: level of disagreement 
bootstrap vs. sample distribution; p: p-value; BCa 95% CI: Bias-corrected and accelerated 95% 
Confidence Interval.
DISCUSSION
The present study investigated whether alcohol-dependent patients exhibited an 
alcohol-related interpretation bias, using a newly developed scenario task. The scenarios 
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included open-ended ambiguous alcohol-, depression-, and panic-relevant scenarios, 
and participants were asked to interpret and to generate a continuation for each 
scenario, respectively. Results demonstrated that alcohol-dependent patients showed 
an alcohol-related interpretation bias. Compared to control patients, alcohol-dependent 
patients had a higher probability of generating alcohol-related continuations on am-
biguous alcohol-relevant scenarios. This was true for scores derived from both raters. 
Moreover, alcohol-related continuations of all three scenario types were positively 
related to levels of harmful drinking (i.e., AUDIT scores) in the entire patient group. 
Regarding alcohol-dependent patients, alcohol-related continuations on alcohol- and 
depression-relevant scenarios were significantly related with AUDIT scores when using 
scores of rater 1 for the regression. When using scores of rater 2 in the regression, 
results showed that alcohol-related continuations on depression-relevant scenarios 
were positively significantly related with AUDIT scores, and alcohol-related continu-
ations on alcohol- and panic-relevant scenarios were marginally significantly related 
with AUDIT scores. 
We also had an exploratory hypothesis concerning the generalization of the alcohol-
related interpretation bias to other ambiguous emotionally relevant contexts (i.e., de-
pression-, and panic-relevant scenarios). We indeed found such a generalization effect: 
Compared to control patients, alcohol-dependent patients had a higher probability of 
generating an alcohol-related continuation on depression-, and panic-relevant scenarios. 
Again, this pattern was consistent across rater 1 and rater 2. 
Regarding the first result, i.e., an alcohol-related interpretation bias on alcohol-relevant 
scenarios, our finding is in accordance with what has been found in risk groups and 
community samples (e.g., Ames & Stacy, 1998; Ames et al., 2005; Krank et al., 2010; 
Stacy, 1995, 1997). In particular, the present finding is in accordance with the scenario-
based approach employed by Woud et al. (2012), demonstrating that male heavy-
drinking students, compared to male light-drinking students, showed an alcohol- 
related interpretation bias regarding ambiguous alcohol-relevant scenarios. The present 
study extends these findings. First, our results show that alcohol-related interpretation 
biases also exist in a clinical sample of alcohol-dependent patients. Second, regression 
analyses revealed a positive association between interpretation bias and symptoms of 
harmful drinking (i.e., AUDIT scores) within the group of alcohol-dependent patients. 
Particularly the latter is noteworthy when taking into consideration that the AUDIT was 
administered approximately 3-4 weeks after participants had completed the scenario 
task. 
Regarding our exploratory hypothesis, results showed that alcohol-dependent patients 
also had a higher probability of generating alcohol-related continuations on panic- and 
depression-relevant scenarios. Finding such a generalization effect is also in line with 
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Woud et al. (2012). An explanation that could account for the present finding is that 
the scenarios contained contextual features that are highly associated with alcohol 
and its consumption (e.g., negative affective states), and therefore may have activated 
alcohol-related memory associations (Krank & Wall, 2006; Krank et al., 2005). Put 
differently, the affective states and bodily symptoms described in these scenarios 
served as alcohol-relevant primes. Associative network accounts provide theoretical 
fundament for this finding (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Bower, 1981; Collins & Loftus, 1975), 
postulating that mood-memory-congruent cues (e.g., negative affective states) can 
indeed activate mood-congruent materials (e.g., alcohol-related concepts). Clinical 
observations demonstrating that relapse after successful treatment is frequently 
attributed to negative affective states such as stress or anger are in line with our findings 
(Marlatt, 1996). From an empirical perspective, studies investigating the activation of 
alcohol-related concepts and drinking motives are also supportive. For example, a 
stress induction can lead to an alcohol-related attentional bias in social drinkers scoring 
high on coping- drinking motives (Field & Powell, 2007). However, there are also 
findings that are less consistent regarding such mood-congruency effects. To illustrate, 
results of Stewart, Hall, Wilkie, and Birch (2002) showed that coping drinkers showed 
an increased activation of alcohol-related concepts when primed negatively, whereas 
enhancement drinkers showed increased activation of alcohol-related concepts when 
primed positively. Unexpectedly, positive primes also activated alcohol-related con-
cepts in coping drinkers, and neutral primes also activated alcohol-related concepts 
in enhancement drinkers. 
Despite these promising findings, the present study is not without limitations. First, 
completing the scenario task at home has the disadvantage that it was beyond our 
control in which context, emotional and physical state participants completed it. For 
example, it is possible that participants were not sober while completing the scenarios. 
However, participants performing the task at home meant that the task was performed 
in a natural setting. One could argue that this is likely to enhance the ecological validity 
of the task. Second, we cannot rule out demand effects, implying that the alcohol- 
dependent patients’ scores on the scenario task could be either an understatement or 
an overstatement of the actual alcohol-related interpretation bias. On the one hand, 
participants may have censured their first association because they became aware of 
the task’s goal (which can also happen during an RT-based association tasks, see De 
Houwer, 2006) or because they were about to be admitted to the clinic and thus con-
sidered alcohol a sort of taboo. On the other hand, however, participants may also have 
generated more alcohol-related answers due to their upcoming admission and treat-
ment. In line with this: We do not know whether scores derived from the generated 
continuations can be considered as ‘implicit’ measures. Despite these limitations, 
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however, alcohol-dependent patients still generated more alcohol-related continuations 
than control patients across all three scenario types. Furthermore, earlier findings 
showed no correlation between the interpretation bias and task awareness (Woud et 
al., 2012). Finally, clinically diagnosed alcohol-dependent patients were compared to a 
clinically diagnosed patient control group. On the one hand, this is an adequate control 
group. On the other hand, however, a design which also included a non-diagnosed 
sample including adult high-risk drinkers and problem drinkers would have been a 
more balanced approach. 
Despite these limitations, however, the present findings suggest interesting routes for 
future research. A next intriguing question is whether the interpretation bias is a 
cause and / or a consequence of alcohol misuse (Kraemer et al., 1997). On the one hand, 
longitudinal research is needed to investigate whether the bias precedes the depen-
dency (i.e., whether it is a predictor for developing an alcohol dependency). On the 
other hand, experimental research could target the question whether inducing an 
interpretation bias increases levels of alcohol consumption. Research in the domain 
of Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM) techniques could prove useful concerning the 
latter idea (cf. Koster, MacLeod, & Fox, 2009). In studies on social anxiety, for example, 
socially-relevant interpretation biases were experimentally induced which indeed 
increased levels of state anxiety (e.g., Mathews & Mackintsoh, 2000; Salemink, van den 
Hout, & Kindt, 2007). Furthermore, it would be worthwhile to investigate potential 
moderators like working memory. For example, Thush et al. (2008) showed that implicit 
alcohol-related memory associations were more strongly related to alcohol use for 
individuals with low than with high levels of working memory (for similar findings, 
see e.g., Grenard et al., 2008; Houben & Wiers, 2009). In contrast, explicit alcohol-related 
cognitions were more strongly related to alcohol use for individuals with high than 
for individuals with low levels of working memory. As such, working memory may be 
an important construct when examining alcohol-related concepts, particularly when 
also examining its differential effects regarding implicit and explicit alcohol-related 
concepts. Finally, findings of Krank et al. (2010) showed that self-coding is beneficial 
in reducing ambiguity during coding and reveals larger effects sizes than external 
coding. Hence, to obtain a more accurate score of alcohol-related interpretation biases 
follow-up research should include self-coding. 
To conclude, the present study showed that alcohol-dependent patients show an al-
cohol-related interpretation bias which generalized to other ambiguous emotionally 
relevant contexts. Furthermore, the alcohol-related interpretation bias was positively 
related to levels of harmful drinking. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
demonstration of such biased interpretation processes in a clinical sample. Moreover, the 
fact that a risk group (Woud et al., 2012) as well as a clinical sample of alcohol-dependent 
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patients have such biases further stresses the significance of these processes. However, 
the present study should be considered as ‘proof of principle’, i.e., a first step towards 
a better understanding of the role of alcohol-related interpretation biases in alcohol 
dependency. Hence, follow-up studies are needed that replicate and validate the present 
findings. Nevertheless, the present findings suggest the possibility of some potential 
clinical applications. For example, the scenario task could be administered before 
treatment to identify those patients suffering from an interpretation bias, and who 
thus may benefit from a more intensive treatment, including possibly a variety of 
CBM techniques, directly aiming to retrain these interpretations, as has been used 
successfully in anxiety (for an overview, see e.g., Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Moreover, 
the treatment could specifically target contexts that triggered the interpretation bias 
and as such lead to a more individualized approach.  
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Does negative affect prime alcohol in  
alcohol- dependent inpatients? A large-scale  
clinical  investigation of the moderating role  
of depression and executive control
ABSTRACT
The present study tested to what extent alcohol-related concepts are automatically activated 
by negative affective words. Participants were alcohol-dependent inpatients (n=847) and 
an inpatient control group (n=130). An affective priming task was used to assess the auto-
matic activation of alcohol-related memory associations. Executive control was assessed 
with an adapted Stroop task. We expected alcohol-dependent inpatients to show enhanced 
alcohol activation after negative primes. In addition, we predicted that this enhanced nega-
tive priming effect would be further qualified by participants’ levels of depressive symptoms. 
Finally, we expected the interaction between executive control and priming effect as well 
as the interaction between executive control, priming effect and depressive symptoms to 
be predictive for group membership. Results showed that alcohol-dependent inpatients did 
not show a priming effect by negative words, and this effect was not moderated by levels 
of depressive symptoms. Moreover, group membership was not predicted by the interaction 
between priming effect and executive control, nor by the interaction between priming effect, 
executive control and depressive symptoms. We conclude that these results are most likely 
due to the particular population we studied (i.e., inpatients instead of at-risk populations) 
and to features of the priming task (i.e., low reliability, part of a test battery).
This chapter is based on: 
Woud, M. L., Wiers, R. W., Pawelczak, S., Becker, E. S., Lindenmeyer, J., & Rinck, M. 
(2013). Does negative affect prime alcohol in alcohol-dependent inpatients? A large-
scale clinical investigation of the moderating role of depression and executive control. 
Journal of Experimental Psychopathology, 4, 279-290.
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INTRODUCTION
Different affective states may trigger alcohol consumption, for example, people drink 
in response to exciting, positive life events as well as in response to sad, negative life 
events. Drinking in response to negative affective states is particularly linked to problem 
drinking and/or psychopathological states of alcohol use (e.g., Carey & Correia, 1997; 
Cooper, 1994; Cunningham, Sobell, Sobell, Gavin, & Annis, 1995; Holahan, Moos, 
Holahan, Cronkite, & Randall, 2001). This is in line with negative reinforcement theories 
of addiction (e.g., Baker, Piper, McCarthy, Majeske, & Fiore, 2004; Koob & Le Moal, 
2001), postulating that a reduction of negative affect is the major drinking motive in 
alcohol dependency. Other factors than heavy drinking and related problems may 
also contribute to the cue-eliciting power of negative affective cues, for example levels 
of psychiatric distress (Zack, Toneatto, & MacLeod, 1999). In the present study, we 
investigated the priming effect of negative affective stimuli on alcohol-related memory 
associations as well as potential moderators of this priming effect (i.e., levels of 
depressive symptoms and executive control). Previous studies mainly investigated risk 
populations, whereas the present study involved a large inpatient sample of alcohol-
dependent inpatients and a control inpatient group. 
Various paradigms have been used to assess alcohol-related memory associations, 
among them the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 
1998), word association tasks (see Stacy, Ames, & Grenard, 2006), scenario-based 
approaches (Woud, Fitzgerald, Wiers, Rinck, & Becker, 2012), and sequential priming 
paradigms (e.g., semantic and affective priming tasks). Priming tasks involve the brief 
presentation of a prime stimulus (e.g., a word), followed by the presentation of a target 
stimulus requiring a response (e.g., categorization). The reaction time (RT) needed to 
respond to the target serves as an index of the ‘associative match’ between prime and 
target, i.e., the prime can either facilitate or slow down response latencies. To illustrate: 
If a problem drinker consistently consumes alcohol in response to negative affective 
states, an association between negative affect and alcohol is established. This association 
becomes stronger the more often this drinking pattern is repeated. Transferring this 
rationale to a priming task, a problem drinker should be faster to categorize alcohol-
related targets when they are preceded by negative instead of positive affective primes. 
Negative reinforcement theories of addiction (e.g., Baker et al., 2004, Koob & Le Moal, 
2001) support such a prediction, postulating that the reduction of negative affective 
states is the key drinking motive when it comes to addictive levels of alcohol consump-
tion. Empirical support for this is provided by research on cue exposure, showing for 
example that a negative mood induction can increase a problem drinker’s desire to 
consume alcohol (Litt, Cooney, Kadden, & Gaupp, 1990).
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Several studies investigated negative affect priming effects as well as potential modera-
tors of these effects, expecting a stronger reactivity to negative cues in individuals 
experiencing negative affective states on top of their alcohol abuse/misuse. Associative 
network accounts (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Bower, 1981; Collins & Loftus, 1975) provide 
the theoretical support for such an assumption. Like negative reinforcement theories, 
associative network accounts postulate that alcohol-related concepts can be automatically 
activated by negative cues. Moreover, these accounts postulate that mood-congruent 
cues can strengthen this activation. According to such a mood-memory-congruency 
perspective, negative affective states should thus lead to an even stronger negative 
priming effect. Empirical support for this assumption is provided by studies investi-
gating the relation between personality traits and levels of alcohol use, for example, 
demonstrating that young drinkers scoring high on anxiety sensitivity, compared to 
those scoring low on anxiety sensitivity, tend to have higher levels of alcohol use 
when experiencing negative affective states (Samoluk & Stewart, 1998; Stewart, Carp, 
Pihl, & Peterson, 1997). Moreover, young drinkers with high levels of anxiety sensi-
tivity also experience more alcohol-related problems (Samoluk & Stewart, 1998). Finally, 
results obtained in clinical samples show that alcohol abuse during negative affective 
states is more likely in dependent patients with a negative temperament (Cannon, 
Leeka, Patterson, & Baker, 1990). 
Following the abovementioned predictions, the study by Zack, Poulos, Fragopoulos, and 
MacLeod (2003) used a verbal priming task to assess whether positive and/or negative 
word cues would automatically activate the concept ‘alcohol’ in young problem drinkers 
who scored either high or low on anxiety sensitivity. Results showed that primes related 
to negative but not positive mood states primed alcohol-related concepts. Furthermore, 
the negative priming effect did not vary as a function of anxiety sensitivity. However, 
the magnitude of the priming effect was related to the severity of alcohol-related 
problems (for related results, see Zack, Poulos, Fragopoulos, Woodford, & MacLeod, 
2006). A similar study was executed in outpatient problem drinkers scoring high 
versus low on psychiatric distress (Zack et al., 1999). Here, alcohol-related concepts 
were primed by negative affective primes in problem drinkers with high but not low 
psychiatric distress. 
In sum, these finding demonstrate that alcohol misuse/abuse is characterized by an 
enhanced activation of alcohol-related concepts when encountering negative affective 
primes. However, the magnitude of this priming effect seems to be conditional, i.e., 
can depend on a moderating variable (e.g., levels of psychiatric distress) and on the 
included sample (e.g., young problem drinkers vs. a sample of outpatient problem 
drinkers). As such, more research is needed to further disentangle the specific conditions 
of these priming effects. This is also important when considered from a clinical and 
Chapter 7
124
therapeutic perspective as there are observations demonstrating that relapse after 
successful treatment is frequently attributed to negative affective states (Marlatt, 
1996), and that such negative states particularly precede severe and not mild relapses 
(Hodgins, el-Guebaly, & Armstrong, 1995).
Therefore, the first aim of the present study was to test whether alcohol-dependent 
inpatients show a negative priming effect. The second aim was to replicate findings by 
Zack et al. (1999). However, the present study tested whether participants’ levels of 
depressive symptoms moderate the negative priming effect (measured via a translated 
version of the Beck Depression Inventory; BDI; Hautzinger, Bailer, Worall, & Keller, 
1994). Moreover, unlike Zack et al. (1999), our study involved a very large sample of 
alcohol-dependent inpatients, plus a large inpatient control group. Finally, an Affective 
Priming Task (APT; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986) was used to assess 
alcohol-related memory associations because this task is a very adequate operationa-
lization to test the automatic activation of memory associations. Alcohol and soft 
drinks words were used as targets, and words related to negative and positive affective 
states served as primes. In order to prevent participants from adopting conscious 
response strategies, and to enhance automatic processing of the primes, primes were 
presented for 300ms only (Neely, 1977; Posner & Snyder, 1975). We predicted that 
alcohol-dependent inpatients would show a negative priming effect, that is, faster 
categorization of alcohol targets when primed with negative affective cues. Second, 
we expected that alcohol-dependent inpatients scoring high on depressive symptoms 
would show a greater negative priming effect. Finally, in order to test the reliability of 
our findings, we also examined the internal validity of our priming task. According to 
Bosson, Swann, and Pennebaker (2000), priming effects can be unreliable and might 
produce small effects. 
Our third aim was to investigate the moderating role of executive control (EC) in 
this context. This is motivated by recent theorizing postulating that deficits in EC 
over impulsive behaviors may be a risk and, most important in this context, also a 
consequence of an addiction (Koob & Volkow, 2010; Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2008; 
Winstanley, Olausson, Taylor, & Jentsch, 2010; de Wit, 2009). Findings obtained in 
risk samples support this view. Thush et al. (2008), for example, showed that automatic 
positive arousal associations were predictive of alcohol use 1 month later in participants 
with low levels of working memory capacity, but not in participants with high levels 
of working memory. Similar findings were reported by Houben and Wiers (2009), 
demonstrating that the relationship between automatic alcohol associations and 
alcohol use depended on participants’ response inhibition abilities. While all of these 
studies involved non-clinical groups, their findings suggest that EC should also play 
an important role in alcohol misuse, and probably also in alcohol abuse. Therefore, 
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our third aim was to investigate whether group membership could be predicted by 
the interaction between EC (measured via an adapted version of the classical Stroop 
task; Stroop, 1935) and scores on the priming task. We expected those with a low level 
of EC and a strong negative priming effect to be in the group of alcohol dependent 
inpatients. Furthermore, we investigated the role of depression in this context, 
expecting that those with a low level of EC, a strong negative priming effect, and a 
high level of BDI to be in the group of alcohol-dependent inpatients.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 977 inpatients from the salus clinic in Lindow, Germany. The 
sample’s mean age was 46.1 years (SD = 8.4), including 674 males and 303 females. In 
the present sample, 847 participants met the criteria for alcohol dependence. The 
inpatient control group contained 130 patients, including patients with various psy-
chological disorders: 60% were diagnosed with a mood disorder, 17% with an anxiety 
disorder, 14% with a psychosomatic disorder, and the final 9% included inpatients 
with, e.g., hypochondria and adaptation disorder. The control group did not include 
any inpatients who were diagnosed with a comorbid alcohol-related disorder. All in-
patients received Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, whereby a few also received additional 
individualized treatments. The treatment duration for alcohol-dependent inpatients 
was approximately 3 months, while the control inpatients’ treatment duration was 
about 4-5 weeks.1
Alcohol use and levels of hazardous drinking were assessed with the Alcohol Use 
Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT; Saunders, Aasland, Babor, De La Fuente, & 
Grant, 1993). As expected, alcohol-dependent inpatients (ADP) had significantly 
higher scores than control inpatients (CP), t(975) = 37.34, p < .001 (ADP: M = 25.6, 
SD = 7.0, range 8-40; CP: M = 2.7, SD = 1.8, range 1-7). Beck’s Depression Inventory 
(BDI; Hautzinger et al., 1994) was used to assess symptoms related to depression. As 
expected, ADP had significantly lower scores than CP, t(975) = 4.17, p < .001 (ADP: 
1 In order to avoid miscategorization of participants, the present sample of n = 977 includes only alcohol-dependent inpatients whose 
AUDIT score was 8 or higher, and control inpatients whose score was lower than 8 (see Saunders et al., 1993). Regarding the BDI-II, 
participants were supposed to have a score of 1 or higher (across both groups). This selection criterion was applied after the priming 
data were merged with the questionnaire data (i.e., AUDIT and BDI). This sample only includes participants with complete data sets 
for both the priming task and the questionnaires.
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M = 13.8, SD = 10.6, range 1-58; CP: M = 17.9, SD = 9.5, range 1-44). ADP were also 
slightly younger than CP, t(975) = 2.41, p < .02 (ADP: M = 45.9, SD = 8.5, range 18-72; 
CP: M = 47.8, SD = 7.2, range 26-63). Moreover, the two groups differed significantly 
regarding the distribution of male and female participants, χ²(1) = 72.06, p < .001 
(626 males and 221 females among the ADP vs. 48 males and 82 females among the 
CP, see also Table 1). 
Table 1. Participant characteristics for alcohol-dependent inpatients and control inpatients. 
Patient Group
Alcohol-dependent Inpatients
(n = 847, 626 males)
Control inpatients
(n = 130, 48 males)
Measure M (SD) M (SD)
Age 45.9 (8.5) 47.8 (7.2)
AUDIT 25.6 (7.0) 2.7 (1.8)
BDI 13.8 (10.6) 17.9 (9.5)
Note: AUDIT: Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test, BDI: Beck Depression Inventory
Affective Priming Task (APT; Fazio et al., 1986)
During the APT, participants were asked to categorize target words into whether they 
denoted alcoholic drinks or soft drinks. Six alcohol targets (beer, wine, liquor, vodka, 
whiskey, rum) and 6 soft drink targets (Coke, Fanta, orange juice, apple juice, water, 
Pepsi) were used. Participants were instructed to look at the prime but to only react 
to target words, respectively. Furthermore, it was explained that targets should be 
categorized as quickly as possible into the correct category (alcohol or soft drink). For 
that purpose, two keys were marked on a computer keyboard, representing the two 
categories. If participants categorized a target word incorrectly or if they did not react 
at all within 5 seconds, an error message was presented. Immediately before a target 
word appeared, a prime word was presented for 300 ms. The primes described 6 positive 
and 6 negative affective states (positive: relaxed, cheerful, jolly, funny, comical, happy; 
negative: stressed, bored, anxious, insecure, lonely, unhappy), respectively.2 This yielded 
four prime-target combinations: alcohol target preceded by positive or negative prime, 
and soft drink target preceded by positive or negative prime. Each prime preceded 
2 Please note that for convenience, we use the terms ‘positive primes’ and ‘negative primes’ from now on.
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each target once, resulting in a total of 144 test trials per participant, preceded by 12 
practice trials. Here, each target appeared once, preceded by a task-unrelated prime 
(i.e., man, woman, child, kitchen, bread, beverage). 
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935)
An adapted version of the classical color-interference Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) was 
used to measure executive control. During the Stroop task, participants were asked to 
categorize stimuli that appeared on the screen according to their print color. Again, 
participants were instructed to react as quickly and as accurately as possible, and an 
error message was presented following incorrect categorization. There were 4 print 
colors regarding the to-be-categorized stimuli, namely yellow, green, red and blue. Each 
color was represented by a key on the keyboard, and participants gave their answer by 
pressing the key that represented the stimulus’ print color. The Stroop included 2 
types of blocks, i.e., neutral blocks and incompatible blocks. During neutral blocks, a 
meaningless, colored string of XXXX was presented. During incompatible blocks, 4 
word stimuli were shown (i.e., ‘yellow’, ‘green’, ‘red’ and ‘blue’). However, these were 
‘color-incongruent words’, i.e., the word’s meaning never matched its print color (e.g., 
the word ‘yellow’ was printed in green, red, or blue color, but never in yellow). All 
neutral and incompatible blocks comprised 6 trials each. There were 4 neutral and 4 
incompatible blocks, respectively, resulting in a total of 4 x 6 = 24 trials per block type. 
As such, all X strings and all word stimuli appeared equally often in all 4 colors across 
the Stroop task. Neutral and incompatible blocks were presented in an alternating 
order, starting with a baseline block. The Stroop also contained 8 so-called ‘dummy 
trials’ during which the word stimulus ‘color’ was shown twice in each print color. 
Two such dummy trials were shown at the very beginning of the Stroop, and then 
were presented at the end of each block to precede the switch between block types. In 
sum, the Stroop task thus included a total of 24 + 24 + 8 = 56 trials. 
Procedure
According to the procedures of the German rehabilitation system, patients who apply 
for inpatient treatment are extensively diagnosed by either a specialized practitioner 
or an addiction counsellor. All applicants are then checked for their diagnosis and 
treatment needs by the medical department of the German Pension Fund to be eligible 
for inpatient treatment. All inpatients included in the present sample underwent this 
procedure. Within the first week after arrival, a participant’s diagnosis was re-checked by 
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his/her therapist. This was based on criteria as formulated in the International Statistical 
Classification of Diseases (ICD-10; WHO, 1992) and also included administration of 
the AUDIT (Saunders et al., 1993). In addition, some participants completed the 
computerized version of the Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI; 
Robins et al., 1988). During this first week, participants also completed the Stroop task 
and the APT. Both were parts of a larger computerized test battery. This test battery 
was implemented as a standard diagnostic instrument which participants complete 
before starting their treatment at the clinic. All participants were detoxificated at that 
moment. The study had the necessary IRB approvals.
 
RESULTS 
Affective Priming Task (APT)
We corrected for the effects of potential outliers by computing the median reaction time 
(RT) of each participant per prime-target combination (minimum RT to be included 
in aggregation: 150 ms). Next, we computed a priming score for alcohol pictures (RT 
negative-alcohol minus RT positive-alcohol). Negative scores indicate that alcohol 
was primed by negative words more than by positive ones. The same score was com-
puted for soda pictures (RT negative-soda minus RT positive-soda). Again, negative 
scores indicate that soda was primed by negative words more than by positive ones. 
Then we computed an overall priming score by subtracting the soda score from the 
alcohol score. Here, negative values indicate that negative words primed alcohol more 
strongly than they primed soda. Despite using the median, however, a few participants 
had extreme outliers among their priming scores. Hence, we excluded 19 participants 
whose score deviated more than 3 SD from the group’s mean score. This sample was 
then checked for influential data points (Cook’s distance), however, no such points were 
identified. The mean error score of the remaining 958 participants was low, M = .01 
(SD = .02). 
To test the predictions that 1) alcohol-dependent inpatients show an enhanced nega-
tive priming effect, and 2) that this negative priming effect is qualified by participants’ 
level of depressive symptoms, we performed a hierarchical regression analysis. 
The priming score served as the dependent variable. As predictors, we entered Group 
(ADP, CP), BDI, Gender, Age (Step 1), and the interaction of Group x BDI (Step 2). 
All variables were standardized before inclusion in the analysis, and interaction terms 
were computed from these standardized scores (Aiken & West, 1991). Step 1 of the 
hierarchical regression analysis of the priming effect was not significant, R² = .005, 
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F(4, 953) = 1.08, p = .36, and none of the predictors were significant either. Hence, 
there was no difference in priming effect between alcohol-dependent inpatients and 
controls. Step 2 of the hierarchical regression analysis was not significant either: R² = 
.005, F(5, 952) = .9, p = .48, and again none of predictors were significant. 
Stroop task
Our third aim addressed the question whether group membership could be predicted 
by the interaction between executive control (EC; i.e., Stroop difference scores) and 
scores on the priming task, and/or by the interaction between EC, priming task and 
level of depressive symptoms (i.e., BDI scores). 
For the Stroop reaction times, we again calculated median scores per participant 
(minimum RT to be included in aggregation: 150 ms). Data of 4 participants were 
missing. Moreover, we excluded 13 participants because their Stroop scores deviated 
more than 3 SD from the group’s mean score. Nine additional participants were excluded 
due to high error rates (more than 20%). The mean error rate of the remaining 825 
participants was M = .02 (SD = .03). The expected Stroop effect was observed in both 
groups, i.e., slower RTs for incompatible color words than for neutral XXX strings: 
alcohol-dependent inpatients: t(824) = 31.24, p < .001 (incompatible: M = 1236, SD = 
289, neutral: M = 1018, SD = 205), control inpatients: t(125) = 14.58, p < .001 (incom-
patible: M = 1325, SD = 335, neutral: M = 1009, SD = 210). 
Next, we calculated an index of EC by subtracting RTs of incompatible color words 
from RTs of neutral strings. As such, a negative Stroop score implies slower RTs on 
incongruent color words, i.e., weaker EC. As a first step, we examined the relationship 
between EC, priming, age, level of hazardous drinking (i.e., AUDIT scores) and depres-
sive symptoms (i.e., BDI scores). We analyzed this for the entire inpatient group as 
well as for the two groups separately. Regarding the outcome of the analysis across the 
entire group: As Table 2 shows, there was a significant and negative correlation 
between EC and age, such that higher levels of EC were associated with being older. 
Furthermore, EC was significantly and positively correlated with AUDIT scores, imply-
ing that lower levels of EC were associated with higher levels of hazardous drinking. 
For alcohol-dependent inpatients alone, we only found a significant correlation between 
EC and age, and the direction of this correlation was the same as that of the entire group 
(i.e., higher levels of EC were associated with being older). For control inpatients, EC 
was significantly and negatively correlated with BDI scores, such that lower levels of 
EC were associated with higher levels of depressive symptoms.  
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Table 2. Correlations of Stroop interference score with priming difference score, AUDIT, BDI, 
and age.
Stroop Interference
Total inpatient 
group (n = 933)
Alcohol-Dependent 
inpatients (n = 812)
Control inpatients   
(n = 121)
Priming difference score .02 .03 -.07
AUDIT .10** -.04 .03
BDI -.03 .02 -.21*
Age -.10** -.10* -.07
Calculation difference score priming task: (RT negative-soda - RT positive-soda) - (RT negative-
alcohol - RT positive-alcohol). Calculation difference score Stroop: (RT XXX string) – (RT 
incongruent color words). Interpretation significances: * p < .05, ** p < .01
As a second step, we examined whether group membership (ADP vs. CP) could be 
predicted by means of the interaction between EC and priming, and/or by the inter-
action between EC, priming and BDI. Group membership served as the dependent 
variable. As predictors, we entered Stroop, priming and BDI (Step 1), the interactions 
of Stroop x priming, Stroop x BDI, and priming x BDI (Step 2), and the interaction of 
priming x Stroop x BDI (Step 3). Again, all variables were standardized before inclusion 
in the analysis, and interaction terms were computed from these standardized scores.3 
Regarding the interaction of interest in Step 2, i.e., Stroop x priming, we found that 
this predictor was not significant (B = -.1, SE = .09, p = .3, Exp(B) = .91). Furthermore, 
the three-way interaction of Step 3, i.e., Stroop x priming x BDI, was not significant 
either, (B = -.06, SE = .11, p = .61, Exp(B) = .95).
Internal validity of the Affective Priming Task
In order to examine the internal validity of the priming task, we calculated mean 
scores for both targets types (i.e., alcohol and soft drink) per prime word, yielding 12 
scores per target type (i.e., 6 negative and 6 positive scores for alcohol targets, and 6 
negative and 6 positive scores for soft drink targets). Next, we computed 6 difference 
scores for each target type by subtracting positive scores from negative scores. This 
yielded 12 difference scores, and these difference score were entered into the analysis 
of internal validity, which revealed a low value: Cronbach’s α = .16. 
3 For the sake of brevity, we only report the outcomes of main interest. In addition, these are the significance values of the predictors in 
Step 1: Stroop: B = -.43, SE = .09, p < .001, Exp(B) = .66; priming: B = -.12, SE = .1, p = .21, Exp(B) = .88; BDI: B = -.36, SE = .09, p < .001, 
Exp(B) = 1.43.
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DISCUSSION
The present study was designed to test to what extent negative affective words would 
automatically activate alcohol-related concepts in (a subgroup of) alcohol-dependent 
inpatients. Participants were a large sample of alcohol-dependent inpatients and an 
inpatient control group. An affective priming task (Fazio et al., 1986) was used to 
measure automatic alcohol activation. Levels of executive control (EC) were assessed 
by an adapted version of the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). We expected alcohol-dependent 
inpatients, compared to control inpatients, to show an enhanced negative priming 
effect. In addition, we expected this negative priming effect to be strongest for those 
dependent inpatients who scored high on depressive symptoms. Third, we expected 
those with low levels of EC and a strong negative priming effect, and in particular those 
with low levels of EC, a strong negative priming effect and high levels of depressive 
symptoms, to be in the group of alcohol-dependent inpatients. 
Regarding the first hypothesis, we did not find a negative priming effect in alcohol-
dependent inpatients, that is, compared to control inpatients, they were not faster to 
categorize alcohol targets when being primed with negative affective words. This is 
not in line with negative reinforcement theories of addiction (e.g., Baker et al., 2004; 
Koob & Le Moal, 2001). These theories put forward that the reduction of negative 
affective states is the most prominent drinking motive in alcohol dependency, so 
expecting a negative priming effect to occur in alcohol-dependent inpatients is a 
plausible deduction. The most parsimonious explanation of our null finding may 
be the rather low reliability of the priming task. According to Bosson et al. (2000), 
priming effects can be unreliable and instable. In fact, the present negative finding 
nicely aligns with a recent call by Kahneman (2012) to critically re-test previous 
priming results. Second, there is evidence that alcohol-dependent inpatients can hold 
both negative and positive drinking motives (e.g., Faber, Khavari, & Douglass, 1980; 
Ooteman, Koeter, Verheul, Schippers, & van den Brink, 2006). Hence, positive as well 
as negative affective primes could have activated alcohol-related memory associations. 
As such, the affective priming task may not have been sensitive enough to disentangle 
these effects.
Second, levels of depressive symptoms did not moderate the expected negative priming 
effect. According to associative network accounts (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Bower, 1981; 
Collins & Loftus, 1975), however, one would have expected such a moderation, as levels 
of depressive symptoms could be regarded as a mood-congruent cue that enhances 
the negative priming effect. When trying to explain this null result, it might be worth-
while to compare the present study with that of Zack et al. (1999). Zack and colleagues 
applied a lexical decision task in outpatient problem drinkers scoring high versus low 
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on psychiatric distress, and they found a negative priming effect in problem drinkers 
who scored high on psychiatric distress. A difference that may account for our contra-
dictive findings is that Zack et al.’s (1999) sample included outpatient problem drink-
ers, and not all of them met the criteria for alcohol dependency. Our sample included 
alcohol-dependent inpatients suffering from a long history of dependency. According to 
Ooteman et al. (2006), drinking motives can change during the course of an alcohol 
dependency, so it is likely that individuals have distinctive drinking motives during 
early stages of their dependency, but then have both positive and negative drinking 
motives at a later stage. According to this perspective, it may have been the case that 
Zack et al.’s (1999) sample held mainly negative drinking motives whereas our clinical 
sample held both positive and negative drinking motives. Another difference between 
the studies lies in the primes that were used. Zack and colleagues used negative and 
neutral primes, whereas we used negative and positive primes. In case participants 
indeed held both negative and positive drinking motives, our setup may have made it 
impossible to find distinct priming effects. Third, Zack et al.’s (1999) priming task had 
more trials than ours (320 versus 144), so maybe a task with more trials may have 
revealed the expected effects. Fourth, Zack et al. (1999) included extra instructions 
making sure participants processed the primes (i.e., participants were asked to read 
each prime silently). We only instructed participants to look at the primes, making it 
possible that our participants did not pay enough attention to them. Finally, Zack et 
al. (1999) used the Symptom Checklist-90 (SCL-90; Slater & Linn, 1982) to classify 
participants. In addition, prime stimuli were derived from the SCL-90, including 
word primes that referred to symptoms ranked highest by problems drinkers scoring 
high on psychiatric distress (Zack, Toneatto, & Streiner, 1998). We classified our sample 
based on depressive symptoms (by means of the BDI; Hautzinger et al., 1994) and used 
primes that referred to rather general negative affective states. Maybe our classification 
was too specific, and our primes too general, suggesting that a close match between 
the participant’s negative symptoms and the type of prime words is a crucial.
The third prediction concerned the moderating role of executive control (EC). Here, 
we expected the interaction between EC and priming to be predictive for participants’ 
group membership. In addition, we expected participants’ levels of depressive symptoms 
to further qualify this interaction, i.e., those with low levels of EC, a strong negative 
priming effect, and high scores on the BDI should belong to the group of alcohol- 
dependent inpatients. Results demonstrated that none of the two predictions were 
confirmed. This is in contrast to recent theorizing which postulates that deficits in EC 
are one of the main consequences of alcohol abuse (e.g., Bechara & Martin, 2004, 
Koob & Volkow, 2010; Noël et al., 2005; Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2008; Winstanle et al., 
2010; de Wit, 2009; and for similar elaborations, see Wiers et al., 2007). Finding a 
Affect-alcohol priming in alcohol-dependent inpatients
133
positive correlation between EC and age in the group of alcohol-dependent inpatients 
(as well as across the entire group) is an additional contradiction here. An explanation 
may lie in the adapted version of the classical Stroop task we used during which 
participants reacted by means of keys that were assigned to the 4 print colors. This 
version has been successfully used in other studies (e.g., Houben & Wiers, 2009). 
However, it may have produced an additional load for our inpatients (i.e., keeping in 
mind the key assignment) which may have affected the assessment of the intended 
concept (i.e., color-word interference) in a negative manner. Finally, according to 
Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, and Howerter (2000), executive control is not a 
unitary concept and can be divided into three distinctive abilities (i.e., response inhi-
bition, working memory updating, and mental set shifting). Hence, though highly 
speculative, finding EC to be a moderator in this context may have required a much 
more focused approach, e.g., by using the stop-signal task (Logan, 1994) tapping into 
the concept of response inhibition, or the Self-Ordered Pointing Task (SOPT; Petrides 
& Milner, 1982) tapping into working memory capacities, a task which has also been 
successfully used to assess moderation effects in non-dependent participants (Grenard 
et al., 2008; Thush et al., 2008). Finally, patients suffering from depression and/or 
anxiety disorders also show deficits in EC (e.g., Austin, Mitchell, & Goodwin, 2001; 
Beaudreau, & O’Hara, 2008; Kaiser et al., 2003; Micco et al., 2009; Trichard et al., 1995). 
In our data, this is reflected by the negative correlation between Stroop scores and 
levels of depressive symptoms. As such, EC may not have been the most differentiating 
variable.
In sum, our findings do not support our predictions derived from the present empirical 
and theoretical state of affairs. However, our null findings are clearly not a result of 
insufficient sample size, as both our dependent and control inpatient samples were 
unusually large. Moreover, due to our selection criteria on AUDIT and BDI, we defined 
our groups as clearly as possible. However, a limitation of the present study is that 
both the priming task and the Stroop task were part of a larger test battery which 
included other computerized tasks to measure cognitive processes related to alcohol 
and executive control, implying that carry-over effects may have affected our results 
in an unfortunate manner. Hence, replicating the present study with both tasks 
administered in a single session seems worthwhile. The application of a more reliable 
paradigm to assess priming effects is another recommendation, and implementing a 
manipulation that guarantees a thorough processing of the affective primes may be 
crucial, too. In student samples, for example, mood induction procedures have been 
applied quite successfully when studying cognitive processes related to the automatic 
activation of alcohol-related concepts (Birch et al., 2008; Grant, Stewart, & Birch, 
2007). 
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To conclude, the present study was designed to identify boundary conditions of the 
automatic activation of alcohol-related memory associations by affective words in a 
clinical population of alcohol-dependent inpatients. Results showed that none of our 
expectations were confirmed. The main reason for this may be found in the particular 
population we studied: Previous studies mainly involved risk samples, whereas we 
tested alcohol-dependent inpatients. Second, features of the affective priming task may 
be responsible for the observed null effects, namely its low reliability and the fact that it 
was part of a larger test battery. However, the identification of risk factors for developing 
and maintaining an alcohol dependency is of great clinical and societal importance. 
Therefore, the general recommendation for future research is to systematically apply 
optimized methods in different populations to further advance our understanding of 
the impact of negative affect on the automatic activation of alcohol-related concepts. 
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Don’t panic: Interpretation bias is predictive of new 
onsets of panic disorder 
ABSTRACT
Psychological models of panic disorder postulate that interpretation of ambiguous material 
as threatening is an important maintaining factor for the disorder. However, demonstrations 
of whether such a bias predicts onset of panic disorder are missing. In the present study, 
we used data from the Dresden Prediction Study, in which an epidemiologic sample of 
young German women was tested at two time points approximately 17 months apart, 
allowing the study of biased interpretation as a potential risk factor. At time point one, 
participants completed an Interpretation Questionnaire including two types of ambiguous 
scenarios: panic-related and general threat-related. Analyses revealed that a panic-related 
interpretation bias predicted onset of panic disorder, even after controlling for two established 
risk factors: anxiety sensitivity and fear of bodily sensations. This is the first prospective 
study demonstrating the incremental validity of interpretation bias as a predictor of panic 
disorder onset. 
This chapter is based on:
Woud, M. L., Zhang, X. C., Becker, E. S., McNally, R. J., & Margraf, J. (2014). Don’t 
panic: Interpretation bias is predictive of new onsets of panic disorder. Journal of 
Anxiety Disorders, 28, 83-87.
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INTRODUCTION
A pounding heart, hot flashes, lightheadedness – these could merely be signs that one 
is falling in love. However, individuals suffering from panic disorder often interpret 
these bodily sensations as signifying an imminent catastrophe such as a heart attack. 
Psychological models of panic disorder postulate that such biased interpretations 
serve to maintain the disorder (e.g., Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Clark, 1986; 
McNally, 1994). In particular, these models postulate that patients suffering from a 
panic disorder automatically interpret bodily sensations as threatening, inciting a 
vicious circle that can culminate in panic. 
Modifying a measure by Butler and Mathews (1983), McNally and Foa (1987) developed 
an Interpretation Questionnaire containing ambiguous scenarios that were panic- 
related or panic-unrelated. They found that patients suffering from agoraphobia and 
panic interpreted panic-related scenarios as threatening more often than did treated 
agoraphobia/panic patients and healthy control subjects. Other investigators replicated 
and extended these findings. Harvey, Richards, Dziadosz, and Swindell (1993) found 
that relative to social phobia patients and healthy control subjects,  panic patients ex-
hibited an interpretation bias specific for the ambiguous panic scenarios, whereas 
both anxiety groups exhibited a threatening interpretation bias for the panic-unrelated 
scenarios. Results of Clark et al. (1997) further clarified this issue, demonstrating 
that patients suffering from panic disorder are more likely to believe their (biased) 
interpretations compared to other anxiety patients and healthy controls. Finally, 
Rosmarin, Bourque, Antony, and McCabe (2009) showed that panic patients exhibited 
a self-referential, not a global interpretation bias for threat.
Extending this work, Teachman, Smith-Janik, and Saporito (2007) studied the role of 
dysfunctional panic-related interpretations by combining a scenario based assessment 
with a reaction time (RT) based assessment. The scenario based assessment (Brief 
Body Sensation Questionnaire, BBSQ; Clark et al., 1997) included ambiguous panic-
related scenarios as well as ambiguous scenarios describing generally threatening 
situations. The RT assessment involved the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), a computerized categorization task using RTs as indices 
for the strength of memory associations. The IAT results showed that panic patients, 
compared to healthy controls, had stronger associations of concepts related to the self 
and panic.1 The BBSIQ results showed a panic-related interpretation bias in patients, 
but not in healthy subjects. 
1 Please see Teachman et al. (2007) for outcomes of a second IAT assessing different panic-related associations.
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It remains unclear whether this interpretation bias is a consequence of panic disorder 
or a predictor, and possible causal risk factor, for the disorder (Kraemer et al., 1997). 
To (partly) investigate this question, Schneider, Unnewehr, Florin, and Margraf 
(2002) administered the Anxiety Interpretation Questionnaire for Children (AIQ-C), 
based on McNally and Foa’s Interpretation Questionnaire, to children of panic patients, 
children of parents with animal phobia, and children of healthy subjects. The AIQ-C 
included three types of ambiguous scenarios, i.e., descriptions of panic-related and 
panic-unrelated body sensations as well as animal-related situations. Results demon-
strated that children of parents who suffered from a panic disorder exhibited a panic-
related interpretation bias, but only after they had been primed with panic-relevant 
but not with panic-irrelevant material. 
Another way to investigate this issue is to study people who are at risk of developing 
panic disorder. For example, cross-sectional and longitudinal research shows that 
anxiety sensitivity predicts the onset of panic attacks (e.g., Cox, Endler, Swinson, & 
Norton, 1991; Schmidt, Lerew, & Jackson, 1997) and anxiety disorders (Schmidt, 
Zvolensky, & Maner, 2006). Hence, examining panic-related interpretation biases 
in people scoring high on anxiety sensitivity may provide valuable information. 
Teachman (2005) found that individuals high on anxiety sensitivity exhibited a 
panic-related interpretation bias (see also Richards, Austin, & Alvarenga, 2001). 
Studies on patients undergoing cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) suggest that reduction 
in interpretation biases over the course of therapy predicts reduction in symptom 
severity and panic frequency (Teachman, Marker, & Clerkin, 2010). Similarly, reduction 
in the strength of automatic panic associations predicts symptom reduction during CBT 
(Teachman, Marker, & Smith-Janik, 2008). Though longitudinal, these studies could 
not test whether premorbid interpretation biases predict the onset of panic disorder.
Accordingly, in this study we used a prospective design to test whether a version of 
McNally and Foa’s Interpretation Questionnaire predicted new onset of panic disorder 
in an epidemiologic study of young German women tested at two time points over an 
approximately 17-month time interval. We hypothesized that women who interpret 
ambiguous panic-related scenarios in a threatening manner at baseline are more likely 
to develop panic disorder at follow-up than are women who have benign interpretations 
of these scenarios at baseline. In addition, we expect that the panic-related interpre-
tation bias retains its predictive significance, even after controlling for levels of anxiety 
sensitivity and for fear of bodily sensations, which are two established correlates of 
panic disorder.
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METHOD
Participants
Participants were 1538 German women who took part in the Dresden Predictor 
Study (DPS; Trumpf et al., 2010). The study involved two assessments. The baseline 
assessment occurred between July 1996 and September 1997, and the follow-up 
assessment occurred about 17-months after that (M = 16.9 months, SD = 6, range = 
7-30 months). During both assessments, participants completed a diagnostic interview 
and a battery of self-report questionnaires including the Interpretation Questionnaire 
(see Trumpf et al., 2010). This article includes the data of participants who completed 
the diagnostic interview at both time points.
Participants were female residents drawn randomly from the population register of 
Dresden whose age the time of the initial interview ranged between 18-25 years old. 
There were 5203 eligible women, and 2068 of them completed the baseline diagnostic 
interview and 997 of these participants completed only the questionnaires for a response 
rate of 58.9%. Of those who completed the diagnostic interview, 1538 (74.4%) completed 
the interview at follow-up.
Diagnostic Interview 
At both assessments, a trained interviewer administered the ‘Diagnostisches Interview 
bei psychischen Störungen – Forschungsversion’ (F-DIPS; translation: Diagnostic 
Interview for Mental Disorders – Research Version; Margraf, Schneider, Soeder, & 
Becker, 1996). The F-DIPS is an extended version of the Anxiety Disorders Interview 
Schedule (ADIS-IV-L; Di Nardo, Brown, & Barlow, 1995) that assesses DSM-IV Axis 
I disorders. Baseline interviews assessed 7-day information and lifetime and point 
prevalence. Follow-up interviews also assessed 7-day information plus the time interval 
since baseline (for details about procedure, training of interviewers, and reliability 
ratings, see Trumpf et al., 2010). 
Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI; Ehlers, 1986; Reiss, Peterson, Gursky, &
McNally, 1986)
The ASI is a 16-item self-report questionnaire measuring fear and concerns regarding 
anxiety-related symptoms such as ‘It scares me when my heart beats rapidly’. Items 
are rated on a five-point Likert scale (0 = ‘very little’ to 4 = ’very much’). 
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Body Sensations Questionnaire (BSQ; Chambless, Caputo, Bright, &
Gallagher, 1984; Ehlers, Margraf, & Chambless, 1993) 
The BSQ includes 17 items that reflect specific bodily sensations (e.g., heart palpations, 
dizziness). Participants are asked to indicate the degree to which they experience anxiety 
related to these sensations by means of a five-point Likert scale (1 = ‘not at all’ to 5 = 
‘extremely’). 
Interpretation Questionnaire
The Interpretation Questionnaire consisted of 18 brief scenarios used in earlier studies 
(Ebert, 1993); 14 were translated from the Interpretation Questionnaire of McNally 
and Foa (1987). Nine items described panic-related situations (e.g., ‘You feel discomfort 
in your chest area. Why?’), and the other nine described general, threat-related situations 
(e.g., ‘You smell smoke’). Below each scenario, three interpretations appeared, one 
threatening. To illustrate, for the first example the following explanations were 
presented: (1) Something is wrong with your heart, (2) You have a sore muscle, (3) 
You have indigestion. Participants had to indicate the interpretation (explanation) 
most likely to come to mind if they were to experience the sensation in the scenario. 
Panic-related and general threat-related scenarios were presented alternating, and the 
order of threatening and non-threatening explanations was randomized across 
scenarios. All participants received the same order of scenarios. 
RESULTS
Participant characteristics 
At baseline (i.e., T1), 45 of the 1538 women met criteria for lifetime panic disorder with 
or without agoraphobia, and 114 women diagnosed with another lifetime psychological 
disorder served as a comparison group. Within this latter group, 70 suffered from a 
mood disorder, 19 from a somatoform disorder, 10 from a substance use disorder, 
and 31 from an eating disorder.2 However, this group did not include any participants 
with anxiety disorders at baseline or follow-up as panic attacks occur frequently 
in other anxiety disorders, too (Barlow, 2002). At follow-up (i.e., T2), there were 26 
new onsets of panic disorder, and 32 had remitted from panic disorder. Within the 
2 From now on, we no longer point out that these data relate to lifetime prevalence.
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comparison group, there were the following new onsets: 37 suffered from a mood 
disorder, 13 from a somatoform disorder, 9 from a substance use disorder, and 9 from 
an eating disorder. At follow-up, 6 participants in the comparison group had remitted 
from a mood disorder, 2 from a somatoform disorder, 1 from a substance use disorder, 
and 4 from an eating disorder. Please find an overview of the group’s means and 
standard deviations of the Interpretation Questionnaire, levels of anxiety sensitivity 
(ASI) and fear of bodily sensations (BSQ) in Table 1.
Table 1. Demographic data per diagnostic group for all four predictors, i.e., Interpretation 
Questionnaire (IB):  IB panic, IB general threat; levels of anxiety sensitivity (ASI); and fear of 
bodily sensations (BSQ).
No diagnosis at 
T1 and T2
No diagnosis at 
T1 but at T2
Diagnostic 
group
Measure M (SD) 
N
M (SD) 
N
Panic
IB panic 0.70 (1.02)
1376
1.67 (1.74)
21
IB threat 2.80 (1.70)
1377
3.70 (1.89)
20
ASI 12.42 (7.35) 
1400
20.41 (9.84)
22
BSQ 1.80 (0.61) 
1389
2.14 (0.69)   
23
Other psych. 
disorders
IB panic 0.60 (0.93)
744
0.48 (0.73)
52
IB threat 2.71 (1.70)
748
2.51 (1.65)
53
ASI 11.56 (6.84)
756
10.39 (7.70)
54
BSQ 1.73 (0.57)
754
1.82 (0.64)  
54
 
Interpretation Questionnaire
Data preparation and statistical approach. First, participants’ scores were recoded: All 
threatening explanations were coded with ‘1’ (e.g., when a panic-related interpretation 
was checked for a panic scenario), all non-threatening ones with ‘0’ (e.g., when a 
panic-unrelated interpretation was checked for a panic scenario). Second, scores were 
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collapsed into a sum score per participant for both panic- and general threat-related 
scenarios. Out of the 1538 women, we had the complete data of 1418. Sixty-eight women 
did not complete the questionnaire. The missing data of the remaining sample ranged 
from 1 to 11 items. For analyses, we used only complete data sets (see Table 1 for 
means and standard deviations of bias indices and ns).3  
We conducted several logistic regressions. The dependent variable in each regression 
was new onset of the respective disorder (‘0’ = absent, ‘1’ = present).  The small sample 
size in the panic group precluded an analysis including all 4 predictors (i.e., panic- and 
threat-related bias, ASI, BSQ). Indeed, standard guidelines (e.g., Backhaus, Erichson, 
Plinke, & Weiber, 2003) specify a minimum of N = 10 per predictor, and hence a mini-
mum of N = 40 for a full analysis in our case. However, our total sample included 
between 19 and 23 participants (see Table 2 for a detailed overview per predictor/
predictor combination). Accordingly, the maximum number of predictors per analysis 
was two, and therefore we conducted several multiple regressions involving two 
predictors (e.g., panic-related interpretation bias with ASI). The sample size of new 
onsets of psychological disorders was slightly larger, but still insufficient for full analyses. 
Hence, we again conducted several multiple regressions.
Relationship of interpretation bias with new onsets of panic disorder and 
psychological disorders at follow-up
An overview of the results appears in Table 2. Analyses revealed that a panic-related 
interpretation bias significantly predicted new onsets of panic disorder even after we 
controlled statistically for anxiety sensitivity and for fear of bodily sensations in two 
separate regressions. In contrast, a general threat-related interpretation bias was a 
non-significant predictor of new onsets of panic disorder after we controlled for anxiety 
sensitivity, and a marginally significant predictor when we controlled for fear of bodily 
sensations. Finally, results showed that levels of anxiety sensitivity also significantly 
predicted new onsets of panic disorders after we controlled for a panic- and general 
threat-related interpretation bias as well as for fear of bodily sensations. Fear of bodily 
sensations, however, was only predictive in the regression controlling for the threat-
related interpretation bias. Regarding the prediction of onset of other psychological 
disorders, results showed that only anxiety sensitivity and fear of bodily sensations 
were significant predictors, but only when these were combined in one analysis. 
3 See Trumpf et al. (2010) for attrition analyses. Analyses of missing values within the present data revealed that there was differential 
attrition within both panic groups. However, this is most likely due to the large sample sizes. Furthermore, effects sizes were extreme-
ly low.
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Table 2. Prediction of new onsets rates of panic disorder and psychological disorders by means 
of Interpretation Questionnaire (IB): IB panic, IB general threat; levels of anxiety sensitivity 
(ASI); and fear of bodily sensations (BSQ).
Statistics
Diagnostic group Predictor(s) in 
regression
N p OR CI
Panic disorder IB panic 21 vs 1376 < 0.001 1.678 1.297--2.171
IB threat 20 vs 1377 0.02 1.315 1.044--1.656
ASI 22 vs 1400 < 0.001 1.109 1.063--1.157
BSQ 23 vs 1398 0.009 2.189 1.213--3.951
IB panic 20 vs 1357 0.023 1.445 1.051--1.988
IB threat 0.26 1.161 0.896--1.504
IB panic 20 vs 1373 0.036 1.380 1.022--1.863
ASI < 0.001 1.092 1.040--1.146
IB panic 21 vs 1372 0.002 1.552 1.176--2.049
BSQ 0.106 1.715 0.891--3.3
IB threat 19 vs 1343 0.249 1.159 0.902--1.49
ASI < 0.001 1.102 1.051--1.156
IB threat 20 vs 1373 0.093 1.230 0.966--1.565
BSQ 0.043 1.972 1.020--3.811
ASI 22 vs 1396 < 0.001 1.116 1.052--1.184
BSQ 0.757 0.879 0.389--1.989
Other psychological disorders IB panic 52 vs 744 0.373 0.855 0.605--1.207
IB threat 53 vs 748 0.396 0.929 0.783--1.102
ASI 54 vs 756 0.231 0.975 0.934--1.017
BSQ 54 vs 754 0.289 1.285 0.808--2.045
IB panic 52 vs 738 0.587 0.902 0.620--1.310
IB threat 0.487 0.935 0.773--1.130
IB panic 52 vs 741 0.563 0.901 0.633--1.283
ASI 0.245 0.974 0.931--1.018
IB panic 52 vs 740 0.295 0.829 0.585--1.177
BSQ 0.284 1.304 0.803--2.119
IB threat 53 vs 745 0.564 0.95 0.797--1.132
ASI 0.346 0.979 0.937--1.023
IB threat 53 vs 744 0.257 0.903 0.756--1.078
BSQ 0.187 1.381 0.855--2.228
ASI 54 vs 752 0.015 0.93 0.877--0.986
BSQ 0.014 2.212 1.176--4.161
Note: N: new onsets vs. no onsets, p: significance; OR: odds ratio, CI: 95% confidence interval 
Significant p-values are printed in italics.
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DISCUSSION
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first longitudinal study to investigate whether 
new onsets of panic disorder are predictable by a panic-related interpretation bias. As 
hypothesized, analyses revealed that women who interpreted ambiguous panic-related 
scenarios in a threatening manner at baseline were more likely to develop panic dis-
order at follow-up than were women who had benign interpretations of these scenarios. 
Strikingly, interpretation bias for panic-related (but not other) scenarios retained its 
predictive significance after we controlled for anxiety sensitivity and for fear of bodily 
sensations – two established correlates of panic disorder. Neither of the two bias 
measures predicted new onsets of other psychological disorders. However, when com-
bined in one analysis, anxiety sensitivity and fear of bodily sensations were significant 
predictors for onset of psychological disorders.
One may explain our findings as follows. Women who tend to interpret bodily sensa-
tions as potentially threatening (as indicated by their interpretations of the ambiguous 
panic-related scenarios in the study) will make these mis-interpretations more often 
in day to day life. Hence, they might experience increased stress, fear, and worry in 
their daily life, and may regard the world as generally dangerous, thereby developing a 
panic-specific memory schema. This panic-specific memory schema is hypersensitive 
(i.e., easily activated) regarding panic-related information, and thus could, in turn, 
reinforce the dysfunctional processing of ambiguous panic-related cues. Having such 
a vulnerability increases the likelihood of developing panic disorder. 
We also found that a general threat-related bias is a marginally significant predictor 
of developing a panic disorder. This is not surprising, as it is very likely that there is some 
overlap in panic- and threat-related memory schemata, respectively. Hence, activation 
of one memory schema will likely activate associated concepts. Findings of cross- 
sectional studies partly support this, showing that panic patients are also likely to 
misinterpret general threat-related ambiguous information (e.g., Harvey et al., 1993).
Taking together, these findings support the incremental, predictive validity of panic-
related interpretation biases, thereby deepening our understanding of the role of 
panic-related interpretation biases. As of yet, there is evidence showing that high 
levels of anxiety sensitivity are positively associated with panic-related interpretation 
biases (e.g., Teachman, 2005; Richards et al., 2001) and with having future panic 
attacks (e.g., Schmidt et al., 1997). Moreover, although Schmidt, Zvolensky, & Maner 
(2006) found that anxiety sensitivity predicted new onsets of  Axis I disorders in gener-
al, they did not find that it specifically increased risk for new onsets of panic disorder 
per se. However, in our epidemiologic sample, we found that anxiety sensitivity predict 
new onsets of panic disorder, not merely panic attacks. As far as we know, this is the 
first demonstration of anxiety sensitivity as a predictor of panic disorder onset. 
Chapter 8
150
The present study is not without limitations. First, the sample of main interest (i.e., new 
onsets of panic) was small, so analyses including all four predictors as well exploratory 
analyses including for example participants’ pre-existing (panic-related) psychopa-
thologies were impossible. Second, our design included two assessments so (individual) 
change trajectories could not be examined. Hence, a multi-wave design including 
three or more time points would have been preferable. Third, maintaining a constant 
time interval between baseline and follow-up was impossible. Therefore, the 17 months 
is not an a priori planned interval, and we do not know whether this affected our results. 
Fourth, the inclusion of control explanations in the Interpretation Questionnaire 
(e.g., neutral, positive) would have been a more optimal approach and would have 
strengthened our conclusions. Finally, the results have a limited generalizability. The 
sample included only well-educated women scoring relatively high on socioeconomic 
status. Furthermore, we only tested young women. 
To summarize, the present data provide new insights regarding the development of 
panic disorder. This becomes even more important when taking into consideration 
that the anxiety literature does not provide many demonstrations of the predictive 
power of interpretation biases. The evidence we found is restricted to studies involving 
(preschool) children and adolescents, and focused on anxiety in general (e.g., Pury, 2002; 
Creswell, Shildrick, & Field, 2011; Muris, Jacques, & Mayer, 2004). However, as of yet 
we do not know whether a panic-related interpretation bias should be also considered 
as a causal risk factor (Kraemer et al., 1997). Teachman et al. (2010) found that changes 
in catastrophic interpretations predicted positive panic-relevant treatment outcomes. 
We found that a panic-related interpretation bias is predictive of new onsets of panic 
disorder. Although these findings clearly demonstrate the important role of panic- 
related interpretation biases in panic disorder, what is needed now are investigations 
manipulating this factor, for example via cognitive bias manipulation procedures (cf. 
Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009). To illustrate, research on social anxiety has shown 
that interpretation biases seemingly play a causal role in increasing anxiety proneness 
(e.g., Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). Hence, investigating whether an experimentally 
induced panic-related interpretation bias affects the appraisal of potential panic 
symptoms would be a next step, bearing in mind the ethical requirements of such an 
approach. 
Moreover, it is also important to think of ways to prevent the development of a panic 
disorder. In this context, the study of Woud, Postma, Holmes, & Mackintosh (2013) 
provides a promising line of research. Their study successfully employed appraisal train-
ing as a ‘cognitive prophylaxis’ in the context of analogue trauma. Hence, developing a 
preventative tool for panic disorder offers an interesting challenge. Finally, research is 
needed that extends present findings regarding panic-related biases in information 
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processing. To illustrate, panic patients do also suffer from panic-related attentional 
biases (e.g., Beck, Stanley, & Averill, 1992; Ehlers, Margraf, Davies, & Roth, 1988). There-
fore, it would be worthwhile to start examining the functional relationship between 
panic-related interpretation and attentional biases, respectively. 
In conclusion, our findings provide strong support for a role of panic-related inter-
pretation biases in the development of panic disorder. 
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9
Ameliorating intrusive memories of distressing  
experiences using computerized reappraisal training
ABSTRACT 
The types of appraisals that follow traumatic experiences have been linked to the emergence 
of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Could changing reappraisals following a 
stressful event reduce the emergence of PTSD symptoms? The present proof-of-principle 
study examined whether a non-explicit, systematic computerized training in reappraisal 
style following a stressful event (a highly distressing film) could reduce intrusive memories 
of the film, and symptoms associated with posttraumatic distress over the subsequent 
week. Participants were trained to adopt a generally positive or negative post-stressor 
appraisal style using a series of scripted vignettes after having been exposed to highly 
distressing film clips. The training targeted self-efficacy beliefs and reappraisals of 
secondary emotions (emotions in response to the emotional reactions elicited by the film). 
Successful appraisal induction was verified using novel vignettes and via change scores 
on the Post Traumatic Cognitions Inventory. Compared with those trained negatively, 
those trained positively reported fewer intrusive memories of the film during the subsequent 
week in a diary, and lower scores on the Impact of Event Scale (a widely-used measure 
of posttraumatic stress symptoms). Results support the use of computerized, non-explicit, 
reappraisal training after a stressful event has occurred and provide a platform for future 
translational studies with clinical populations that have experienced significant real-world 
stress or trauma.
This chapter is based on: 
Woud, M. L., Holmes, E. A., Postma, P., Dalgleish, T. & Mackintosh, B. (2012). 
Ameliorating intrusive memories of distressing experiences using computerized 
reappraisal training. Emotion, 12, 778-784.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a broad consensus within philosophy (e.g., Solomon, 1993), affective science 
(e.g., Lazarus, 1982; Ochsner & Gross, 2008; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001), and 
abnormal psychology (e.g., Power & Dalgleish, 2008) that the emotional impact of 
stressful events is principally determined by how those events are appraised or 
interpreted. These initial event-related appraisals are frequently the starting point 
for iterative cycles of appraising and reappraising that extend beyond the events 
themselves to encompass their emotional, cognitive, and practical implications 
(Gross & Thompson, 2007; Lewis, 1996). The nature of these appraisal cycles seems to 
drive not only how we feel about events but other aspects of cognitive processing such 
as how well the events are remembered (see Gross, 2002) and the frequency with 
which such memories intrude into awareness (e.g., Schartau, Dalgleish, & Dunn, 2009). 
For example, we know from the literature on traumatic stress reactions to highly 
emotive events that appraising the self as culpable for such events or as chronically 
psychologically damaged by them (e.g., ‘I have permanently changed for the worse’; ‘The 
event happened because of the way I acted’) is associated with increases in debilitating 
intrusive recollections of those events and one’s role in them (Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin, 
& Orsillo, 1999; Grey & Holmes, 2008). The very presence of these intrusive experiences 
can itself then become the subject of further appraisal (e.g., ‘Having this flashback 
must mean I’m going mad’). Again, the nature of such appraisals appears to drive 
both further intrusive phenomenology and other symptoms of post-event distress, 
including in severe cases posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Bryant & Guthrie, 2005; 
Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Meiser-Stedman, Dalgleish, Glucksman, Yule, & Smith, 2009).
A core feature of this broad cognitive appraisal model of the genesis of event-based 
emotions and their concomitants is that appraisals vary in the extent to which they 
reflect the ‘reality’ of a given situation. This is important, because appraisals with a 
low ‘truth value’ can then be the target for attempts at appraisal change, or reappraisal 
(Gross, 2002), designed to reduce associated distress and other symptoms. So, for 
example, appraising oneself as culpable for a negative event (as above) may well lead 
to significant distress and intrusive recollections, but if the evidence suggests that 
self-blame is misdirected then targeted re-scripting of such appraisals into a more 
adaptive form has the potential to down-regulate distress and intrusive reexperiencing 
(e.g., intrusive memories) of the event. There is now an impressive body of laboratory 
research looking at the beneficial effects of reappraisal as a broad emotion-regulation 
strategy in healthy participants (Gross, 2002) and exciting preliminary findings in 
those with emotional disorders (e.g., Carthy, Horesh, Apter, Edge, & Gross, 2010; 
Ehring, Tuschen-Caffler, Schnulle, Fischer, & Gross, 2010; Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, 
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& Schweizer, 2010). These extant studies have a number of prototypical characteristics. 
First, they tend to focus on modifying appraisals occurring relatively early in the 
appraisal cycle; i.e., on reappraising the event itself rather than its downstream impli-
cations or one’s responses to it. Although this is clearly important, for a significant 
number of real-world situations opportunities to reappraise will occur after the events 
in question have already happened. In these circumstances, although it is of course 
possible to interpret retrospectively aspects of the event itself, modifying appraisals of 
the event’s implications and/or one’s responses to it are a potentially tractable regulation 
strategy that could be applied more broadly regardless of event contents. The primary 
aim of the current study was therefore to examine the effects of reappraisals applied 
following the experience of an emotive event, as opposed to prior to or during the event, 
and directed at the implications of the event for the person and his/her responses to 
it, as opposed to the actual contents of the event experience.
A second feature of existing studies is a focus on the impact of reappraisal on emotions 
rather than on concomitants of the cognitive-affective response such as memory 
intrusions (although a number of studies have looked at memory for the event itself; 
see Gross, 2002). This makes sense when looking at reappraisal in the local context of 
the event itself. However, when reappraisal efforts are employed post-event, and thus 
less directly targeted at event contents, alternative outcome variables should be con-
sidered. Consequently, the present study examined the effects of post-event reappraisals 
on intrusive and distressing memories for events and attempts to avoid them. A final 
characteristic of some existing studies that is worth noting (though perhaps of less 
importance) is that they often have not involved systematic reappraisal training, relying 
instead on single (or a limited number of) attempts to apply a reappraisal strategy. 
We contend that reappraisal efforts are likely to reap richer benefits following more 
comprehensive training. In the present study we therefore sought to train participants 
systematically into a more adaptive appraisal style following event exposure. 
We based our training protocol on methods developed within the Cognitive Bias 
Modification (CBM) literature (e.g., MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & 
Holker, 2002; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; MacLeod, Koster, & Fox, 2009). CBM 
involves the presentation of multiple trials in which participants are guided to respond 
in a systematically biased manner. CBM can therefore be used to train people out of 
bad ‘cognitive habits’, such as tendencies to attend selectively to threat or to interpret 
ambiguous situations in a negative manner. CBM has also been successfully deployed 
to alter participants’ appraisals (CBM-App training) (e.g., Lang, Moulds, & Holmes, 
2009; Schartau et al., 2009). Hence, we sought here to extend CBM-App training to 
explore the possibility of modifying appraisal style following stressor event exposure. 
A feature of the CBM-App training used in the present study that differs from typical 
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(non-CBM) reappraisals studies, is its non-explicit nature: In CBM-App, as used here, 
participants’ appraisal styles are modified through repeated practise but participants 
are not explicitly informed as to the purpose of the manipulation or encouraged to 
make such changes explicitly. 
In line with prior studies within both the reappraisal literature and the psychological 
trauma literature we employed a series of highly emotive film clips as the distressing 
event (see Holmes & Bourne, 2008; Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007). Such clips reliably 
induce significant levels of emotion as well as intrusive memories of the film over the 
subsequent weeks. They therefore provide an ideal test-bed to evaluate the efficacy of 
post-event CBM-App training. Consistent with the emotion-regulation literature on 
reappraisal which routinely compares reappraisal to an unhelpful regulation strategy 
(e.g., rumination or expression suppression; see Gross, 2002), we sought to compare a 
putatively adaptive strategy – training in positive reappraisals – with a likely unhelpful 
strategy – training in negative reappraisals. 
We defined what is a positive or helpful versus negative or unhelpful reappraisal 
based on the extensive literature on appraisal styles in the wake of traumatic events 
(see Dalgleish, 2004). That is, after psychological trauma people can have vastly differ-
ent appraisals of the same event – one person my escape from a fire relieved to be alive, 
another feeling guilty and that it could be their fault. Specifically, we drew on prospective 
work by Bryant and Guthrie (2005, 2007) who assessed a group of trainee firefighters 
before trauma exposure using a measure of appraisals called the Posttraumatic 
Cognitions Inventory (PTCI; Foa et al., 1999). They then followed them up over four 
years to see which pre-trauma appraisals were associated with later trauma symptoms. 
Interestingly, negative appraisals about the self (e.g., ‘The event happened to me because 
of the sort of person I am’), rather than appraisals about the world, predicted later 
PTSD. The authors suggested that techniques to help people engage in more adaptive 
appraisals might help people better prepare for, or cope with, potentially traumatic 
events. Based on the encouraging data from Bryant and colleagues, we used the PTCI 
(Foa et al., 1999) as the source for our training materials. 
The training itself involved repeatedly guiding participants via a computerized para-
digm towards either positive versus negative appraisals (dependent on experimental 
condition) across a large set of scripted vignettes. After training, participants kept a 
one week diary recording any intrusive memories of the film. At one week they 
completed a questionnaire (the Impact of Event Scale-Revised, IES-R; Weiss & Marmer, 
1997) measuring post-traumatic intrusive, avoidance, and hyperarousal phenomena 
associated with the film. 
Our two hypotheses were: First, that CBM-App training would successfully induce 
either a functional or dysfunctional stressor-related appraisal style (dependent on 
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training condition and without explicit instruction). We tested this via post-training 
appraisals of novel ambiguous sentences and post-training scores on the PTCI. We did 
not expect there to be differences in the magnitude of emotional response to the film 
since the reappraisal target was the self-efficacy beliefs and reappraisal of secondary 
emotions (emotions in response to the emotional reactions elicited by the film) over 
a longer time period rather than immediate response to the film per se. Second, we 
predicted that training condition would influence the number of intrusions of the 
stressor film over one week and IES-R scores at one week, with training focused on 
functional appraisals leading to fewer intrusions and lower IES-R scores, compared 
with training focused on dysfunctional appraisals. 
METHOD
Participants
The 76 healthy participants (39 women) were recruited through advertising at the 
University of East Anglia. Participants were 18-60 years and fluent in written English. 
All participants received a small honorarium.
 
Stressor film
The 20 minute distressing film was a compilation of 1-3 minute clips. These clips reli-
ably elicit acute distress and subsequent intrusive memories in healthy volunteers (see 
Holmes & Bourne, 2008). To verify that engagement with the film was comparable across 
conditions, participants rated attention to the film, using a 10-point Likert-scale (see 
Holmes & Steel, 2004). The film contents comprised clips drawn from earlier studies 
(e.g., Bourne, Frasquilho, Roth, & Holmes, 2010; Holmes, James, Kilford, & Deeprose, 
2010; Schartau et al., 2009) with scenes displaying contents relevant to the DSM-IV 
criteria for a traumatic event; for example, footage from the 9/11 World Trade Center 
terrorist attack, motor vehicle accidents such as a car on fire and a sinking car, a bomb 
exploding, and a rampaging elephant injuring people. To enhance self-relevance, par-
ticipants were asked to view the film ‘as if they were there, a bystander at the scene of 
the events, and to pay attention to the film as later there may be questions about film 
contents’.
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Reappraisal training (CBM-App)
Training phase 
Training comprised processing a series of reappraisal-related scripted vignettes that 
appeared to participants as a sentence completion task (note that explicit instructions 
to actively reappraise were not used). Each sentence ended in a to-be-completed word 
fragment such that the meaning of the sentence remained ambiguous until the final 
word fragment was resolved. The participant’s task was to finish each sentence by 
completing the word fragment. Word fragments were designed such that only one 
possible solution could complete the sentence’s meaning, and these words produced 
an outcome consistent with either a functional or dysfunctional reappraisal depending 
on training condition (positive or negative). Themes from the ‘Self ’ subscale of the 
PTCI were used to develop CBM-App materials given the association of these themes 
with later post-stressor intrusions and distress (Bryant & Guthrie, 2005, 2007). Such 
items include ‘If I think about the event, I will not be able to handle it’ and ‘I can’t deal 
with even the slightest upset’. As a further example, there are PTCI items related to 
‘Trusting oneself to act appropriately in future’ this theme was used to create the 
following training sentences: (1) ‘In a crisis, I predict my responses will be h-lpf-l/u-el-ss’ 
(resolved as ‘useless’ in the negative CBM-App condition or ‘helpful’ in the positive) 
and:  (2) ‘When faced with a crisis, I now believe that I will react in a way which is r-l-able/
unr-l-able’. To encourage thorough processing of the sentences’ meaning, a comprehen-
sion question was included after just under half of the sentences (e.g., for the first 
example ‘Do you believe you will be able to respond in a useful way when there is a 
crisis?’). Questions were designed such that ‘yes’/‘no’ answers occurred equally often, 
with error feedback for incorrect responses. It is important to reiterate that the training 
was deliberately not targeted at reappraising the contents of the film.  
In this way, 72 training sentences and 32 comprehension questions were created, along 
with 8 emotionally neutral filler sentences giving a total of 80 sentences presented in 
blocks of 10. Blocks were presented in the same order for each participant but the 
sentences’ order within each block was individually randomized. 
A trial sequence was as follows: The sentence was displayed via computer screen 
without the final word fragment. Participants were instructed to proceed by pressing 
the ‘advance’ key when they had read the sentence(s). After the key press, the text 
disappeared revealing the final word fragment. Participants typed the first missing 
letter of the fragment as quickly as possible. The completed correct word then appeared 
on screen. Either a comprehension question followed or a new sentence was presented. 
Measuring induced reappraisal bias 
Induced bias was assessed following CBM-App training using a two-phase procedure 
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involving an initial encoding stage, followed by a later surprise recognition stage 
(Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). During encoding, participants were presented with 
ten novel ambiguous sentences in random order, also based on PTCI items. Each 
sentence was introduced with a distinctive title and, unlike the former training items, 
remained ambiguous (see Appendix Table A1 for an example). After each, participants 
were required to imagine themselves vividly in the situation and rate this using a 10 
point scale. 
In the surprise recognition phase the original 10 encoding-phase sentence titles, each 
followed by a set of 4 related sentences, were presented in turn. Participants rated, on 
a 4 point scale, how close in meaning each new sentence seemed to the original sen-
tence. Of the four new sentences, two represented a possible positive and a negative 
interpretation of the original sentence (positive and negative target sentences). Two 
more sentences, with a general positive/negative meaning respectively, had contents 
broadly similar to the original sentence, but not an actual resolution of the ambiguity 
(positive and negative foil items; see Appendix Table A1).
Intrusion diary
Participants were given a diary to record any intrusions of film contents during the 7 
days following the experimental session. Participants were advised (both verbally and 
via written instructions in the diary) that intrusions were defined as ‘any memory of 
the film (or part of the film) that appeared apparently spontaneously in their minds. 
Do not include any memories of the film that you deliberately or consciously bring to 
mind’. The diary was similar to that used in previous studies (Hagenaars, Van Minnen, 
Holmes, Brewin, & Hoogduin, 2008; Holmes & colleagues, 2004, 2009, 2006; Krans, 
Näring, Holmes, & Becker, 2009; Stuart, Holmes, & Brewin, 2006). Participants were 
asked to record all intrusions immediately after they occurred (whenever possible) 
and to set aside a regular time slot each day to check that their diary was up-to-date 
as a way of ensuring intrusions were not omitted if it had been impractical to write an 
intrusion down immediately. If participants had experienced no intrusions during 
any period they were also asked to make this explicit in the diary. Participants were 
also given instructions about the different forms intrusions can take: ‘What goes 
through our minds can either take the form of words and phrases (‘verbal thoughts’), or 
it can be like mental images. Although mental images often take the form of pictures 
they can actually include any of the five senses, so you can imagine sounds or smells 
too.’ Participants were therefore asked to specify in their diary whether each intrusion 
experienced was a thought, an image intrusion or a combination of both and to describe 
its contents (e.g., ‘A fireman carrying a baby’) so as to ensure that the intrusion related 
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to the film. The diaries were then reviewed with participants at the start of the follow 
up session to resolve any uncertainties. A summary score of the number of intrusions 
of any type reported in the diary was produced for each participant.
Diary compliance rating 
Following Davies and Clark (1998), participants were asked to rate their diary 
completion in comparison with the statement, ‘I have often forgotten (or have been 
unable) to record my intrusive thoughts or images in the diary’, on a scale ranging 
from ‘0’ (not at all true of me) to ‘10’ (completely true of me). 
State and Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S, STAI-T; Spielberger, Gorsuch, 
Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983)
The STAI-S and STAI-T were used to measure state and trait anxiety, respectively. 
Both subscales comprise 20 anxiety related statements describing anxiety symptoms 
that participants rate for occurrence and frequency. The STAI has good internal 
consistency, .89. The test–retest reliability of the STAI-T is .88, and .70 for the STAI-S 
(Barnes, Harp, & Jung, 2002).
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996)
The BDI-II was administered to assess depressive symptoms. Participants respond to 
21 depression related questions with respect to the way they felt during the past 2 
weeks. The internal consistency is high with an alpha level of .90, and the test–retest 
reliability is also high .93 (Beck et al., 1996).
Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI; Foa et al., 1999)
The PTCI is a self-report measure comprising 36 statements which reflect appraisals 
surrounding distressing or traumatic experiences (e.g., ‘I can’t trust that I will do the 
right thing’). It contains three subscales: negative cognitions about Self (21 items), 
negative cognitions about theWorld (7 items) and Self-Blame (5 items). Each item is 
rated using a 7 point Likert scale ranging from 1 = ’totally disagree’ to 7 = ’totally 
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agree’. Cronbach’s α has been reported at .97 for the Self scale, .88 for World, and .86 
for Self-Blame. Test–retest reliability has been reported at .75 and higher (Foa et al., 
1999). The PTCI was presented 3 times: pre-training, immediately post-CBM-App 
training and at 1-week follow-up, to examine changes in appraisal style. 
Impact of Event Scale-Revised (IES-R; Weiss & Marmer, 1997)
The IES-R is a self-report measure assessing current intrusion, avoidance and 
hyperarousal phenomena tied to a stress-inducing event. The 22 items were adapted 
to reflect experiences linked to the stressor films (e.g., Avoidance: ‘I tried not to think 
about the film’) as in Lang et al., (2009). Internal consistency has been reported at .97 
for the total score, .86 for the Intrusion subscale, .82 for Avoidance, and .85 for 
Hyperarousal. Test– retest reliability has been reported at .87 for the total score, .89 
for the Intrusion scale, .79 for Avoidance, and .82 for Hyperarousal (Sundin & Horowitz, 
2002). The IES-R was administered 1-week post CBM-App training to measure those 
post-traumatic phenomena tied to the film over that week.
Visual analogue mood rating scales (VAS mood scales)
Participants completed mood ratings before and after viewing the film to assess its 
emotive impact. Participants rated four mood states (happiness, depression, anger, 
anxiety) using 11 point scales from 0 = ’not at all’ to 10 = ’extremely’ (Davies & Clark, 
1998). Scores across the 4 scales were averaged (happiness reverse scored) to provide 
a single index of mood at each time point. Cronbach’s α was .72 for the first mood 
rating, and .80 for the second mood rating.
Procedure
Prior to viewing the stressor film, participants completed a number of widely-used, 
standardized self-report measures assessing variables putatively involved with stress-
related reappraisals. These data enabled us to check comparability on these variables 
across CBM-App conditions and comprised the: Trauma History Checklist (THC; 
Holmes et al., 2004) – a short measure of trauma history; STAI-S and STAI-T, and 
BDI-II. Participants then completed the first VAS mood ratings and PTCI. Participants 
were left alone to watch the stressful film projected onto the white wall of a darkened 
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testing room to maximize impact, followed by the attention to film rating and the second 
mood rating. 
The CBM-App training and bias assessment were presented next, followed by the third 
mood rating and second PTCI. Finally, the diary was distributed with instructions as 
to its completion during the following week.
One week later participants returned for completion of the third PTCI, IES-R and 
a review of their diary to ensure that subsequent analysis only included intrusions 
categorized as being related to the film clips. They were then debriefed, thanked and 
paid for their participation.  
RESULTS
Participant characteristics, baseline measures and compliance checks 
Data from 2 participants who did not comply with instructions (they were unable to 
watch the film clips) were set aside (according in advance to standardised laboratory 
protocols such as refusing to watch the stressful film and pressing the same key press 
throughout the training phase without reading the computer screen), leaving a final 
sample of 74 participants (37 women; mean age = 22.47, SD = 5.96). There were no 
significant between-group (CBM-positive vs. – negative) differences on demographics 
or baseline measures:  age, t(72) = 1.31, p = .19;  THC, t(72) = 1.44, p = .16, STAI-S, 
STAI-T, and BDI,  and baseline mood, t’s < 1, nor for attention paid to the film t’s < 1, 
or diary compliance, t(72) = 1.18,  p = .24 (see Table 1).
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Table 1. Demographic data, self report questionnaire, mood and diary data of the sample.
Negative group
(n = 37, 19 female)
Positive group
(n = 37, 18 female)
t-test
Measure M SD M SD
Age 21.57 3.80 23.38 7.47 t(72) = 1.31,     
p = .19
THC 2.05 1.68 1.57 1.19 t(72) = 1.44,  
p = .16
STAI-S 31.62 6.84 33.22 8.04 t(72) = 0.92,   
p = .36
STAI-T 36.76 8.09 38.62 9.23 t(72) = 0.92, 
p = .36
BDI-II 6.62 4.13 7.49 5.75 t(72) = 0.74,       
p = .46
Pre-film mood 1.64 1.08 1.73 1.22 t(72) = 0.33,       
p = .74
Post-film mood 3.99 2.08 3.74 1.90 t(72) = 0.54,       
p = .59
Attention to film 9.41 .69 9.24 .80 t(72) = 0.94,       
p = .35
Diary compliance 1.70 .81 1.46 .96 t(72) = 1.18,       
p = .24
No of intrusions in  
7 day diary
6.43 5.10 4.32 3.60 t(72) = 2.06,       
p < .05
PTCI Time 1 86.30 31.12 84.24 29.00 t(72) = 0.29,       
p = .77
PTCI Time 2 88.05 35.66 77.30 25.41 t(72) = 1.49,       
p = .14
PTCI Time 3 85.73 33.28 69.62 24.21 t(72) = 2.38,       
p < .03
IES-R 23.57 19.15 15.68 11.47 t(72) = 2.15,       
p < .04
Note: THC: Trauma history checklist; STAI-S/T: Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-State/
Trait version; BDI-II: Beck Depression Inventory-II; PTCI: Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory; 
IES-R: Revised Impact of Event Scale.
 
 
Effects of film on mood 
A mixed-model ANOVA with Time (pre vs. post film) as a within-subjects factor and 
Group (negative vs. positive CBM-App) as a between-subjects factor on the combined 
mood scores (see Table 1), showed a significant main effect of Time, F(1,72) = 95.59, 
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p < .001, ηp² = .57, but no significant effect of Group, nor a Time x Group interaction, 
F’s < 1, revealing that both groups experienced strong and comparable increases in 
negative mood post-film. 
Hypothesis 1: Modification of reappraisal bias and changes in PTCI scores 
The raw data from the test/recognition phase were converted into an index of bias, that 
is the degree to which ambiguous sentences had been appraised as having a positive 
(or negative) meaning by subtracting the mean ratings for negative targets from posi-
tive targets. This ‘Bias Index’ yields a positive score for a positive bias and negative 
score for a negative bias. A between-group comparison of the ‘Bias Index’ confirmed 
a significant difference t(72) = 8.33, p < .001, d = 1.96, (positive group: M = 1.54, SD 
= .83; negative group M = -0.55, SD = 1.28), with each group yielding a mean bias 
significantly different from zero in the anticipated direction (negative: t(36) = 2.63, 
p < .02, d =.43 positive: t(36) = 11.30, p < .001, d = 1.86), indicating that biases had 
been successfully induced in both directions.
PTCI change (see Table 1) was explored, using a mixed model ANOVA. There was a 
significant interaction between Training group and Time, F(2,71) = 4.63, p < .02, ηp² 
= .06, and a main effect of Time F(2,71) = 5.49, p < .01, ηp² = .07. Follow-up analysis 
indicated that the positive group significantly improved (lower scores), relative to 
baseline, both immediately after training t(36) = 2.70,  p < .02, d = 0.26, and at one week, 
t(36) = 4.73, p < .001, d = .56. No significant changes were noted for the negative 
group, t’s < 1.
Hypothesis 2: Film intrusions over 1-week and IES-R scores
In total 69 participants reported intrusions. As anticipated, intrusions were rated as 
generally distressing in both conditions (negative, M = 38.10, SD = 20.00; positive, 
M = 41.80, SD = 18.17). Critically, participants receiving positive CBM-App training 
reported less frequent intrusions, t(72) = 2.06, p < .05 , d = 0.49, and the mean number 
of intrusions (4.3 vs 6.4 in the positive and negative groups respectively), are in line 
with those found in earlier studies using similar film material (e.g., Bourne et al., 
2010; Holmes et al., 2009). In addition, those trained positively reported lower IES-R 
scores, indicative of lower levels of post-film symptomatology, than those trained 
negatively, t(72) = 2.15, p < .04, d = .52 (Table 1). 
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DISCUSSION
Our aim was to investigate whether systematic computerized training in positive and 
functional reappraisals (positive CBM-App) following the experience of a distressing 
event (an emotive set of film clips), and unrelated to the specific contents of that 
event, could reduce intrusive memories of that event and other associated symptoma-
tology (e.g., avoidance) compared with training of dysfunctional appraisals (negative 
CBM-App). CBM-App training successfully modified appraisal styles in the intended 
directions as assessed by independent vignettes immediately post-training (both 
groups) and by scores on the PTCI (positively trained group) both post-training and 
at one week. Most importantly, participants who received positive CBM-App training 
reported significantly fewer intrusions of the distressing film over the subsequent week 
and lower scores on the IES-R for that period, compared with those who received 
negative training. 
The findings are encouraging. They demonstrate, in principle, that reappraisal inter-
ventions can successfully be applied following an experimental event, as opposed to 
during that event (or just prior), and can modify intrusive re-experiencing of that 
event. This is in line with recent psychophysiological work on reappraisal by Sheppes, 
Catra, and Meiran (2009) highlighting the success of targeting appraisals subsequent 
to, rather than in advance of, an emotional situation. Furthermore, this particular 
post-event strategy (even though at a preliminary phase) has the advantage of not tying 
reappraisal to specific event contents, but to broader appraisals about for example, 
self and symptoms that straddle different types of stressful events. The data, though 
still at an early stage, therefore have clear translational possibilities for assisting 
individuals who are emotionally troubled by events in their past to which they have 
attached dysfunctional appraisals. To that extent, the current CBM-App protocol could 
be regarded as a computerized instantiation of aspects of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
(CBT) as provided to survivors of distressing events such as trauma and bereavement 
who are suffering from clinical distress, including PTSD. However, CBT is time con-
suming, expensive, requires a professional therapist, and the event survivors must first 
identify themselves as needing help. The further and careful translational development 
of computerized CBM-App could ultimately provide individuals with the facility to 
undergo the training at home, with minimal professional support. This might provide 
a flexible and motivating approach for a computer literate generation. There is now a 
clear need for incremental follow-on studies focussing on replication in the laboratory 
and extension to survivors of real-life, as opposed to analogue, distressing events, and 
with a greater focus on individual differences variables that may modulate training 
effects (e.g., habitual use of reappraisal as an emotion regulation strategy).
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There are limitations regarding the present study that merit discussion. Our design 
did not include an additional control group who received for example neutral or no 
training. Therefore, it is not clear what produced the observed effects, i.e. whether the 
negative appraisal training lead to more intrusions, whether the positive appraisal 
training reduced the intrusions, or whether both effects occurred. Adding a neutral 
control group would have enabled us to draw more precise conclusions. The lack of such 
a control group is less important for the bias modification checks (on PTCI) as we had 
pre-training or ‘no bias’ baseline for this measure. It would also have been interesting 
to examine whether the way that participants appraised new stressful experiences 
following training (e.g., a second film) had been altered.
In sum, we show that functional reappraisal training (relative to dysfunctional training) 
following an emotive experience can reduce intrusive memories and other associated 
symptoms over the following week. This provides proof-of-principle support for 
exploring the translational potential of such reappraisal training for use following 
real world stressors.
 
APPENDIX
Table A1. Examples of stimuli used to measure induced reappraisal bias including title, ambiguous 
encoding sentence, and recognition sentences used to assess induced bias following bias modi-
fication. Each recognition sentence was rated for similarity to the original titled sentence using 
a four point scale ranging from 1 (very different in meaning) to 4 (very similar in meaning).
Title “Aftermath of events.”
Encoding sentence “People come to terms with the aftermath of these types of events 
in many different ways. My reactions are very indicative of the 
way I seem to be dealing with it. ”
Recognition sentences
Negative target “People come to terms with the aftermath of these types of events 
in many different ways, but my reactions mean my coping skills 
are poor. ”
Positive target “People come to terms with the aftermath of these types of events 
in many different ways, but my reactions mean my coping skills 
are healthy. ”
Negative foil “People come to terms with the aftermath of these types of events 
in many different ways, but my reactions mean my coping skills 
are suspicious. ”
Positive foil “People come to terms with the aftermath of these types of events 
in many different ways, but my reactions mean my coping skills 
are trustworthy. ”
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Reducing analogue trauma symptoms  
by computerized reappraisal training –  
Considering a cognitive prophylaxis?
 
ABSTRACT
Distressing intrusions are a hallmark of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Dysfunctional 
appraisal of these symptoms may exacerbate the disorder, and conversely may lead to further 
intrusive memories. This raises the intriguing possibility that learning to ‘reappraise’ potential 
symptoms more functionally may protect against such symptoms. Woud, Holmes, Postma, 
Dalgleish, & Mackintosh (2012) found that ‘reappraisal training’ when delivered after an 
analogue stressful event reduced later intrusive memories and other posttraumatic symptoms. 
The present study aimed to investigate whether reappraisal training administered before a 
stressful event is also beneficial. Participants first received positive or negative reappraisal 
training (CBM-App training) using a series of scripted vignettes. Subsequently, participants 
were exposed to a film with traumatic content. Effects of the CBM-App training procedure were 
assessed via three distinct outcome measures, namely: (a) post-training appraisals of novel 
ambiguous vignettes, (b) change scores on the Post Traumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI), 
and (c) intrusive symptom diary. CBM-App training successfully induced training-congruent 
appraisal styles. Moreover, those trained positively reported less distress arising from their 
intrusive memories of the trauma film during the subsequent week than those trained nega-
tively. However, the induced appraisal bias only partly affected PTCI scores. The study has 
the following limitations: First, parti cipants used their own negative event as a reference for 
the PTCI assessments. Second, the events may have differed regarding their emotional im-
pact. Third, there was no control group. We conclude that CBM-App training has also 
some beneficial effects when applied before a stressful event and may serve as a cognitive 
prophylaxis against trauma-related symptomatology.
This chapter is based on: 
Woud, M. L., Postma, P., Holmes, E. A., & Mackintosh, B. (2013). Reducing analogue 
trauma symptoms by computerized reappraisal training – Considering a cognitive 
prophylaxis? Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 44, 312-315.
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INTRODUCTION
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a distressing psychological reaction to a 
traumatic event (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders; DSM-IV-
TR, 2000). Distressing intrusions, i.e., the involuntary re-experiencing of the trauma, 
are a hallmark symptom. According to cognitive models of PTSD (e.g., Dalgleish, 2004; 
Ehlers & Clark, 2000), a maintaining factor is the maladaptive appraisals associated 
with having intrusions (‘Having these flashbacks means I’m going mad’), as they may 
be interpreted as a sign of permanent psychological damage. Furthermore, models 
stress the role of maladaptive appraisals when developing PTSD. Prospective studies 
such as executed by Bryant and Guthrie (2005, 2007) support this. In their studies, 
trainee fire-fighters completed the Post Traumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI; Foa, 
Ehlers, Clark, Tolin, & Orsillo, 1999), which measures appraisals following trauma, 
before they were exposed to stressful situations. Fire-fighters were assessed for PTSD 
symptomatology after six months (Bryant & Guthrie, 2005) and after four years 
(Bryant & Guthrie, 2007) of fire-fighting-duty. Results showed that a baseline tenden-
cy to engage in maladaptive appraisals predicted subsequent PTSD, particularly 
scores on the PTCI-Self subscale. 
This raises the intriguing possibility that learning to ‘reappraise’ may be of importance 
in PTSD. There is an emerging body of research investigating the beneficial effects of 
reappraisal, for example as an emotion-regulation-strategy in healthy participants 
(Gross, 2002), in clinical contexts such as depression (e.g., Lang, Moulds, & Holmes, 
2009) and in analogue posttraumatic-stress (e.g., Woud, Holmes, Postma, Dalgleish, 
& Mackintosh, 2012). To illustrate, Woud et al. (2012) trained participants to engage 
in positive or negative appraisal styles after having been exposed to distressing films. 
The computerized training targeted self-efficacy beliefs and reappraisals of secondary 
emotions, i.e., emotions in response to the emotional reactions elicited by the films. 
Procedures were based on methods developed within the Cognitive Bias Modification 
(CBM) framework (cf. Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009). Results demonstrated that the 
CBM-Appraisal (CBM-App) training successfully induced training congruent appraisal 
styles. Moreover, compared to those trained negatively, those trained positively reported 
fewer intrusive memories of the film, and had lower scores on the PTCI (Foa et al., 1999) 
as well as on the Impact of Event Scale-Revised (IES-R; Weiss & Marmer, 1997) at one-
week follow-up (the IES-R is a widely-used clinical measure of posttraumatic stress). 
In sum, results support that reappraisal training does have therapeutic effects when 
applied after the traumatic event. However, could it also have prophylactic effects 
when applied before the traumatic event? The current study set out to explore this. 
Therefore, we adapted the procedure of Woud et al. (2012) such that participants first 
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completed positive or negative CBM-App training and then watched the distressing 
films. We predicted that CBM-App training would successfully induce either an 
adaptive or maladaptive appraisal style (depending on the training condition). This 
was tested via post-training appraisals of novel ambiguous vignettes and via PTCI scores 
post-film and at one-week follow-up. Second, we predicted that those trained positively 
would report fewer intrusions of the stressor films and less intrusion distress than 
those trained negatively. 
METHOD
Participants
Out of the panel of community based volunteers of the MRC Cognition and Brain 
Sciences Unit, 54 participants were recruited. Selection criteria were fluent written 
English ability, no reported psychological problems or past traumatic experiences, 
and sub-clinical scores on the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) and on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-
II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), i.e., at or below 40 and 13, respectively (Harrison & 
Turpin, 2003). 
Self report measures
State-Trait anxiety was assessed via the State and Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S, 
STAI-T; Spielberger et al., 1983). Depressive symptoms were measured via the Beck 
Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996). The Posttraumatic Cognitions 
Inventory (PTCI; Foa et al., 1999) was used to assess appraisals surrounding distressing 
and / or traumatic experiences, including all three subscales (negative cognitions 
about Self, the World and Self-Blame).
Mood rating 
Four mood states were assessed (happiness, depression, anger, anxiety) using a 
11-point Likert scale ranging from 0 = ‘not at all’ to 10 = ‘extremely’ (Davies & Clark, 
1998). Scores were averaged (with reversed happiness scores) to provide a single 
mood index.
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Reappraisal training (CBM-App)
Training phase 
A detailed description of the applied CBM-App training procedure can be found in 
Woud et al. (2012). Participants were presented with a series of ambiguous, reappraisal-
related scripted vignettes (henceforth called ‘scripts’) that ended in a to-be-completed 
word fragment. Participants had to complete the word fragment by typing in its first 
missing letter. These words then produced an outcome which was consistent with either 
an adaptive or maladaptive appraisal of the ambiguous script. 
Scripts were based on items of the PTCI Self subscale. For example, ‘Trusting oneself to 
act appropriately in future’ was adapted as follows: ‘In a crisis, I predict my responses 
will be h-lpf-l/u-el-ss’ (resolved as ‘helpful’ in the positive or ‘useless’ in the negative 
CBM-App condition). Just under half of these scripts were followed by a question to 
test ongoing comprehension. The training comprised 72 training and 8 emotionally 
neutral filler scripts (presented in blocks of 10). Blocks were presented in the same 
order for each participant but the sentences’ order within each block was individually 
randomized. 
Measuring induced reappraisal bias 
The training’s success was assessed via a two-phase-procedure (Mathews & Mackintosh, 
2000). During the encoding-phase, participants read 10 novel ambiguous scripts in 
random order. Scripts started with a title and, unlike the former training items, 
remained ambiguous. Participants were asked to imagine themselves vividly in the 
described situation (assessed via a 10-point Likert scale). In the recognition-phase, 
the 10 encoding-phase titles were presented again, followed by a set of 4 related 
sentences. By means of a 4-point Likert scale, participants rated how close in meaning 
each sentence was to the original script of that title. There were two target sentences, 
representing a possible positive and negative interpretation of the original script, and 
there were two foil sentences, representing a general positive and negative meaning 
that did not resolve the script’s ambiguity.
Stressor film 
The 20-minute distressing film was a compilation of 1-3 minute clips that have been 
used in Woud et al. (2012), displaying contents such as footages from the 9/11 World 
Trade Center terrorist attack or motor vehicle accidents. Participants had to view the 
film ‘as if they were there, a bystander at the scene of the events, and to pay attention 
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to the film as later there may be questions about film content’. By means of a 10-point 
Likert scale participants rated their attention paid to the film (see Holmes & Steel, 
2004).
 
Intrusion diary
To record film-related intrusions as well as intrusion distress, participants received a 
7-day-diary (see Holmes & colleagues, 2004, 2009). Intrusions were defined as ‘any 
memory of the film (or part of the film) that appeared apparently spontaneously in 
your mind. Do not include any memories of the film that you deliberately or consciously 
bring to mind.’ Participants were instructed to record all intrusions immediately after 
they occurred (whenever possible) and to check their diary each day at a fixed time 
point to make sure that it was up-to-date. 
Explanations were given about the types of intrusions: ‘What goes through our minds 
can either take the form of words and phrases (‘verbal thoughts’), or it can be like mental 
images. Although mental images often take the form of pictures they can actually include 
any of the five senses, so you can imagine sounds or smells too.’ Participants were 
asked to specify whether their intrusion was a thought or image or a combination of 
both, and what its exact contents was. 
Diary compliance rating
Participants rated their diary completion in comparison with the statement ‘I have 
often forgotten (or have been unable) to record my intrusive thoughts or images in 
the diary’ on a scale ranging from ‘0’ (not at all true of me) to ‘10’ (completely true of 
me) (Davies & Clark, 1998).
Procedure
After informed consent, participants completed the STAI-T and BDI-II. Based on the 
STAI-T and BDI-II selection criteria, twelve participants were excluded. Then, STAI-S, 
PTCI and the first mood rating followed. As PTCI-responses are anchored to a specific 
traumatic event, participants were asked to use an own negative event as a reference 
(see Bryant & Guthrie, 2005, 2007). This instruction was used during all three PTCI 
assessments. The CBM-App training was presented next, with participants randomly 
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negative event as a reference. After that, the encoding-recognition phase followed. 
Participants then watched the stressor film and completed the attention-to-film- 
assessment and the second mood and PTCI rating, respectively. Finally, the 7-day-diary 
and PTCI were distributed. One week later participants were contacted via telephone 
to discuss their diary entries. They were debriefed and thanked and if they had not 
already done so, prompted to return the diary, the PTCI and diary compliance rating 
using a pre-paid envelope that had been supplied.
RESULTS
Participant characteristics 
Data of 7 participants were excluded. Two participants failed to submit the diaries, the 
remaining 5 participants were indentified as multivariate outliers on BDI, intrusion 
frequency and distress (2 in negative and 3 in positive CBM-App condition) by calcu-
lating Mahalanobis distance with the criterion for outliers set at p = .05 (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 1996). The final sample included 47 participants (31 women, Mage = 29.06, 
SD = 10.02). The two CBM-App Training Groups did not differ on age, STAI-S, STAI-T, 
BDI and mood, nor on attention paid to the film or diary compliance (see for means, 
standard deviations and significances Table 1).
Table 1. Demographics and self report data, mood, PTCI and diary data.
Negative CBM-App
(n = 25, 16 female)
Positive CBM-App
(n = 22, 15 female)
Measure M SD M SD t(45) p
Age 29.88 10.16 28.13 10.02 .59 .56
STAI-S 26.52 5.59 27.91 6.48 .79 .43
STAI-T 29.84 5.73 31.23 6.15 .80 .43
BDI-II 2.56 2.22 3.95 3.42 1.68 .10
Baseline mood 1.03 .73 1.35 .79 1.46 .15
Post-film mood 2.64 1.93 2.42 1.79 .40 .69
Attention to film 9.40 .76 9.50 .60 .50 .62
Diary compliance .72 1.17 .73 .98 .02 .98
PTCI Time 1 84.44 35.18 95.18 42.38 .95 .35
PTCI Time 2 93.60 43.78 92.31 39.31 .11 .92
PTCI Time 3 80.80 37.60 83.00 39.30 .20 .85
Note: STAI-S/T: Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-State/Trait version; BDI-II: Beck 
Depression Inventory-II; PTCI: Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory.
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Effects of film on mood 
A mixed-model ANOVA with Time (pre vs. post film mood) as a within-subjects factor 
and CBM-App Training Group (negative vs. positive) as a between-subjects factor 
showed a significant main effect of Time, F(1,45) = 29.10,  p < .001, ηp² = .39, though 
no significant main effect of Training Group, F(1,45) = .02, p = . 88. Importantly, there 
was no significant Time x CBM-App Training Group interaction, F(1,45) = 1.19, p = 
.28, confirming that the film had a negative impact on mood across both groups (see 
Table 1 for means and standard deviations).
Manipulation check: Assessment bias index and PTCI scores 
The raw data from the recognition-phase were converted into a bias index by subtracting 
the mean ratings for negative targets from those of positive targets. Hence, a positive 
bias index indicated that positive targets were rated closer in meaning to the ambigu-
ous sentences than negative targets, and vice versa for a negative bias index. Analyses 
revealed a significant difference in bias index between the two CBM-App training groups, 
t(45) = 14.09, p < .001, d  = 4.10, with each group yielding a mean bias significantly 
different from zero in the anticipated direction, positive CBM-App group: t(21) = 
11.51, p < .001, d = 2.44  (M = 1.78, SD = .73), negative CBM-App group: t(24) = 8.91, 
p< .001, d = 1.78 (M = -1.58, SD = .89). 
PTCI changes were explored via a mixed model ANOVA. There was no significant 
main effect of CBM-App Training Group, F(1,45) = .12,  p = .73, though a significant 
main effect of Time, F(2,44) = 8.42,  p < .01, ηp² = .28, and a significant interaction 
between Time and Training Group, F(2,44) = 3.17,  p = .052, ηp² = .13. Investigating 
this interaction more thoroughly, analyses revealed a significant improvement (lower 
scores) when comparing baseline versus one-week follow-up in the positive CBM-App 
group, t(21) = 2.93,  p < .01, d = .30. No improvement was found when comparing 
baseline versus post-film assessment, t(21) = .70,  p = .49. Scores in the negative 
CBM-App group became significantly worse (higher scores) when comparing baseline 
versus post-film assessment, t(24) = 3.54,  p < .01, d = .23. However, the baseline 
versus one-week follow-up comparison was not significant, t(24) = .88,  p = .39.
Film intrusions over 1-week
Intrusions were experienced by 80% of participants in the negative CBM-App group 
and 77.3% of participants in the positive negative CBM-App group with no significant 
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group differences, χ²(1) = .05, p = .82. The analysis of intrusion distress was necessarily 
confined to the 78.7% of those who had experienced intrusions. There was a significant 
difference between CBM-App training groups t(35) = 2.23, p = .03, d = .79, with less 
distress for those trained positively (positive: M =12.23, SD = 9.25, negative: M = 
22.74, SD = 17.46). However, there was no significant difference between the two 
groups regarding the frequency of intrusions, t(45) = .26, p = .79 (positive: M = 7.14, 
SD = 8.08; negative: M = 6.56, SD = 6.95). 
DISCUSSION
CBM-App training successfully induced training-congruent appraisal styles: Partici-
pants trained positively appraised novel ambiguous vignettes in a more adaptive manner 
than participants trained negatively. Regarding the PTCI, those trained positively did 
not improve immediately after the training phase (i.e., baseline vs. post-film), though 
did improve when comparing baseline versus one-week follow-up. PTCI scores of 
those trained negatively became worse post-film, but no difference was found between 
baseline versus one-week follow-up. Results of the 7-day-diary showed that those 
trained positively experienced less intrusion distress than those trained negatively. 
No significant difference was found regarding the frequency of film-related intrusions.
The present findings corroborate the significant role of reappraisal in PTSD, showing 
that CBM-App training can have some preventative function in analogue traumatic 
stress. Results support assumptions of cognitive models of PTSD (e.g., Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000) and provide an interesting extension of the CBM-training literature. 
Moreover, these data could encourage some first, careful clinical applications for 
assisting individuals who may encounter traumatic events such as policeman or fire-
fighters. However, they also demonstrate the boundaries of such CBM procedures: 
PTCI scores were only partly affected, and the change in scores might be to some 
extent driven by the non-significant baseline differences between the two training 
groups. Finally, CBM-App training only reduced intrusion distress. The prospective 
nature of this study might explain this. Maybe, participants were less engaged during 
the training, as nothing actively distressed them at that point. Moreover, participants’ 
STAI and BDI scores were low (compared to those reported in Woud et al., 2012), and 
this also may have influenced the trainings’ effect.
The present findings are not without limitations. During the PTCI measurements, 
participants had to think of their own stressful event. However, we do not know any-
thing of the emotional impact of the event and whether participants were compliant 
in general. Hence, although this procedure has been applied successfully before (e.g., 
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Bryant & Guthrie, 2005, 2007), this is may be an element in our procedure that may 
have produced noise. Second, our design did not include a control group receiving 
neutral CBM-App training. Nevertheless, results showed training-congruent biases 
that differed from zero. 
To conclude, CBM-App training also has beneficial effects on trauma-related symp-
tomatology when applied before a stressful event. These findings clearly advance our 
understanding of the role of reappraisal in PTSD: CBM-App training not only has a 
therapeutic (Woud et al., 2012), but also a prophylactic effect. Future research now 
has to target the potential underlying mechanisms of CBM-App training in order to 
crystallize the processes that produced the effects and to optimize its application.
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Dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations are hallmark features of many 
different psychological disorders. According to various (disorder specific) psychologi-
cal models, these cognitive processes underlie the development, maintenance, and 
relapse of psychopathology. Hence, the general aim of this dissertation was to advance 
the present understanding of the role of dysfunctional automatic associations and 
interpretations in psychopathology.
The theoretical framework was provided by a newly developed dual process model of 
abnormal behavior with a specific focus on dysfunctional automatic associations and 
interpretations. According to this model, two cognitive processing styles influence an 
individual’s response to both internal and external stimuli, i.e., associative processing 
and propositional processing. In associative processing, a stimulus is processed quickly 
and automatically, without requiring any cognitive resources. Associative memory 
networks are considered as the base for this type of processing. That is, associations 
are activated spontaneously and this activation then spreads out via the associative 
network. This occurs outside an individual’s control or awareness. As a consequence, 
the individual cannot examine whether these associations are true or false. However, 
these associations nevertheless trigger a behavioral response. In propositional pro-
cessing, a stimulus is processed in a slower, more effortful and reflective manner. As 
such, the generated explicit associations and interpretations can be validated. Based 
on this validation, a behavioral response is triggered. However, such processing requires 
cognitive resources and motivation. 
Generally, automatic processing does not lead to major negative consequences for 
our daily human life. However, from a psychopathological perspective, the situation 
is different. Here, automatic associations and interpretations as well as the elicited 
behavioral responses are often dysfunctional, for example, when an individual is unable 
to deactivate or to correct automatic associations and interpretations. As such, a better 
understanding of the role of dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations 
can lead to a better understanding of the development, maintenance, and relapse of 
psychopathology. 
The investigation of the role of dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations 
in psychopathology within the present dissertation is characterized by three features: 
First, the role of dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations was examined 
as a correlate, predictor, and causal risk factor of psychopathology. Second, different 
types of psychopathology, and different kinds of samples (risk and clinical samples), 
were examined. Third, a variety of paradigms were used to assess dysfunctional asso-
ciations and interpretations, ranging from more direct to indirect approaches. 
In this final chapter, I will summarize and discuss the main findings of the studies 
included in my dissertation. The overarching structure will be provided by the three 
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features outlined above. Thus, I will start with presenting the findings regarding the role 
of dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations as a correlate, predictor, 
and causal risk factor. This includes a discussion of the expected as well as relevant 
additional findings. In addition, the findings will be embedded within a broader context 
and again linked to the dual process model of abnormal behavior. Moreover, limitations, 
future directions, and implications will be presented. This section will be followed by 
a discussion of the results obtained in risk samples and clinical samples, both within 
the present dissertation, but also from a more general perspective. Next, the applied 
paradigms will be evaluated. The aims and objectives of this dissertation as specified in 
the Introduction will be integrated throughout the discussion. Finally, the implications 
for theory, research and clinical practice will be presented.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS – 
THE ROLE OF DYSFUNCTIONAL AUTOMATIC  
ASSOCIATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
In this section I will first present findings regarding the role of dysfunctional automatic 
associations and interpretations as a correlate, then as a predictor, and finally as a 
causal risk factor for psychopathology.
CORRELATE
Chapter 2: This study aimed to expand self-report procedures, and tested the suitability 
of an indirect measure in the context of ‘thinspiration’ versus ‘fear of fat’. Therefore, 
a stimulus response compatibility task (SRC; Mogg, Bradley, Field, & De Houwer, 
2003) was applied whereby undergraduate female students were asked to categorize 
pictures of models as either thin or chubby by moving a manikin figure either towards 
or away from the pictures. Participants were faster to approach than to avoid thin 
models, however, there was no difference in approach-avoidance responses to chubby 
models. Moreover, approach-avoidance responses were associated with important 
eating-related cognitive schemata, e.g., participants’ level of drive for thinness, thin-ideal 
internalization, body dissatisfaction and their weight control behaviors. 
Chapter 3: This chapter involved two studies and examined automatic associations 
towards spiders. The aim was to test the sensitivity of a newly developed variation of the 
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Single Target Implicit Association Test (STIAT; Wigboldus, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 
2004), namely a STIAT including a task-irrelevant instruction. Study 1 compared spider-
fearful individuals to non-fearful controls, Study 2 compared spider enthusiasts to 
non-fearful controls. The novel STIAT version was indeed sensitive to group differences 
in automatic spider associations. In Study 1, the STIAT successfully distinguished 
between spider-fearful individuals and non-fearful controls, i.e., the former group 
showed stronger automatic negative associations toward spiders than the latter group. 
Moreover, STIAT scores predicted automatic fear responses best, whereas controlled 
avoidance behavior was best predicted by explicit fear of spiders. Results of Study 2 
demonstrated that the novel STIAT version was also able to differentiate between 
spider enthusiasts and non-fearful controls, i.e., the former group showed stronger 
automatic positive associations than the latter group. 
Chapter 4: This study aimed at replicating previous findings regarding alcohol-related 
interpretation biases. However, compared to previous approaches, the study employed 
a scenario-based approach to provide a more ecologically valid assessment of such 
biased cognitions. Heavy and light drinking male students were asked to complete 
open-ended ambiguous scenarios that were either alcohol-related or neutral in context. 
Results showed that heavy drinking students generated more alcohol continuations 
for ambiguous alcohol-related scenarios than light drinking students, and this bias 
correlated positively with levels of harmful drinking and alcohol-related problems. 
Chapter 5: This study also aimed to replicate findings from prior research in the context 
of alcohol-related interpretation biases. This time, however, an encoding recognition 
task was used, including scenarios related to positive and negative reinforcement 
drinking (i.e., coping and enhancement). Male and female students were presented 
with ambiguous scenarios and were asked to rate possible interpretations of these 
scenarios. Coping motives were a unique predictor of the tendency to interpret negative 
ambiguous alcohol-relevant situations in an alcohol-related manner, while enhancement 
motives were a unique predictor of the tendency to interpret positive ambiguous 
alcohol-relevant situations in an alcohol-related manner. However, there was not an 
expected moderating effect of executive control on the prediction of prospective 
drinking by the two types of biases. 
Chapter 6: The aim of this study was to extend the scenario-based approach as applied 
in Chapter 4 to a clinical sample. Clinically diagnosed alcohol-dependent patients as 
well as clinically diagnosed control patients completed 12 open-ended ambiguous 
scenarios (i.e., seven alcohol-relevant, five emotionally relevant). The probability of 
generating an alcohol-related continuation on all scenario types was higher for 
alcohol-dependent patients than for control patients. Moreover, the alcohol-related 
interpretation bias was positively associated with levels of harmful drinking.
Discussion
189
Chapter 7: This study aimed to investigate the effect of negative affective primes on 
the activation of alcohol-related associations. Again, alcohol-dependent patients as 
well as control patients were tested. Alcohol-dependent patients did not show the 
expected enhanced priming effect following negative primes. In addition, there was 
no expected moderating effect of levels of depressive symptoms. Finally, group 
membership could not be predicted by the interaction between priming effect and 
executive control, nor by the interaction between priming effect, executive control 
and depressive symptoms. 
Discussion & Conclusions
The discussion of Chapters 2-7 is structured as follows. First, results of Chapters 2-6 
will be addressed as these results were in line with our expectations. This discussion 
starts with integrating the main findings of these chapters into the model of Kraemer 
et al. (1997). That is, I will briefly discuss the role of dysfunctional automatic associations 
and interpretations as a correlate of (levels of) psychopathology, based on what we as 
well as others have found. Next, the findings will be explained in more detail by means 
of the dual process model of abnormal behavior. After that, an overview will be given 
of the valuable extra information Chapters 2-6 provided. That is, this overview will 
highlight those findings that go beyond the role of dysfunctional automatic associations 
and interpretations as a correlate of (levels of) psychopathology. Within this overview, 
results of the single chapters will be discussed but I will also link results of multiple 
chapters in order to discuss these findings from a more overarching perspective. This 
overview will end with an integration of the additional findings into the dual process 
model of abnormal behavior. Finally, the null findings of Chapter 7 will be addressed.
According to Kraemer et al. (1997), investigating whether a factor is a correlate of 
(levels of) psychopathology is the first important step when aiming to obtain more 
insight into the typology of a potential risk factor. The studies described in Chapters 2-7 
focused on this step and tested whether particular risk groups/types of psychopathology 
are characterized by specific dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations. 
Here, the general expectation was that a high-risk group/a group suffering from a 
type of psychopathology, compared to a low-risk group/a group not suffering from 
psychopathology, would show disorder-congruent automatic associations and inter-
pretations. 
The results of Chapter 2-6 (but not Chapter 7) were consistent with this hypothesis: 
Dysfunctional automatic approach-avoidance associations were related to important 
dysfunctional eating-related concepts (Chapter 2), spider fearful individuals showed 
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stronger fear-related spider associations compared to non-fearful controls (Chapter 
3), and there was evidence of dysfunctional alcohol-related interpretations in analogue 
risk samples (Chapter 4 and 5) as well as in a clinical population of alcohol-dependent 
patients (Chapter 6). To conclude, findings obtained in three different clinical domains 
(i.e., eating pathology, anxiety, alcohol misuse and dependency) indicated that dys-
functional automatic associations and interpretations are indeed a correlate of (levels 
of) psychopathology. Observing this relationship in three different clinical domains 
supports the argument that dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations 
are a general feature of psychopathology, particularly when integrated within the 
broader literature demonstrating that many other clinical domains are also characterized 
by such dysfunctional cognitive processes: Social phobia, panic disorder and generalized 
anxiety disorders are some examples within the anxiety domain, and depression is a 
prominent example within the mood disorders domain (for reviews, see e.g., Mathews 
& MacLeod, 2005; Roefs et al., 2011). In addition, dysfunctional automatic associations 
and interpretations also exist in other addictions, e.g., nicotine dependence (for review, 
see Rooke, Hine, & Thorsteinsson, 2008; Stacy & Wiers, 2010). As such, the present 
results are clearly in line with findings obtained in other disorders that are characterized 
by dysfunctional cognitive processing styles. Moreover, the present results extended 
our present understanding of the role of automatic dysfunctional associations and 
interpretations as a correlate of (levels of) psychopathology and by this further empha-
size their importance. 
The dual process model of abnormal behavior as described in detail in the Introduction 
provides the theoretical foundation for explaining the present findings (see page 15). 
According to this model, a stimulus is processed by means of two cognitive processing 
styles. In associative processing, a stimulus is processed quickly and automatically via 
the spreading activation of associative memory networks. As a consequence, the in-
dividual cannot examine whether these associations are true or false. In propositional 
processing, a stimulus is processed in a slower and reflective manner. As such, the 
generated explicit associations and interpretations can be validated. The interplay of 
both propositional and associative processing is considered to be responsible for 
behavior. Applying these assumptions to the obtained results suggest the following: 
On perceiving a (disorder-relevant) stimulus, associative processing, propositional 
processing or both styles became activated, and this activation then produced a 
corresponding response. Misevaluations as well as misinterpretations are two likely 
cognitive responses, and both phenomena were found in the present results. To 
illustrate, the results of Chapter 3 are a good example of a misevaluation. During 
the STIAT, spider pictures were presented on the screen. As soon as a spider-fearful 
individual recognized the spider, automatic negative associations were activated. This 
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activation affected the categorization speed during the STIAT correspondingly, i.e., 
spider-fearful individuals showed faster RTs when spiders required the same response 
as fear-related words, than when spiders required the same response as pleasant 
words. The results of Chapter 4 are a good illustration of a misinterpretation: During 
the processing of ambiguous alcohol-related scenarios, alcohol-related memory sche-
mata, which were established and strengthened during previous experiences with 
alcohol, became active. Due to their higher levels of alcohol consumption, alcohol- 
related associations were strongest in heavy drinking students. Hence, heavy drinking 
students interpreted the ambiguous alcohol scenarios in an alcohol-related manner 
more often than light drinking students.
Having discussed the role of dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations 
as a correlate of (levels of) psychopathology, I will now highlight some valuable addition-
al information provided by the results of Chapters 2-6. There are five issues I will discuss 
in more detail here. First, there was a relationship between dysfunctional automatic 
associations and deliberative cognitions measured via self-report. For example, results 
of Chapter 3 demonstrated a correlation between automatic negative spider associations 
and self-reported fear of spiders. Regarding the strength of the correlations, the lowest 
was r = .30 and the highest r = .72, and this range reflects moderate relationships. 
These findings seem to indicate that automatic associations were not independent 
from the assessed explicit associations (see ‘Evaluation of the paradigms’ for an in-depth 
discussion of this issue).
Second, meaningful relationships were found despite differences in context and time 
of the assessment. In Chapter 6, it was found that the alcohol-related interpretation bias 
assessed in a clinical sample of alcohol-dependent patients was correlated with harmful 
levels of drinking (i.e., AUDIT scores), and so were alcohol-related continuations on 
other ambiguous emotionally relevant scenarios (e.g., depression-relevant scenarios). 
However, the scenario task and the AUDIT were administered in two different contexts 
(at the patient’s home vs. at the clinic) and there was a 3-4 week time gap between the 
two assessments. Hence, this finding is quite noteworthy because it is an indication of 
the stability of the two assessed psychological concepts. 
Third, dysfunctional interpretations generalized to other (emotionally-relevant) am-
biguous contexts (Chapter 2 and 6). Regarding Chapter 2, for example, participants also 
coded some of their continuations of ambiguous neutral scenarios as alcohol-related. 
The results of Chapter 6 also showed such a generalization effect, as alcohol-dependent 
patients had a higher probability of generating alcohol-related continuations for panic-
and depression-relevant scenarios. Such generalization effects are not restricted to 
the clinical domain of alcohol abuse and misuse. There is similar empirical evidence 
from other domains To illustrate, Harvey, Richards, Dziadosz, and Swindell (1993) 
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found that both panic patients and patients suffering from social phobia were more 
likely than healthy controls to interpret ambiguous scenarios as being threat-related. 
This suggests that anxiety disorders might be characterized by a general predisposition 
to interpret ambiguous information as threatening (for a more detailed elaboration, 
see Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). A similar mechanism could be true 
for alcohol abuse and misuse, i.e., a general predisposition to interpret ambiguous 
information that is partially related to alcohol and its consumption as being alcohol-
related. The work of Krank and colleagues on the role of context effects in addiction 
would offer support for this hypothesis (e.g., Krank & Wall, 2006; Krank, Wall, Stewart, 
Wiers, & Goldmann, 2005). 
Fourth, correlational patterns between dysfunctional interpretations and other relevant 
concepts were unique. In Chapter 5, analyses revealed that coping motives were a 
unique predictor of a negative alcohol-related interpretation bias, while enhancement 
motives were a unique predictor of a positive alcohol-related interpretation bias. Similar 
results have been obtained by Salemink and Wiers (2013), although they employed a 
Word Sentence Association Paradigm (WSAP; Beard & Amir, 2009) to assess alcohol-
related interpretations. However, examining the differences between and similarities 
of positive and negative drinking motives by means of more indirect tasks has not yet 
received much attention (for an exception, see Stewart, Hall, Wilkie, & Birch, 2002). 
Hence, although the present correlations were rather weak, these data might never-
theless motivate further examination of the functional properties of such congruency 
effects in the context of alcohol misuse. 
Fifth, dysfunctional automatic associations, compared to explicit associations, were a 
better predictor of dysfunctional automatic behavior. In Chapter 3, it was found that 
fear-related spider associations, compared to explicit fear of spiders, were the best 
predictor of spontaneous fear responses. That is, dysfunctional automatic fear-related 
spider associations had a unique predictive validity regarding disorder-congruent 
behavioral responses. This was true although a variant of the STIAT had been applied, 
namely a STIAT with a task-irrelevant instruction. On the one hand, this finding 
complements other findings in the domain of spider fear, reported by Huijding and 
de Jong (2006). They showed that the EAST was the best predictor of automatic fear 
responses (i.e., startle reflex). In contrast, self-reported spider fear was the only pre-
dictor of relatively controllable fear responses (i.e., behavioral avoidance). On the 
other hand, the present finding contributes to the assumption that different measures 
have differential predictive validity regarding the prediction of behavior (for related 
findings, see Asendorpf, Banse, & Mücke, 2002; Egloff & Schmuckle, 2002; Klein, 
Becker, & Rinck, 2011; Reinecke, Becker, & Rinck, 2010). 
To conclude, these additional results not only provide evidence that automatic dys-
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functional associations and interpretations are a correlate of (levels of) psychopathology, 
but also provide additional insights into their nature and role. In order to obtain a 
more in-depth understanding of these additional results, I will now integrate them 
into the dual process model of abnormal behavior. This elaboration will be done for 
each of the five results I described in the previous sections. To start with, the results 
of Chapter 3 demonstrated a positive correlation between automatic negative spider 
associations and self-reported fear of spiders, i.e., the stronger participants’ automatic 
negative spider associations, the stronger their explicit negative spider associations. 
This suggests that (1) both associative and propositional processing lead to similar 
activation patterns and therefore generated similar outcomes, or (2) the output of 
the associative system did not get rejected during propositional processing and/or 
overruled propositional processing. Moreover, the results of Chapter 3 showed that 
automatic negative spider associations were the best predictors of automatic fear 
responses, compared to self-report. This finding is indicative of the direct disorder-
congruent route between automatic associations and behavioral responses as described 
in the dual process model of abnormal behavior. Moreover, it underlines the value of 
including both direct and indirect measures of associations when aiming to predict 
behavioral outcomes as in Klein et al. (2010). 
Theoretically interesting, but not per se relevant for the specific topic of this dissertation, 
are results of the second study of Chapter 3. Here, the novel STIAT version was also 
able to differentiate between spider enthusiasts and non-fearful controls, i.e., the former 
group showed stronger automatic positive associations than the latter group. This is 
still in line with the functional properties of dual process models, albeit more with 
models of normal behavior (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Smith & DeCoster, 
2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). In addition, these results contradict the assumption 
that (ST)IAT effects are the result of general negative associations towards spiders 
(e.g., Karpinski & Hilton, 2001).
Regarding results of Chapter 5 in the context of alcohol misuse, relationships were 
found between specific biases and drinking motives: Coping motives were a unique 
predictor of a negative alcohol-related interpretation bias, while enhancement motives 
were a unique predictor of a positive alcohol-related interpretation bias. These findings 
suggest that different measures not only have unique differential predictive validity 
regarding the prediction of behavioral responses, different measures might also have 
a unique, i.e., valence-congruent relationship. This could be considered as a kind of 
‘valence-congruent interplay’ within the dual process model of abnormal behavior. 
Finally, assumptions of the dual process model of abnormal behavior are also in 
line with the generalization effects reported in Chapter 2 and 6: Here, the spreading 
activation account becomes particularly relevant via the role of the contextual cues 
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presented within the (emotionally relevant) ambiguous scenarios: These scenarios in-
volved cognitions, affective states, and bodily symptoms that may be associated with 
alcohol and its consumption. Hence, these contextual cues activated the corresponding 
alcohol-related memory schemata which then biased the processing of the ambiguous 
scenarios in an alcohol-related manner. Finally, the fact that the correlational pattern 
between alcohol-related interpretation biases and levels of harmful drinking as reported 
in Chapter 6 was found despite the difference in context and time of assessment could 
be an extra indication of the associative strength between these concepts. As this 
study included alcohol-dependent patients who were dependent for quite a long time, 
these associative paths were ‘developed well.’  
The final part of this discussion section concerns the finding of Chapter 7. These 
results were not as expected. It was predicted that alcohol-dependent inpatients, 
compared to control inpatients, would show an enhanced alcohol priming effect 
following negative primes. In addition, it was predicted that this effect would be 
further qualified by participants’ levels of depressive symptoms. However, negative 
words did not prime alcohol-related concepts in alcohol-dependent inpatients, and 
there was no moderating role of depressive symptoms. Finally, it was expected that 
the interaction between executive control and priming effect as well as the interaction 
between executive control, priming effect and depressive symptoms would be predictive 
of group membership. Again, results did not confirm this. 
In terms of Kraemer et al. (1997), this would imply that automatic alcohol-related 
associations, as operationalized in this study, should be considered as a non-correlate. 
That is, there is no direct relationship between automatic negative alcohol-related 
associations and alcohol dependency. However, assumptions put forward by the dual 
process model of abnormal behavior as well as negative reinforcement theories of 
addiction (e.g., Baker, Piper, Fiore, McCarthy, & Majeskie, 2004; Koob & Le Moal, 2001) 
would have clearly predicted such a relationship: According to negative reinforcement 
theories of addiction, reducing negative affective states is the most prominent drinking 
motive in alcohol dependency. When combining this with predictions of the dual 
process model of abnormal behavior, one could have expected a strong association 
between negative affect and alcohol in alcohol-dependent patients, which should 
have been even stronger in those patients experiencing negative affective states on top 
of their alcohol dependency. The most plausible explanation here is the low reliability of 
the affective priming task we used, and thus it will be useful to examine this relationship 
using alternative tasks.  
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Limitations, Future Directions & Implications
In the next sections, I will discuss the limitations of the studies we conducted to 
investigate the role of dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations as a 
correlate of (levels of) psychopathology. This discussion only includes the findings of 
Chapter 2-6 as the limitations of Chapter 7 have been addressed intensively in the chap-
ter itself. Moreover, within the particular discussions of Chapter 2-6, several limitations 
have already been addressed. However, I would nevertheless like to re-highlight a few 
overarching considerations and elaborate on them in more detail (please see ‘Evaluations 
of paradigms’ for limitations specifically related to the direct versus indirect issue). 
The first limitation is that we investigated dysfunctional cognitive processes in isolation. 
However, recent theorizing has adopted a novel perspective on this matter. According 
to Hirsch, Clark, and Mathews (2006), “cognitive biases do not operate in isolation, 
but rather can influence each other and/or can interact so that the impact of each on 
another variable is influenced by the other. Via both these mechanisms we argue than 
combinations of biases have a greater impact on disorders than if individual cognitive 
processes acted in isolation” (p. 224). This perspective is based on demonstrations of 
various dysfunctional cognitive processes in social anxiety (e.g., attention, interpreta-
tion, memory). However, it seems very likely that this rationale can be applied also to 
other types of psychopathology (for the ‘combined cognitive bias hypothesis in de-
pression’, see Everaert, Koster, & Derakshan, 2012; Holmes, Lang, & Deeprose, 2009). 
To investigate this, we are currently running a study in the context of alcohol misuse, 
which tests the presence as well as the functional properties of three dysfunctional 
cognitive processes related to attention, interpretation, and memory. Of course, such 
an integrative approach is also recommended for the other areas we investigated, i.e., 
eating pathology and fear of spiders. 
Another limitation is related to the paradigms used to assess dysfunctional interpre-
tations, i.e., the scenario task (Chapter 4 and 6) and the encoding recognition task 
(Chapter 5). A problem all these tasks have in common is that any bias found might 
be due to a response bias. That is, the results may not be an index of an individual’s 
actual interpretation, but might instead be due to a greater tendency in an individual to 
endorse a more disorder-congruent interpretation, even without necessarily believing 
it. In order to obtain more insight into this matter, an alcohol homograph priming is 
currently used in the context of alcohol dependency. That is, we are examining the 
effect of ambiguous alcohol-related primes on the activation of alcohol-related inter-
pretations in a clinical sample of alcohol-dependent inpatients and a control inpatient 
group. During the homograph priming, alcohol and soft drinks words are used as 
targets, and primes consist of either alcohol-related or alcohol-unrelated homo-
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graphs (e.g., ‘shot’ versus ‘bank’). If alcohol-dependency is indeed characterized by 
alcohol-related interpretation biases, results should show that alcohol dependent 
inpatients, compared to control inpatients, are faster to categorize alcohol targets 
when primed with alcohol-related homographs. Homograph priming tasks have 
been used successfully before, for example when assessing interpretation biases in 
social anxiety (Richards & French, 1992). Of course, applying an RT based paradigm has 
also some disadvantages (see ‘Evaluations of paradigms’). However, if interpreted with 
the necessary caution, these findings might nevertheless advance the understanding 
of the role of dysfunctional interpretations in alcohol-dependency. 
In line with the previous limitation is another limitation regarding the generalization 
effect we found to other (emotionally-relevant) ambiguous scenarios within the 
scenario-based approach. For example, in Chapter 4 we found that alcohol-dependent 
patients had a higher probability of generating alcohol-related continuations also for 
ambiguous panic-and depression-relevant scenarios (for related findings, see Chapter 
6). So far, we argued that this generalization effect is due to the spreading activation 
and put forward that emotionally ambiguous scenarios involve cues that also activate 
alcohol-related memory schemata. This nevertheless means that we regard these 
scenarios as distinctive, i.e., they relate to different kinds of cognitions. To illustrate, 
ambiguous depression-relevant scenarios were designed based on cognitions that are 
highly relevant in depression, whereas ambiguous alcohol-relevant scenarios were 
designed based on cognitions that are highly relevant in alcohol dependency. However, 
we do not know whether this operationalization was indeed successful. Put differently: 
We do not know whether depression-relevant scenarios were truly depression-specific 
and whether alcohol-relevant scenarios were truly alcohol-specific. To illustrate, both 
the depression and alcohol scenarios contained negative affective states. However, we 
do not know whether these negative affective states were indeed disorder specific. To 
illustrate, the cognition ‘I am a failure’ is a typical depression-relevant cognition but 
could also be a relevant negative affective state in alcohol dependency. Hence, a lack of 
specificity then would be the most plausible explanation for the generalization effects 
we found. 
Another problem concerning some of the present studies is that they are ‘proof of the 
principle’ studies. That is, they should be regarded as a first step towards a better 
understanding of the role of dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations 
in the particular type of psychopathology. Hence, replications and extensions are 
needed to substantiate and refine the present findings. The findings which would 
benefit most from replicating and extending them are those of Chapter 2. Here, we 
tested the suitability of an indirect measure in the context of thinspiration versus fear 
of fat by means of an SRC task. Results showed an approach bias towards thin models, 
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and approach-avoidance responses were related to important eating-related cognitive 
schemata. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no follow-up studies that 
further investigated the relationship between dysfunctional approach-avoidance asso-
ciations and eating pathology/body image disturbance by means of an indirect measure. 
A paradigm which might provide a very ecologically valid extension of the present 
findings is the Approach-Avoidance Task (AAT; Rinck & Becker, 2007). During the 
AAT, participants are instructed to pull a joystick towards themselves (approach 
movement) or to push it away from themselves (avoidance movement) in response to 
pictures presented on the computer screen. The time participants need to fully execute 
these valenced movement provides an index of their spontaneous behavioral tendencies 
towards the particular picture category. As such, the AAT might provide a valuable 
extension from measuring dysfunctional approach-avoidance associations to dysfunc-
tional approach-avoidance behavioral tendencies in the context of eating pathology 
and body image.
Finally, many (cognitive) models of psychology postulate that highly specific dysfunc-
tional automatic associations and interpretations maintain psychopathology. Hence, 
trying to identify these specific associations and interpretations with a variety of 
measures seems a very important next step. For example, for the STIAT applied in 
Chapter 3 to assess spider-related associations, we used fear-related versus pleasant 
words as attributes. However, there are many more concepts that are relevant in fear 
of spiders, for example spiders could be evaluated negatively because people consider 
them as being disgusting (see Huijding & de Jong, 2007), uncontrollable, hairy etc. 
Hence, it might be worthwhile to disentangle which negative concept is triggered 
when and which negative concept is indeed crucial for a spider fearful individual. 
Specifying the associations’ nature is also important from a theoretical point of view, 
namely in order to test the validity of the dual process model of abnormal behavior 
regarding its prediction that there are indeed disorder-specific dysfunctional auto-
matic associations and interpretations. 
Last but not least, when following recommendations of Kraemer et al. (1997), future 
research should address the role of the assessed dysfunctional automatic associations 
and interpretations as a predictor and causal risk factor (i.e., not simply as correlates).
Regarding the clinical implications of these findings the following aspects are impor-
tant. First, obtaining more insight into the specificity of dysfunctional automatic 
associations and interpretations would be also beneficial for the treatment of a particular 
disorder. By this, the observed emotional, behavioral, and physiological responses 
can be understood better. Moreover, different associations and interpretations including 
their corresponding response might require different approaches during treatment. 
For example, exposure might be helpful to reduce the fear towards a spider, whereas 
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learning something about the many skills spiders do have (e.g., spinning webs and 
producing silk) might be helpful to reduce disgust. Another important clinical impli-
cation lies in the role of context effects. There are empirical demonstrations suggesting 
that the activation of automatic dysfunctional associations and interpretations depends 
on which aspect of a particular stimulus is made salient (e.g., Mitchell, Nosek, & Banaji, 
2003). This becomes particularly important when aiming to understand treatment 
effects and antecedents of relapse. For example, there are observations demonstrating 
that relapse after successful treatment is frequently attributed to negative affective 
states (Marlatt, 1996). Hence, reducing negative affect is the ‘active’ salient aspect of the 
concept alcohol, and not aspects such as arousal or excitement, and this is important 
in light of relapse prevention. Moreover, in order to gain a better understanding of 
treatment effects, it seems worthwhile to also examine the changes in dysfunctional 
automatic associations and interpretations over the course of a treatment. This could 
provide useful information regarding the processes the treatment targets. However, this 
of course requires valid and reliable measures which, for example, are sensitive enough 
to detect such (subtle) changes (for a related discussion concerning the application of 
indirect measures to assess treatment change, see e.g., Huijding & de Jong, 2007). 
PREDICTOR
Chapter 8: This study investigated whether a panic-related interpretation bias is pre-
dictive of the onset of panic disorder, by means of a prospective longitudinal design. 
At time point 1, female participants completed an interpretation questionnaire including 
two types of ambiguous scenarios: panic-related and general threat-related. We found 
that a panic-related interpretation bias predicted the onset of panic disorder at time 
point 2, even after controlling for two established risk factors: anxiety sensitivity and 
fear of bodily sensations. 
Discussion & Conclusions
In the model of Kraemer et al. (1997), the second step to determine the typology of a 
potential risk factor is to examine whether it precedes psychopathology. Hence, the 
study reported in Chapter 8 investigated whether dysfunctional interpretations are 
predictive of the development of psychopathology. The general expectation regarding 
this step was that those individuals who misinterpret ambiguous scenarios are more 
likely later to develop a psychological disorder. The study of Chapter 8 was conducted 
Discussion
199
in the context of panic disorder. As it is well-established that panic disorder is indeed 
characterized by panic-related interpretation biases (i.e., is a correlate), examining 
whether such a bias precedes panic disorder (i.e., is a predictor) was therefore a question 
warranting research.
The results of Chapter 8 confirmed the predictor hypothesis: Women who interpreted 
ambiguous panic-related scenarios in a threatening manner at baseline were more 
likely to develop panic disorder at follow-up compared to women who had benign 
interpretations of these scenarios. In addition, the interpretation bias for panic-related 
scenarios remained a significant predictor, after controlling for anxiety sensitivity and 
fear of bodily sensations. To the best of our knowledge, these data are the first to show 
that new onsets of panic disorder are predictable by a panic-related interpretation 
bias. In general, there are not many prospective studies examining the role of inter-
pretation biases as a predictor of psychopathology. There are some results involving 
(preschool) children and adolescents in the context of anxiety. Here, Pury (2002), for 
example, found that threat-related interpretation biases were predictive for negative 
affect during a stressful period in undergraduates (see also Creswell, Shildrick, & 
Field, 2011; Muris, Jacques, & Mayer, 2004). When also including studies assessing 
the predictive power of dysfunctional associations, the prospective study of Glashouwer, 
de Jong, and Penninx (2011) provides valuable information. This study included 
three groups (healthy controls, depressed individuals, individuals remitted from an 
anxiety disorder) and explicit as well as automatic negative self-associations were 
assessed. Here, automatic as well as explicit negative self-associations were predictive 
of the onset of an anxiety disorder at follow-up. In particular, automatic negative self-
associations were predictive in the depressed and remitted group (but only in the single 
predictor analysis), whereas explicit negative self-associations were predictive for the 
onset of anxiety across all three groups (for related findings, see Glashouwer, de Jong, 
& Pennix, 2012). 
Linking the findings of Chapter 8 back to the dual process model of abnormal behavior, 
the following vicious circle could, at least in part, provide an explanation: Women 
who tend to interpret bodily sensations as potentially threatening (as indicated by their 
interpretations of the ambiguous panic-related scenarios in the study) will make these 
mis-interpretations more often in day to day life. It is likely that these mis-interpretations 
will be accompanied by many dysfunctional cognitive, emotional, and behavioral 
responses such as increased stress, fear, and worry. As a result of experiencing such 
dysfunctional responses, a panic-specific memory schema might be established. This 
panic-specific memory schema is hypersensitive (i.e., easily activated by panic-related 
information such as certain body sensations), and thus could, in turn, reinforce the 
dysfunctional processing of further ambiguous cues as being panic-related. This 
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reinforcing element is indicated by the bi-directional link between the ‘Disorder 
congruent interpretations’ and ‘Responses’ in the dual process model of abnormal 
behavior (page 15), i.e., there is a reinforcing connection between cognitive processing 
and outcome. Hence, having such a vulnerability could increase the likelihood of 
developing a panic disorder, once the panic-specific memory schema reaches a certain 
level of hypersensitivity. 
This study also provided valuable additional information: The panic-related interpre-
tation bias was predictive over and above two well-known risk factors, i.e., anxiety 
sensitivity and fear of bodily sensations. Again, these results suggest a uniqueness 
regarding dysfunctional interpretations. However, it has to be noted that anxiety 
sensitivity also predicted new onsets of panic disorder. This is not surprising from the 
perspective of the dual process model of abnormal behavior: On the one hand, it is 
likely that there is a panic-specific memory schemata. On the other hand, however, it 
also likely that this panic-schemata is embedded in a general anxiety-related memory 
schemata, as panic can be regarded as a subset of anxiety. Hence, when interpreting 
ambiguous panic-related information, not only the panic, but also the general anxiety-
related memory schemata might have been activated. As such, both concepts have 
predictive validity in this context. However, what is different is the measurement 
procedure: Panic-related interpretations were measured via a scenario task whereby 
contextual cues automatically activated panic-related interpretations. In contrast, levels 
of anxiety sensitivity were measured by self-report whereby participants explicitly 
evaluated their fear.
Limitations, Future Directions & Implications
A detailed overview of the limitations of this study can be found in Chapter 8. How-
ever, I would like to re-emphasize one limitation and elaborate on it in more detail: 
The sample of main interest at time point 2, i.e., new onsets of panic, was very small. 
Hence, an analysis including all four predictors was impossible. However, given the 
results of Glashouwer et al. (2011) showing that the predictive validity of automatic as 
well as explicit negative associations changed when all predictors where entered into 
the regression, such an analysis could have provided useful information to refine the 
present results. Moreover, the small sample size did not allow for any exploratory 
analyses including for example participants’ pre-existing psychopathologies. However, 
investigating this seems crucial when taking, for example, results by Trumpf, Margraf, 
Vriends, Meyer, and Becker (2010) into account. Their prospective study investigated 
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whether young women with specific phobia had an increased risk of developing other 
mental disorders at a period of 17 months later. They found that women with specific 
phobia had a greater risk of developing another anxiety disorder, depression, and any 
somatoform disorder at time point 2. Hence, controlling for participants’ pre-existing 
psychopathologies might also have been important for our study. 
Following these limitations, there are plenty of topics for future research. For example, 
thoroughly examining the role of other risk factors as well as other psychopathologies 
is an important next research target. In line with this, more studies are needed to 
investigate possible mediators and moderators regarding the prediction of panic 
onset via panic-related interpretations biases. Furthermore, a replication study is 
recommended to test the predictive validity of panic-related interpretation biases 
when using different interpretation measures. However, given the fact that these 
suggestions require a longitudinal prospective design including many participants 
and several assessments points, the implementation of such a study is not an easy 
endeavor. A final suggestion for future research brings us back again to the model of 
Kraemer et al. (1997). Now that research has shown that panic-related interpretation 
biases are a correlate as well as a predictor of the onset of panic, a next intriguing 
question is whether this bias can be changed and whether this change would have an 
effect on panic-related symptoms. Put differently, it has to be examined whether a 
panic-related interpretation bias is a causal risk factor. Here, one could test whether it 
is possible to induce a panic-related interpretation bias in a high risk sample, and 
whether this has an effect on the appraisal of potential panic symptoms. Second, one 
could investigate whether it is possible to change panic-related interpretation biases 
in a high risk sample, and whether this has beneficial effects on panic-related symptoms. 
Finally, the clinical implications. As pointed out earlier when discussing the clinical 
implications of the findings concerning the role of dysfunctional associations and 
interpretations as a correlate, the findings of Chapter 8 are also important for the 
improvement and extension of present therapeutic interventions for panic disorder. 
Perhaps more important, however, is that the present findings provide a strong rationale 
for early interventions to prevent development of panic disorder. Our results showed 
that a panic-related interpretation bias precedes the onset of panic disorder. This may 
provide a focus for the screening and identification of potentially vulnerable individuals, 
and if the bias does in fact play a causal role, may offer a target for a focused preven-
tative intervention.  
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CAUSAL RISK FACTOR
Chapter 9: This study investigated the causal role of (dys)functional interpretations in 
the context of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and tested the effect of positive 
and negative reappraisal training (CBM-App training) on analogue trauma symptoms. 
It was expected that positive CBM-App training would lead to fewer analogue trauma 
symptoms than negative CBM-App training. To test this hypothesis, participants 
were exposed to highly distressing film clips and were then randomly allocated to either 
positive or negative CBM-App training. Results showed that CBM-App training 
successfully induced training-congruent appraisal styles. Moreover, compared to those 
trained negatively, those trained positively reported fewer intrusive memories of the 
film, and had lower scores on the Post Traumatic Cognition Inventory (PTCI; Foa, 
Ehlers, Clark, Tolin, & Orsillo, 1999) as well as on the Impact of Event Scale-Revised 
(IES-R; Weiss & Marmer, 1997) at one-week follow-up.
Chapter 10: The aim of this study was to test the prophylactic effect of CBM-App and 
used a reversed order of tasks, i.e., first CBM-App training and then exposure to high-
ly distressing film clips. Again, results showed that CBM-App training successfully 
induced training-congruent appraisal styles. In addition, those trained positively 
reported less distress arising from their intrusive memories. However, the induced 
appraisal bias only partly affected PTCI scores.
Discussion & Conclusions
According to Kraemer et al. (1997), investigating whether a factor is causal risk factor 
involves two steps. First, it has to be tested whether the factor can change or whether 
it can be changed. In case this is possible, the factor should be considered as a variable 
risk factor. Second, it has to be examined whether this change then has an effect on 
the outcome, i.e., whether it affects (levels of) psychopathological behavior/psycho-
pathology. If this is indeed the case, then the variable risk factor should be regarded 
as a causal risk factor. The studies reported in Chapter 9 and 10 focused on these two 
steps by means of two analogue experimental studies. It was expected that it would be 
possible to induce functional versus dysfunctional appraisal styles, and that this 
would lead to training-congruent differences in analogue trauma symptoms.  
Regarding step 1 (whether the factor can be changed), both studies showed that it is 
possible to induce a training-congruent appraisal style: Following the CBM-App 
training, positive-trained participants appraised novel ambiguous vignettes in a more 
adaptive manner than participants who were trained negatively. This finding is novel 
Discussion
203
within the context of PTSD (for related findings, see Schartau, Dalgleish, & Dunn, 
2009). In contrast, in the domain of social anxiety, for example, it is relatively well 
established that computerized interpretation training (i.e., Cognitive Bias Modification 
- Interpretation, CBM-I) can affect the interpretation of socially ambiguous scenarios 
in a training-congruent manner (for a recent review and meta-analysis of CBM in 
anxiety and depression, see Hallion & Ruscio, 2011, and for additional reviews on 
CBM, see e.g., Hertel & Mathews, 2011; MacLeod & Mathews, 2012). CBM-I research 
on the modification of negative depression-related interpretation, for example, is in 
its infancy. However, there are first promising effects, including studies which combined 
CBM-I with mental imagery techniques (e.g., Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Holmes, 
Lang, & Shah, 2009).
Regarding step 2 (does changing the putative risk factor have an impact on the 
outcome), we found that the two CBM-App training groups differed regarding their 
analogue trauma symptoms, and that this difference was in the expected training-
congruent manner: Those who received positive CBM-App training, compared to those 
who received negative CBM-App training, showed generally less analogue trauma 
symptoms. Research in the anxiety and depression domain has also found such transfer 
effects. However, this is not always the case. According to the meta-analysis of Hallion 
& Ruscio (2011), CBM-I had small effects on symptoms, even when symptoms were 
assessed in the presence of a stressor (which the authors suggest might be necessary 
as it is the interplay between dysfunctional cognitive processing and a stressor which 
influences anxiety- and depression-related symptoms). Moreover, training effects do 
not always transfer to other measures of interpretation (e.g., Salemink, van den Hout, 
& Kindt, 2007). The lack of transfer/generalization could be an indication that effects 
are limited to the training paradigm and thus do not affect other measures of inter-
pretation. In addition, these findings could be due to poor validity and reliability of 
the applied measures. 
Based on the dual process model of abnormal behavior, the findings of Chapter 9 and 
10 could be explained as follows. During the training, which targeted self-efficacy 
beliefs and reappraisals of secondary emotions (i.e., emotions in response to the emo-
tional reactions elicited by the films), a training-congruent trauma-appraisal memory 
schema was established. This schema became activated following the perception of an 
analogue trauma-related internal and/or external stimulus, and this stimulus was 
then processed in a training congruent manner. For example, those who received 
positive CBM-App training might have interpreted the occurrence of an intrusion as 
a normal part of processing the trauma films. Those who received negative CBM-App 
training, however, might have interpreted such an intrusion as a sign that the trauma 
films still affected him/her negatively. As a consequence, training-congruent, i.e., 
Chapter 11
204
functional or dysfunctional responses were triggered, e.g., acceptance vs. avoidance, 
staying calm vs. becoming stressed. In turn, these functional or dysfunctional responses 
might have reinforced the training-congruent associations and/or interpretations, as 
indicated by the bi-directional link in the dual process model of abnormal behavior.
An in-depth discussion regarding the slightly different outcomes when applying the 
CBM-App training before versus after the analogue trauma event in combination 
with the dual process model of abnormal behavior goes beyond the scope of this dis-
sertation. The same is true for a detailed discussion of the underlying mechanisms of 
the applied CBM-App training (and CBM-I). Regarding the latter, there is an ongoing 
debate, including priming-related mechanisms (e.g., Hoppitt, Mathews, Yiend, & 
Mackintosh, 2010) or the idea that the training induces an implicit production rule to 
generate and select training-congruent interpretations when processing new ambigu-
ous information (e.g., Mathews & MacLeod, 2002; Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, & 
Rutherford, 2006), both sharing some features with the dual process model of abnormal 
behavior. 
Limitations, Future Directions & Implications
There are several limitations that apply to both studies. First, there was no pre-training 
assessment. Hence, strictly speaking, we do not know whether appraisal styles 
changed by means of the CBM-App training. As a consequence, mediational analyses 
to examine whether a change in appraisal is related to the observed group differences 
on analogue trauma symptoms post CBM-App training could not be conducted (see 
MacLeod, Koster, & Fox, 2009). Moreover, there was no neutral control condition, so 
it is unclear what exactly produced the observed differences between the two training 
groups: Did the positive CBM-App training reduce analogue trauma symptoms, or 
did negative CBM-App increase them, or both? Furthermore, nothing is known about the 
temporal aspects of the CBM-App training effect nor its moderators. Concerning the 
latter, Salemink and Wiers (2012) identified level of regulatory control as a moderator 
of CBM-I effects in anxiety disorder. Finally, both studies were analogue experimental 
studies, implying that we do not know whether we could also find such effects in clini-
cal samples. In order to obtain more insight into this matter, a randomized control 
trial is currently being conducted, testing the effects of positive CBM-App versus 
control CBM-App prior to standard Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, in a clinical sample 
of patients with PTSD. 
Regarding the clinical applications of the findings of Chapter 9 and 10, in the absence 
of any evidence for the clinical effects of CBM-App in the context of PTSD, it is prema-
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ture to make concrete recommendations (see Woud & Krans, 2013). However, a few 
thoughts concerning the advantages of such a computerized training, in case it would 
be effective, may be allowed. Please note that these suggestions do not imply replacing, 
for example, Cognitive Behavioral Treatment (CBT) by CBM-App. We rather regard 
CBM-App as a beneficial addition as it could be used to specifically target one important 
process, namely dysfunctional appraisals, whereas CBT is a complex multicomponent 
intervention. Generally, CBT has been proven to be an effective approach in the treat-
ment of PTSD (Foa, 2000). However, it is time-consuming and patients must first 
identify themselves as needing help. In contrast, CBM-App could allow the patient to 
do the training at home, with minimal professional support, and this might provide a 
much more flexible and motivating approach. Moreover, it would allow participants 
to self-administer and adjust their ‘dose’ according to their needs. In addition, its use 
avoids potential stigmatism and concerns of potential recipients about admitting to 
suffering from mental health problems associated with PTSD. 
FINDINGS OBTAINED IN RISK SAMPLES VERSUS 
CLINICAL SAMPLES
Throughout this dissertation, different types of psychopathology were examined. 
Moreover, this included different levels of psychopathology, e.g., risk samples and 
clinical samples. Studying different types of psychopathology is important because 
dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations could be considered as a 
shared cognitive vulnerability factor. The approach in the present dissertation has 
some similarities with a transdiagnostic perspective (e.g., Barlow, Allen, & Choate, 2004; 
Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004; Mansell, Harvey, Watkins, & Shafran, 
2009; Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011). However, strictly speaking, we did not ex-
amine one specific risk factor that is involved in multiple and comorbid psychological 
disorders, such as stress or rumination. Instead, general cognitive phenomena (i.e., 
dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations) were examined, whose specific 
expression depended on the particular type of psychopathology. Nevertheless, exam-
ining the mere presence of such phenomena is also informative as it provides insight 
into fundamental cognitive processes underlying psychopathology. In the context of 
emotional disorders, McEvoy, Nathan, and Norton (2009) state “… that commonalities 
across emotional disorders may outweigh the differences” (page 20), and this might be 
true for more than just emotional disorders. Moreover, it provides insight into fun-
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damental cognitive processes itself, namely how meaning is given to the world. As 
described at the beginning of the Introduction, different minds create different mean-
ings. Hence, by investigating this in psychopathology, specifically across different 
types of psychopathology, it can be shown how this meaning-making process can 
take many different directions. 
Examining different types of psychopathology at different stages is also important 
because it might provide valuable information regarding the presence as well as the 
specificity of dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations. Hence, extending 
studies that were conducted with risk samples to clinical populations will always be a 
crucial part of clinical research. Such results can provide useful input for the improve-
ment and refinement of ways to study and to treat psychopathology. Nevertheless, it 
is critical to note that when relating data obtained in risk samples to that obtained in 
clinical samples, we do not know whether these samples are indeed comparable and 
therefore should generate similar results on task applied in both samples. 
In the present dissertation, risk samples and a clinical sample in the context of alcohol 
abuse and misuse were studied (Chapter 4, 5 and 6). Within both samples, the presence 
of alcohol-related interpretation biases was investigated by means of a scenario-based 
approach. Both samples showed alcohol-related interpretation biases. This might be a 
demonstration of the significance of such dysfunctional interpretations, and in addi-
tion is theoretically very important: If alcohol-related interpretation biases were only 
observed in clinical samples, it would be impossible to argue that such biases could be 
crucial regarding the development of an alcohol dependency. However, if found in 
risk as well as clinical samples, then one is allowed to start forming hypotheses about 
the causal role of such a factor. Hence, conducting follow-up studies to further examine 
the (causal) typology of such a potential risk factor seems worthwhile (Kraemer et al., 
1997). Clinical research addressing the role of dysfunctional interpretations in other 
psychological disorders would support such an approach, as there are many more 
demonstrations that dysfunctional interpretations indeed exist in risk samples as well 
as clinical samples, for example in depression (for review, see Gotlib & Joormann, 
2010) or social phobia (for review, see Hirsch & Clark, 2004). 
However, there is also evidence that observations in risk samples and clinical popula-
tions do not match. Moreover, findings can be inconsistent even within one population. 
Research on interpretation biases in depression, for example, has revealed many mixed 
findings. In the context of alcohol abuse and misuse as studied in this dissertation, 
there is little research comparing the role of dysfunctional automatic associations and 
interpretations in risk samples to clinical samples (for an exception, see the work of 
Zack and colleagues, 1999, 2003; and for a review, see Stacy & Wiers, 2010). However, 
there is some evidence regarding another dysfunctional cognitive process, namely 
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automatic attention. Here, it has been shown that heavy drinkers show an attentional 
bias towards alcohol (e.g., Field, Mogg, Zetteler, & Bradley, 2004), whereas abstaining 
alcohol-dependent patients show an attentional bias away from alcohol (e.g., Noël et 
al., 2006). Several explanations could account for such inconsistencies, for example 
the properties of or variations in paradigms, the qualitative differences between risk 
and clinical samples, the inaccuracy regarding the psychological model used to derive 
a specific hypothesis or the different interplay between various cognitive processes in 
risk versus clinical samples (for elaborations in the area of depression, see e.g., Vrijsen, 
Van Oostrom, Isaac, Becker, & Speckens, 2013). In any case, these findings are important 
but have to be interpreted very cautiously. Given the open questions regarding differ-
ences and similarities among risk and clinical samples, a very systematic investigation 
is needed in order to fully understand the role of dysfunctional automatic associations 
and interpretations across different types of psychopathology. 
EVALUATION OF THE PARADIGMS 
A third characteristic of this dissertation was that a variety of paradigms were used 
to assess dysfunctional associations and interpretations ranging from more direct to 
indirect approaches (Chapter 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8). Discussions following the emergence 
of dual process models (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Smith & DeCoster, 
2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004) raised the issue whether direct and indirect tasks 
should be regarded as complementary or competing. As such, it seems necessary to 
employ both types of tasks when aiming to assess dysfunctional automatic associations 
and interpretations. However, because not all tasks were used with all samples and dis-
orders studied within this dissertation, each particular paradigm can only be evaluated 
for the specific situations studied here. 
Moreover, two issues need to be mentioned before starting this evaluation: First, this 
discussion only concerns the assessment studies, i.e., studies in which the direct versus 
indirect issue is relevant. Second, this discussion only focuses on limitations related 
to the direct versus indirect issue, as other limitations and considerations have been 
addressed before. 
I would like to start with some background regarding the terms ‘implicit’, ‘direct versus 
indirect’ and ‘automaticity’, in combination with topics such as ‘measurement procedure’ 
and ‘a measurement procedure’s outcome’. Throughout the literature, many tasks are 
described as ‘implicit’, for example the STIAT. However, according to De Houwer 
(2006), the functional properties of the term ‘implicit’ are neither fully understood 
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nor defined very well. Moreover, De Houwer (2006) puts forward that there is an 
important difference between a measurement procedure and a procedure’s outcome. 
To start with, referring to a measurement procedure as implicit which has, for example, 
sometimes been equated with ‘unconscious’, does not seem very appropriate, given 
the fact that people are mostly aware of what is measured. Instead, the terms ‘direct’ 
versus ‘indirect’ are more suitable here (De Houwer, 2006). ‘Direct’ refers to a measure-
ment procedure whereby the concept of interest is inferred directly. In contrast, ‘indirect’ 
refers to a measurement procedure whereby the concept of interest is inferred indirectly, 
for example, from a behavioral performance. Asking a spider-fearful individual to 
evaluate a spider by means of a Liktert scale refers to a direct measurement procedure 
of spider-related associations. However, comparing the categorization times of a spider-
fearful individual during the different blocks of an STIAT can be considered as an 
indirect measurement procedure. Following this, De Houwer suggests that only a 
measurement procedure’s outcome can be considered as to be implicit. However, this 
also bears some disadvantages (for detailed elaborations, see De Houwer, 2006; De 
Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009). Hence, the term ‘automaticity’ 
comes into play. According to De Houwer (2006), defining a measurement procedure’s 
outcome as ‘automatic’ seems most appropriate as automatic embraces a number of 
functional properties that largely (but not fully) overlap with the term implicit. With 
regard to the tasks used in this dissertation, properties like fast, effortless, goal-in-
dependent and unintentional are most relevant. As such, the tasks’ outcome can be 
considered to be the product of the individual’s automatic reaction towards the stimulus, 
without any effects of, for example, the individual’s goals or awareness (De Houwer et 
al., 2009). 
The following tasks are included in this dissertation: an SRC task (Chapter 2), an STIAT 
(Chapter 3), a scenario task (Chapter 4 and 6), an encoding recognition task (Chapter 
5), an affective priming task (Chapter 7) and the Interpretation Bias Questionnaire 
(Chapter 8). When looking at the criteria for indirect measurement procedures, all 
the tasks can be regarded as indirect. Regarding the SRC, STIAT and affective priming 
task, participants’ categorization times served as an index of the concept of interest 
(i.e., automatic associations). The scenario task as well as the encoding recognition 
task can also be considered as indirect. Within both tasks, alcohol-related interpretation 
biases were the concept of interest. Regarding the scenario task, participants’ continua-
tions were used an index, regarding the encoding recognition task, participants’ ratings 
were used an index to infer the concept of interest, respectively. Finally, during the 
Interpretation Bias Questionnaire, participants had to choose the explanation that 
fitted best with the corresponding ambiguous scenario. Here, the sum score of chosen 
panic-related explanations served as a bias index. 
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Whether the procedures’ outcomes can be considered as automatic, or which property 
of automaticity has been operationalized within a particular procedure, is extremely 
hard to evaluate (for a recent elaboration of the concept ‘automaticity’ in the area of 
anxiety and depression, see Teachman, Joormann, Steinman, & Gotlib, 2013). Hence, 
given the variety of the employed tasks in combination with the fact that this issue has 
not been examined particularly thoroughly, if at all, for each of the tasks, an in-depth 
discussion is beyond the scope of this discussion. Nevertheless, it is worth raising a 
few points of interest. One issue is whether participants are aware of what is being 
measured by the task. For the reaction times-based paradigms (i.e., SRC, STIAT, 
affective priming task), this might be harder for participants to discover but it is never-
theless possible. For example, during the SRC task (Chapter 2), participants were 
explicitly instructed to, for example, ‘move the manikin towards chubby and away 
from thin models’. As such, the pictures’ contents was task-relevant and this may have 
directed participants’ attention to the task’s aim. Making use of task-irrelevant instruc-
tions might have prevented this (see, e.g., Rinck & Becker, 2007; Wiers, Rinck, Dictus, 
& van den Wildenberg, 2009). The STIAT version we employed indeed used such a 
variation and it successfully distinguished between the tested groups (Chapter 3). 
However, a direct comparison between different tasks using task-relevant versus task-
irrelevant instructions is needed in order to draw valid conclusion regarding the 
effect of such a variation in instructions (for an exception, see Field, Caren, Fernie, & 
De Houwer, 2011). The role of demand characteristics is particularly relevant for the 
results of the scenario task of Chapter 4. Here, 40% of participants indicated that they 
were aware of the task’s aim. However, the awareness score did not correlate with the 
bias index, suggesting that the findings were not simply the result of demand effects. 
Another critical issue concerning the role of demand characteristics when using the 
scenario task is that participants might have censured their first interpretation (Chapter 
4 and 6). Hence, we do not know what the ‘true score’ is. The Interpretation Bias 
Questionnaire (Chapter 8) also bears a disadvantage that might influence participants’ 
responses: By providing several explanations of the ambiguous scenarios, including 
dysfunctional as well as functional/neutral ones, it becomes very obvious that the 
scenarios are ambiguous. Once participants realize this, demand effects cannot be 
ruled out. To conclude, indirect tasks do offer a lot of advantages. However, these 
tasks are also not without limitations. Hence, this should be kept in mind when inter-
preting their results. 
Another issue regarding the evaluation of the tasks is the question of whether or not 
direct and indirect tasks should be regarded as complementary or competing. To the 
extent that indirect measures, compared to direct measures, indeed provide unique 
information it seems plausible to regard them as independent. In fact, this argument 
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is used frequently to explain the absence of a correlation between direct and indirect 
measures, mostly in combination with discussing the measures’ validity. However, 
from the perspective of dual process models (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; 
Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), a correlation can and should be 
expected. This would then imply that direct and indirect measures are not indepen-
dent. This argument is, of course, used by researchers who found a correlation (as we 
did in the present dissertation). To conclude, interpreting the absence, presence, or 
strength of a correlation between direct and indirect measures might be a matter of 
perspective. In this context, Reinecke et al. (2010) put forward a very elegant solution, 
suggesting the addition a behavioral task, as indirect measures should be a (better) 
predictor of the more automatic behavioral components (see also Klein et al., 2011). A 
final and related issue in this context: Tasks should not only be evaluated regarding their 
validity, but also their reliability is important. According to Borsboom, Mellenbergh, 
& van Heerden (2004) and Tuerlinckx, De Boeck, & Lens (2002), a measure can be 
valid without being reliable. The issue of reliability becomes, for example, very important 
when intending to predict future behavior, which is a crucial part of clinical research. 
In the present dissertation, we found that STIAT scores were the best predictors of 
predicted automatic fear responses (Chapter 3). Hence, the replication of these findings 
would be an important next step to examine whether STIAT scores remain stable over 
time and are thus a stable predictor. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY, RESEARCH AND 
CLINICAL PRACTICE
In the Introduction, a dual process model of abnormal behavior was presented, which 
provided the theoretical framework for the studies reported in this dissertation. 
Developing such a model was necessary because the role of dysfunctional automatic 
associations and interpretations was examined across different types of psychopathol-
ogy, and as of yet, the literature did not provide such a model. The underlying as-
sumption of this model is that dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations 
should be considered as a shared cognitive vulnerability factor. Hence, as pointed out 
before, this has some overlap with a transdiagnostic perspective (e.g., Barlow et al., 2004; 
Harvey et al., 2004; Mansell et al., 2009; Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011). Now, when 
considering the implications for theory, research, and clinical practice following the 
findings of this dissertation, this perspective becomes even more important. 
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The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM V; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013), which provides an overview of criteria for the classification of 
mental disorders, is the output of the recent perspective on psychopathology. This 
recent perspective implies that disorders are classified according to specific cognitive, 
behavioral, and physiological symptoms. As well as the many advantages of this approach 
(e.g., easy and efficient communication between users of the DSM), such a classification 
system also confers many disadvantages (e.g., Kraemer, 2007). In light of the present 
dissertation, the most relevant disadvantage is that such a categorical classification is not 
in line with observations from clinical reality: Many different types of psychopathology 
share many (dysfunctional) cognitive phenomena and there are high comorbidity 
rates. Given these observations, a different perspective is needed. A perspective which 
may be more in line with the reality of clinical presentations is a dimensional perspective 
(Harvey et al., 2004). According to this perspective, psychopathology should not be 
classified into discrete psychological disorders. Instead, psychopathology should be 
classified by processes. 
The dual process model of abnormal behavior represents such a transdiagnostic per-
spective as it assumes that dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations 
are general cognitive psychopathological phenomena, i.e., they can be present in many 
different types of disorders because they are the output of fundamental (albeit dysfunc-
tional) cognitive processes. The findings of the present dissertation generally support 
this assumption because dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations 
have been found across three different domains of psychopathology: eating pathology, 
anxiety, and alcohol misuse and dependency (for an exception, see findings of Chapter 
7). However, other types of psychopathology are also characterized by dysfunctional 
automatic associations and interpretations such as emotional and somatoform disorders 
(for review, see e.g., Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Roefs et al., 
2011). When regarded from a process perspective, Harvey et al. (2004) conclude that 
the following cognitive processes are reliably associated with multiple disorders: inter-
pretation and expectancy biases, selective attention and memory, specific metacognitive 
beliefs, attentional avoidance, recurrent memories, overgeneral memory, emotional 
reasoning, recurrent negative thinking (e.g., worry, rumination), thought suppression, 
and safety behaviors. 
What kind of research implications does such a transdiagnostic perspective bring 
along? According to Nolen-Hoeksema and Watkins (2011), all present transdiagnositic 
models have one problem in common: “Current transdiagnostic models, however, 
have difficulty simultaneously explaining the mechanisms by which a transdiagnostic 
risk factor leads to multiple disorders (i.e., multifinality) and why one individual with 
a particular transdiagnostic risk factor develops one set of symptoms while another 
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with the same transdiagnostic risk factor develops another set of symptoms (i.e., 
divergent trajectories)” (page 589). Targeting this problem seems impossible at first 
sight, however, the heuristic for the development of transdiagnostic models of psycho-
pathology introduced by Nolen-Hoeksema and Watkins offers many exciting routes 
for future research. I would like to highlight three research routes which are derived 
from the heuristic. The first research route focuses on the investigation of the three 
components described in the heuristic. There are two types of risk factor, namely distal 
risk factors (e.g., environmental context) as well as proximal risk factors (e.g., basic 
cognitive and biological factors). Then, there are moderators (e.g., biological or envi-
ronmental features affecting the sensitivity to and rewarding value of internal/external 
stimuli). Investigating these three components seems a worthwhile endeavor because 
this provides insight into which specific factors and moderators contribute to (co-
morbid) disorders. The second research route focuses on the mechanisms described 
in the model. Examples of these mechanisms are shaping, classical and operant 
conditioning, modeling, and observational learning. Obtaining more insight into 
the functional properties and (boundary) conditions of these mechanisms is also im-
portant. The third research route focuses on both the components and mechanisms, 
for example, via experimental or longitudinal research, to examine how the interplay 
of components and mechanisms contribute to the development and maintenance of 
(comorbid) disorders.
Before discussing the clinical implications, I would like to add a final issue concerning 
the implications for future research. As mentioned already briefly when evaluating 
the paradigms that were employed, not all tasks were used with all samples and disor-
ders. When considering this as a matrix, the present dissertation thus only addressed a 
few cells. To illustrate, we examined the role of dysfunctional interpretations in alcohol 
misuse and dependency (Chapter 4, 5, and 6). However, this seems also an adequate 
research topic in the area of fear of spiders (Chapter 3). Hence, what is needed is more 
research which fills these gaps by investigating every process in every disorder. This 
could also be useful to further specify the dual process model of abnormal behavior, 
as the exact underlying mechanisms are not yet fully understood nor is it suitable to 
make exact predictions regarding the responses following the two processing styles 
(i.e., associative processing and propositional processing). 
Finally, I will consider some clinical implications that arise from this dissertation in 
combination with the transdiagnostic heuristic provided by Nolen-Hoeksema and 
Watkins (2011). A first clinical implication concerns prevention. We found that dys-
functional interpretations are predictive of developing psychopathology (Chapter 8). 
Hence, by further advancing the understanding of which types of risk factors are 
involved in (comorbid) disorders and how (comorbid) disorders emerge given the 
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specific risk factors, individuals who are at risk of developing psychopathology could be 
identified more easily. Moreover, this insight could help to refine our understanding 
of the temporal aspects regarding psychopathology, i.e., how a risk of psychopathology 
develops and changes over time. From a preventative perspective, this would imply 
that individuals who are indentified as being vulnerable (i.e., who show dysfunctional 
automatic associations and interpretations, see e.g., Chapter 2-5) should be checked 
on a regular basis. Moreover, once an individual has a psychological disorder (see 
Chapter 6), it would be important to examine the course of dysfunctional automatic 
associations and interpretations, for example, before and after treatment. From a more 
therapeutic perspective, it might be helpful to add process-focused approaches to 
standard (disorder-specific) treatments (Harvey et al., 2004). To illustrate, a Cognitive 
Bias Modification – Appraisal training (see Chapter 9 and 10) targeting rumination, 
which is supposed to be related to a number psychopathologies (for review, see Aldao, 
Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010), could be a very fruitful addition. 
This last issue brings up a more general clinical implication, namely the extension of 
existing interventions. CBT is a very successful approach for many disorders. However, 
there is not much research addressing the question of whether CBT also changes 
dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations (for exceptions, see e.g., Bowler 
et al., 2012; Huijding & de Jong, 2007, 2009; Reinecke, Soltau, Hoyer, Becker, & Rinck, 
2012). Moreover, relapse is a serious problem in many disorders. Hence, if dysfunctional 
automatic associations and interpretations are indeed (one of the) underlying factors 
of psychopathology, their assessment and their modification might have to become a 
more integral part of treatment. Regarding assessment, it might be worthwhile to 
supplement interview-based diagnostic procedures with a test battery including tasks 
that target dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations. Ideally, this test 
battery is applied before, during and after treatment. Regarding modification, it might 
be worthwhile to extend the more direct CBT approaches with tasks targeting the au-
tomatic features of associations and interpretations. CBT often uses very explicit 
strategies, such as reflecting on pros and cons, formulating correct alternative cognitions, 
and so on. Hence, CBM procedures might offer a very valuable addition here as they 
are supposed to target more automatic processing (see e.g., Williams, Blackwell, 
Mackenzie, Holmes, & Andrews, 2013). However, a very important note in this context: 
Not all patients are characterized by dysfunctional automatic associations and inter-
pretations. For example, while on average a group of spider-fearful individuals may 
show an interpretation bias, this bias will not be present for every single individual in 
this group. Therefore, screening is needed to identify those patients who would indeed 
benefit from a CBM procedure, as CBM would not be an appropriate treatment for 
patients in whom the targeted processes were not in fact dysfunctional. Developing 
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reliable forms of such screening will be an important challenge for future research. 
Having summarized and discussed the main findings from the studies in my disserta-
tion, and subsequently the implications for theory, research, and clinical practice, I will 
finish with a short recapitulation and summary. However, first I would like to remind 
the reader of the very starting point of this dissertation, as this provides the rationale 
for carrying out such a series of studies across several disorders, in different types of 
samples, and using various methods. That is, that evaluating and assigning meaning 
are fundamental parts of our everyday human life, and that the (partly) automatic nature 
of these processes can be very beneficial. However, this also means that when systematic 
distortions start to enter this meaning-making system, the consequences can be far-
reaching and potentially even lead to psychological disorders. Understanding such a 
fundamental system requires taking a broad view across psychopathology. Such an 
approach offers many challenges, but also many exciting avenues for research, perhaps 
most importantly in the potential for clinical interventions. Therefore, I hope that my 
dissertation has been evaluated and interpreted as an inspiration and motivation to even 
further advance our understanding of the role of dysfunctional automatic associations 
and interpretations in psychopathology.
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The general aim of this dissertation was to advance the understanding of the role of 
dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations in psychopathology. 
Dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations are core features of various 
psychological disorders. According to many psychological models, these cognitive 
processes underlie the development, maintenance, and relapse of psychopathology. 
There are three important features regarding this dissertation. First, the role of dys-
functional automatic associations and interpretations was examined as a correlate, 
predictor, and causal risk factor of psychopathology. Second, different types of psycho-
pathology, and different kinds of samples (risk and clinical samples), were examined. 
Third, a variety of paradigms were used to assess dysfunctional associations and 
interpretations ranging from more direct to indirect approaches. 
The theoretical framework underlying the studies included in this dissertation was 
provided by a dual process model of abnormal behavior with a specific focus on 
dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations. This model was specifically 
developed for the present dissertation. Dual process models of normal behavior (e.g., 
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004) 
and the dual process model of anxiety (Ouimet, Gawronski, & Dozois, 2009) were used 
to develop the dual process model of abnormal behavior. The procedural framework 
for the studies in this dissertation was provided by Kraemer et al. (1997). Their model 
provides a stepwise approach of how to examine the psychopathologic typology of a risk 
factor, i.e., whether it is a correlate, predictor, and causal risk factor of psychopathology. 
Applied to the present dissertation, the psychopathologic typology of dysfunctional 
automatic associations and interpretations was thus examined.
This dissertation includes 9 empirical studies. Chapters 2-7 focused on the role of 
dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations as a correlate of (levels of) 
psychopathology. These studies were conducted in three different clinical domains: 
eating pathology, anxiety, and alcohol abuse and dependency. Moreover, a variety of 
paradigms were used, ranging from more direct to indirect approaches. Finally, these 
studies included risk groups and clinical samples, thus investigated dysfunctional 
cognitive processes at different levels of psychopathology severity. Chapter 8 addressed 
the role of dysfunctional interpretations as a predictor of psychopathology, namely 
onset of panic disorder and included a longitudinal epidemiological study. Finally, 
Chapter 9 and 10 investigated the causal role of (dys)functional interpretations. To 
this end, two analogue experimental studies in the context of Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) were conducted to test the effect of positive versus negative reappraisal 
training (Cognitive Bias Modification - Appraisal training) on subsequent intrusive 
memories to an analogue trauma. 
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The present dissertation has three main outcomes: The first is that dysfunctional 
automatic associations and interpretations were indeed found to be a correlate, pre-
dictor, and causal risk factor of (levels of) several different types of psychopathology. 
This result provides more insight into the specific contribution of dysfunctional auto-
matic associations and interpretations to the development, course, and modification of 
psychopathology. Within the studies investigating dysfunctional automatic associations 
and interpretations as a correlate, there are also several additional findings. Relationships 
were demonstrated between dysfunctional automatic associations and deliberative 
cognitions measured via self-report. Moreover, relationships were unique and found 
despite differences in time and context of the assessment. In addition, dysfunctional 
interpretations generalized to other (emotionally relevant) ambiguous contexts. Finally, 
dysfunctional automatic associations, compared to explicit associations, were a better 
predictor of dysfunctional automatic behavior. As such, these results provide more 
insight into the specific conditions of the relationship between dysfunctional automatic 
associations and interpretations and psychopathology.
The second outcome of this dissertation is that dysfunctional automatic associations and 
interpretations were found in risk as well as clinical samples. This result demonstrates 
that dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations are present at different 
stages of psychopathology. 
The third outcome is that the presence of such dysfunctional cognitions could be 
demonstrated by means of a variety of paradigms, ranging from more direct to indi-
rect approaches. This result shows that dysfunctional automatic associations and 
interpretations are present at different levels of information processing. 
Overall, these findings suggest that dysfunctional automatic associations and inter-
pretations can be considered as general cognitive psychopathological phenomena. 
This is generally supportive of a dimensional, i.e., a process-based, perspective on 
psychopathology, rather than a categorical perspective. While there are limitations 
specific to individual studies, recurring limitations were cautions regarding the tasks’ 
validity. Therefore, future research is needed to extend, replicate and refine the present 
findings. Moreover, this line of investigation could prove useful in specifying further 
the dual process model of abnormal behavior. Developing such a general model of the 
role of and interplay between dysfunctional automatic associations and interpretations 
across psychopathology could help to build theoretically-informed bridges between 
different disorders in terms of our basic understanding and clinical approaches. This 
in turn could aid the development of more effective strategies for the prevention and 
treatment of psychopathology. 
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In ons dagelijks leven zijn wij voortdurend bezig dingen te beoordelen en te interprete-
ren. Wij proberen dingen te begrijpen. Wij interpreteren en definiëren. Hierdoor creëert 
ieder persoon een eigen realiteit. De basis hiervoor is het geheugen: Gebeurtenissen 
uit het verleden beïnvloeden namelijk onze interpretatie in het hier en nu. 
Een persoonlijk voorbeeld ter illustratie: Tijdens een etentje met collega’s vertelde ik 
over mijn onderzoek naar interpretatie processen. Een collega gaf aan dat het woord 
‘Mars’ een mooi voorbeeld is om uit te leggen wat ambigue prikkels en interpretatie-
vertekeningen zijn. Ik vond dat maar een raar voorbeeld en was in de war: ‘Hoezo, 
Mars is toch niet ambi …’. Toen ik de gezichten van mijn collega’s zag besloot ik de zin 
niet meer af te maken. Mars is een chocoladereep, maar ja, het is ook een planeet en 
de god van de oorlog. Echter, deze alternatieve interpretaties kwamen niet bij mij op. 
Hoe kon dit gebeuren? En zo snel en automatisch?
Het antwoord ligt in mijn verleden, mijn ‘chocolade verleden’. Op het moment dat ik 
het woord ‘Mars’ hoorde, werden verschillende positieve associaties actief, variërend 
van ‘zoet’ – ‘zacht’ naar ‘maakt me gelukkig’ en ‘dit zal me nooit teleurstellen’. De 
activering van mijn chocoladegerelateerde geheugenschema maakte het voor mij 
onmogelijk aan iets anders te denken dan aan chocolade. Mijn interpretatie stond dus 
vast: Mars is een chocoladereep. 
Een belangrijke eigenschap van dit voorbeeld is hoe automatisch ik deze prikkel 
verwerkt en geïnterpreteerd heb. In ons dagelijks leven leveren automatische en snelle 
verwerkingen vaak veel voordelen op, bijvoorbeeld tijdens het auto rijden. Bovendien 
is het gedrag dat hierop volgt vaak zonder ernstige gevolgen en kan desnoods gecor-
rigeerd worden. Automatische associaties en interpretaties en de corresponderende 
gedragsconsequenties kunnen echter wel erg disfunctioneel worden. Dit kan weder-
om een erg negatieve invloed op een individu hebben en, in het ergste geval, tot een 
psychische stoornis leiden. 
Onderzoek heeft laten zien dat disfunctionele automatische associaties en interpretaties 
inderdaad belangrijke kenmerken zijn van verschillende psychische stoornissen (voor 
een overzicht, zie Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Roefs et al., 2011). Veel psychologische 
theorieën gaan ervan uit dat deze processen een belangrijke rol spelen bij het ontstaan 
en in stand houden van psychopathologie. Anders geformuleerd: disfunctionele auto-
matische associaties en interpretaties kunnen mensen kwetsbaar maken voor het krijgen 
en behouden van een psychologische stoornis. Het bestuderen van deze processen is 
daarom een belangrijke taak en kan ons helpen beter te begrijpen hoe psychologische 
stoornissen ontstaan en waarom deze stoornissen zo persistent zijn. Het doel van dit 
proefschrift was daarom meer inzicht te krijgen in de rol van disfunctionele automa-
tische associaties en interpretaties in psychopathologie.
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THEORETISCHE ACHTERGROND
Het duale procesmodel van abnormaal gedrag, wat specifiek voor dit proefschrift 
werd ontwikkeld, vormt het theoretische kader van dit proefschrift. Dit model richt 
zich met name op disfunctionele automatische associaties en interpretaties. Duale 
procesmodellen van normaal gedrag (bijvoorbeeld Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; 
Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004) en het duale procesmodel van 
angst (Ouimet, Gawronski, & Dozois, 2009) werden gebruikt als basis voor het duale 
procesmodel van abnormaal gedrag.
Het duale procesmodel van abnormaal gedrag gaat ervan uit dat er twee systemen 
zijn die ons gedrag bepalen, namelijk een associatief en een propositioneel systeem. 
Het associatieve systeem verwerkt prikkels op een snelle en automatische manier. 
Deze verwerking vindt plaats buiten de bewuste controle van het individu. Het proposi-
tionele systeem verwerkt daarentegen prikkels op een langzame en bewuste manier. 
Het individu kan de informatie toetsen en erover nadenken. Zoals eerder aangeven, 
heeft een automatische verwerking van prikkels meestal geen ernstige gevolgen. Echter, 
binnen de psychopathologie kan dit wel nadelig zijn, bijvoorbeeld wanneer bepaalde 
prikkels automatisch als bedreigend worden ervaren terwijl de prikkels eigenlijk hele-
maal niet bedreigend zijn. Mensen die bijvoorbeeld bang zijn voor spinnen hebben 
bij het zien van een spin de meest uiteenlopende negatieve automatische associaties, 
zoals ‘eng’, ‘oncontroleerbaar’ of ‘springt op mij’. Dit kan sterke gevoelens van angst 
oproepen. Vermijdingsgedrag is een mogelijk gevolg hiervan en maakt een correctie 
van de irrationele gedachten onmogelijk: Zou de persoon gewoon rustig voor de spin 
blijven staan zal snel duidelijk worden dat er eigenlijk niet veel gebeurt. Er zijn ook 
positieve disfunctionele associaties en interpretaties. Wanneer iemand die veel drinkt 
het woord ‘rondje’ hoort, is een positieve alcoholgerelateerde associatie en interpretatie 
het meest waarschijnlijk voor deze persoon. Hierdoor zal deze persoon eerder geneigd 
zijn een biertje te bestellen dan een cola. Dit zijn maar enkele voorbeelden maar een ding 
zal zeker duidelijk worden: Op lange termijn zal een dergelijke ‘vertekende verwerking’ 
niet veel goeds brengen. 
Het procedurele kader voor dit proefschrift is gebaseerd op het model van Kraemer 
et al. (1997). Dit model beschrijft een stapsgewijze benadering van hoe men de aard van 
een risico factor (in dit geval dus disfunctionele automatische associaties en interpre-
taties) kan onderzoeken. Stap 1 omvat studies die onderzochten of disfunctionele 
automatische associaties en interpretaties samenhangen met (de mate van) psychopa-
thologie. De vraag hier was dus of disfunctionele automatische associaties en inter-
pretaties een ‘correlaat’ zijn van (de mate van) psychopathologie. Bij stap 2 werd gekeken 
in hoeverre disfunctionele interpretaties voorspellend zijn voor het ontstaan van een 
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psychische stoornis. Hier werd dus onderzocht of disfunctionele interpretaties een 
‘predictor’ zijn van psychopathologie. Stap 3 richtte zich op de vraag in hoeverre het 
mogelijk is (dis)functionele interpretaties te manipuleren, en of dit de symptomen 
van een psychische stoornis kan verminderen. Door middel van deze laatste stap kon 
gekeken worden of disfunctionele interpretaties een ‘causale risico factor’ zijn. 
Het onderzoek binnen dit proefschrift heeft drie kenmerken. Ten eerste werd de rol 
van disfunctionele automatische associaties en interpretaties onderzocht als correlaat, 
predictor en causale risico factor van psychopathologie. Een zodanige aanpak biedt 
de mogelijkheid op een structurele manier te onderzoeken in hoeverre disfunctionele 
automatische associaties en interpretaties betrokken zijn bij het ontstaan en voort-
bestaan van psychopathologie. Ten tweede werden verschillende psychologische 
stoornissen, als ook verschillende steekproeven (risico en klinische steekproeven) 
onderzocht. Dit is gebaseerd op de veronderstelling dat disfunctionele automatische 
associaties en interpretaties samengaan met een ‘cognitieve kwetsbaarheid’ voor psy-
chopathologie. Onderzoek dat zich richt op verschillende soorten stoornissen tijdens 
verschillende fases van een stoornis, is daarom van groot belang. Ten derde werden 
verschillende paradigma’s gebruikt om disfunctionele automatische associaties en 
interpretaties te meten, variërend van meer directe tot meer indirecte benaderingen. 
Dit onderscheid is van belang voor recente discussies omtrent de vraag of directe en 
indirecte metingen wel of niet complementair zijn.
   
DE ROL VAN DISFUNCTIONELE AUTOMATISCHE 
ASSOCIATIES EN INTERPRETATIES ALS CORRELAAT, 
PREDICTOR EN CAUSALE RISICOFACTOR IN 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGIE 
CORRELAAT
Hoofdstukken 2-7 richten zich op de rol van disfunctionele automatische associaties 
en interpretaties als correlaat van (de mate van) psychopathologie. 
Hoofdstuk 2 beschrijft een studie waarbij een indirecte maat werd ingezet om de con-
cepten ‘thinspiration’ en ‘fear of fat’ nader te onderzoeken, namelijk een zogenaamde 
stimulus response compatibility task (SRC; Mogg, Bradley, Field, & De Houwer, 
2003). Tijdens deze computer taak moesten vrouwelijke studenten plaatjes in twee 
categorieën indelen (dun of mollig). Dit werd met behulp van een klein poppetje 
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gedaan dat op het computerscherm verscheen. Dat poppetje kon de plaatjes benaderen 
óf vermijden. De resultaten lieten zien dat de proefpersonen sneller waren in het 
benaderen van dunne modellen vergeleken met dikke modellen. Wat betreft het be-
naderen en vermijden van dikke modellen werd geen verschil gevonden. Verder werd 
gevonden dat de toenaderings- en vermijdingsbewegingen gecorreleerd waren met 
verschillende, aan eten gerelateerde cognities zoals tevredenheid met het eigen lichaam, 
internalisering van het dunne ideaal, mate van gewichtscontrole, enzovoorts. 
Hoofdstuk 3 bevat twee studies waarin automatische associaties ten opzichte van 
spinnen onderzocht werden. Hierbij werd een variant van de Single Target Implicit 
Association Test (STIAT; Wigboldus, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2004) gebruikt, 
namelijk een STIAT met een taak-irrelevante instructie. Dit betekende dat de proef-
personen spinnenplaatjes niet in, bijvoorbeeld, de categorie ‘spinnen’ moesten cate-
goriseren, maar in de categorie ‘plaatje’. In Studie 1 werden spinnenangstige met 
niet-angstige proefpersonen vergeleken, in Studie 2 spinnenliefhebbers met niet-lief-
hebbers. De nieuwe STIAT variant liet inderdaad verschillen tussen de desbetreffende 
groepen zien: in Studie 1 vertoonden spinnenangstige proefpersonen, vergeleken met 
niet-angstige proefpersonen, sterkere automatische negatieve associaties ten opzichte 
van spinnen. Bovendien waren de STIAT scores een betere voorspeller voor automatische 
angstreacties, terwijl expliciet gemeten angst een betere voorspeller was voor gecon-
troleerd vermijdingsgedrag. De resultaten van Studie 2 lieten zien dat de STIAT ook 
groepsverschillen tussen spinnenliefhebbers en niet-liefhebbers kon aantonen: 
Spinnenliefhebbers hadden, vergeleken met niet-liefhebbers, sterkere automatische 
positieve associaties ten opzichte van spinnen. 
Hoofdstuk 4 is een replicatiestudie van eerdere bevindingen omtrent alcoholgerelateerde 
interpretatievertekeningen. Binnen dit onderzoek werd een scenariotaak gebruikt 
waarbij de proefpersonen een einde moesten bedenken voor ambigue, alcoholgerela-
teerde of neutrale verhaaltjes. De resultaten toonden aan dat mannelijke studenten 
die veel dronken, vergeleken met mannelijke studenten die weinig dronken, vaker een 
aan alcoholgerelateerd einde bedachten voor ambigue alcoholgerelateerde verhaaltjes. 
Verder werd gevonden dat hoe sterker deze alcoholgerelateerde interpretatievertekening 
was, hoe hoger de mate van schadelijk drinken en alcoholgerelateerde problemen was. 
Het doel van hoofdstuk 5 was gelijk aan dat van hoofdstuk 4. Echter, gebruikten we 
hier een zogenaamde ‘encoding recognition’ taak. Bovendien werden verhaaltjes 
gebruikt die gerelateerd waren aan positieve en negatieve drinkmotieven, namelijk 
‘coping’ en ‘enhancement’. Proefpersonen waren mannelijke en vrouwelijke drinkende 
studenten. Zij kregen ambigue verhaaltjes aangeboden en per verhaal een set van 
interpretaties die beoordeeld moest worden. Er werd gevonden dat coping-gere-
lateerde drinkmotieven een unieke voorspeller waren voor een alcoholgerelateerde 
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interpretatievertekening ten opzichte van negatieve alcohol verhaaltjes, terwijl enhan-
cement-gerelateerde drinkmotieven een unieke voorspeller waren voor een alcohol-
gerelateerde interpretatievertekening ten opzichte van positieve alcohol verhaaltjes. 
Echter, toekomstig drinkgedrag werd niet voorspeld door de twee alcoholgerelateerde 
vertekeningen. 
In hoofdstuk 6 word de scenario taak zoals gebruikt in hoofdstuk 4 toegepast binnen een 
klinische setting, namelijk bij een groep alcoholverslaafde patiënten en een controle 
groep. Er waren 12 ambigue verhaaltjes (zeven alcoholgerelateerd en vijf paniek- en 
depressiegerelateerd). De resultaten toonden aan dat de kans om een alcoholgerelateerd 
einde te bedenken groter was bij alcoholverslaafde patiënten dan bij controle patiënten. 
Dit was het geval voor alle drie soorten verhaaltjes. Bovendien werd een positieve cor-
relatie gevonden tussen de sterkte van de alcoholgerelateerde interpretatievertekening 
en de mate van schadelijk drinken. 
Hoofdstuk 7 onderzocht het effect van negatieve prikkels op de activering van alcohol-
gerelateerde concepten met behulp van een priming taak. De proefpersonen waren 
een groep alcoholverslaafde patiënten en in een controle groep. Tegen de verwachting 
in lieten alcoholverslaafde patiënten geen sterkte activering van alcoholgerelateerde 
concepten zien nadat zij blootgesteld werden aan negatieve prikkels. 
De resultaten van Hoofdstukken 2-6 tonen aan dat disfunctionele automatische associ-
aties en interpretaties inderdaad een correlaat zijn van (de mate van) psychopathologie. 
Bovendien zijn er additionele resultaten die deze bevindingen nuanceren. Er werden 
correlaties aangetoond tussen directe en indirecte metingen. De correlaties waren 
uniek en werden gevonden ondanks verschillen in tijd en context van de meting. Dis-
functionele interpretaties generaliseerden naar andere ambigue contexten. Tenslotte 
kon aangetoond worden dat disfunctionele automatische associaties, vergeleken met 
zelfrapportage, een betere predictor waren voor automatische angstreacties. 
PREDICTOR
Hoofdstuk 8 richtte zich op de rol van disfunctionele automatische associaties en inter-
pretaties als predictor van psychopathologie. Specifiek werd onderzocht in hoeverre 
disfunctionele paniekgerelateerde interpretaties voorspellend zijn voor het ontstaan 
van een paniekstoornis. Hiervoor werd een longitudinale epidemiologische studie 
uitgevoerd met twee meetpunten. De resultaten lieten zien dat disfunctionele paniek-
gerelateerde interpretaties inderdaad een predictor zijn voor het ontstaan van een 
paniekstoornis, ook wanneer gecontroleerd werd voor twee andere belangrijke risico-
factoren (namelijk angstgevoeligheid en lichamelijke gewaarwordingen).
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CAUSALE RISICO FACTOR
In hoofdstukken 9 en 10 werd de causale rol van disfunctionele interpretaties onder-
zocht. Er werden twee experimentele studies uitgevoerd in de context van posttrauma-
tische stresstoornis (PTSS) waarbij het effect van positief versus negatief interpretatie 
training (Cognitive Bias Modification – Appraisal, ofwel CBM-App) op analoge trauma 
symptomen werd onderzocht. In hoofdstuk 9 werd de CBM-App training na een 
stressvolle film aangeboden. De resultaten lieten zien dat de mensen in de positieve 
training groep, vergeleken met mensen in de negatieve training groep, minder intrusies 
hadden en lager scoorden op analoge trauma symptomen. In hoofdstuk 10 werd de 
training vóór de stressvolle film aangeboden. Hier werd gevonden dat de mensen in 
de positieve training groep, vergeleken met mensen in de negatieve training groep, 
hun intrusies als minder stressvol hebben ervaren. 
 
IMPLICATIES VOOR THEORIE, ONDERZOEK EN
KLINISCHE PRAKTIJK
 
Dit proefschrift heeft drie hoofdbevindingen. Ten eerste werd gevonden dat disfunc-
tionele automatische associaties en interpretaties een correlaat, predictor en causale 
risico factor zijn voor (de mate van) psychopathologie. Ten tweede werd aangetoond 
dat verschillende soorten psychische stoornissen gekenmerkt zijn door de aanwezigheid 
van disfunctionele automatische associaties en interpretaties in verschillende fases 
van psychopathologie. Ten derde kon de aanwezigheid van disfunctionele automatische 
associaties en interpretaties worden aangetoond met behulp van verschillende para-
digma’s, variërend van meer directe tot meer indirecte metingen. 
Deze bevindingen bieden ondersteuning voor een dimensioneel, ofwel procesmatig, in 
plaats van een categorisch perspectief op psychopathologie. Dit houdt in dat disfunctio-
nele automatische associaties en interpretaties een soort algemeen fenomeen zijn. Dit 
is in overeenstemming met het duale procesmodel van abnormaal gedrag. Bovendien 
bieden deze bevindingen ondersteuning voor een transdiagnostisch perspectief op 
psychopathologie (bijvoorbeeld Barlow, Allen, & Choate, 2004; Harvey, Watkins, 
Mansell, & Shafran, 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011). Transdiagnostisch 
houdt in dat men over stoornissen heen kijkt en niet slechts binnen een stoornis.
Gezien deze uitkomsten zijn disfunctionele automatische associaties en interpretaties 
te beschouwen als een risicofactor voor psychopathologie. Toekomstig onderzoek moet 
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zich daarom op drie aspecten richten: Ten eerste moeten replicatie- en verdiepings-
studies worden uitgevoerd om verder inzicht te vergaren in disfunctionele automatische 
associaties en interpretaties. Ten tweede moeten de hieraan onderliggende mechanis-
men verder onderzocht en gespecificeerd worden. Ten derde moet de interactie tussen 
disfunctionele automatische associaties en interpretaties en de onderliggende mecha-
nismen in kaart gebracht worden. 
Wat betreft de implicaties zijn er de volgende aanbevelingen. De eerste aanbeveling richt 
zich op de preventie van psychopathologie. Wanneer er meer inzicht is in disfunctionele 
automatische associaties en interpretaties en hun onderliggende mechanismen zouden 
kwetsbare individuen eerder geïdentificeerd kunnen worden. Wanneer een individu 
al een psychologische stoornis heeft, is bijvoorbeeld het onderzoeken van de aard als 
ook van het beloop van disfunctionele automatische associaties en interpretaties voor 
en na therapie een informatieve stap. Verder zou het zinvol zijn de aanwezigheid van 
disfunctionele automatische associaties en interpretaties met verschillende paradigma’s 
te onderzoeken. Tenslotte, een aanbeveling voor de praktijk: Procesmatige interventies 
(bijvoorbeeld een interpretatie training) zouden een waardevolle toevoeging kunnen 
zijn aan de huidige therapievormen. 
Wanneer deze implicaties voor onderzoek en praktijk worden opgevolgd zou het duale 
procesmodel van abnormaal gedrag verder gespecificeerd en genuanceerd kunnen 
worden.  De ontwikkeling van een zodanig model zou het mogelijk maken de rol van 
alsmede de interactie tussen disfunctionele automatische associaties en interpretaties 
over verschillende soorten psychopathologie heen beter te begrijpen. Dit zou wederom 
tot effectievere behandelingsstrategieën kunnen leiden en op lange termijn tot een 
verbetering van de kwaliteit van de zorg voor de patiënt kunnen resulteren.  
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ASSOCIATIONS
Rating scales
Many different rating scales have been developed to measure associations. The most 
widely used is the Likert Scale (Likert, 1932), which, for example, requires participants 
to provide a rating of the concept/object of interest. It makes use of a continuum, e.g., 
ranging from very negative until very positive, and includes a fixed choice response 
format. 
Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). 
The IAT is reaction time (RT) paradigm, which aims to measure the relative associative 
strength between two concepts. Participants are asked to sort stimuli (e.g., word and/
or pictures) into four categories by means of two response keys: two categories repre-
sent a target concept (e.g., me vs. other), and two categories represent two poles of an 
attribute dimension (e.g., calm vs. anxious). Each target category is paired with both 
attributes. As such, faster RTs during a particular target-attribute combination suggest 
a strong association between the two stimuli. In research on anxiety and depression, 
for example, results of Glashouwer and de Jong (2010) showed that patients suffering 
from an anxiety disorder exhibited stronger self-anxious associations than depressed 
patients and controls did. In contrast, patients suffering from depression exhibited 
stronger self-depressive associations compared to anxious patients and controls. 
During the past years, many IAT variants have been developed. This was (partly) moti-
vated to overcome limitations of the original IAT. However, the type of stimuli and 
basic task elements are similar to the original IAT, i.e., participants are asked to sort 
word or picture stimuli into predefined categories. To illustrate, a well known problem 
of the IAT is its double-relative nature, because it assesses the relative strength of 
associations between two targets and two attributes (De Houwer, 2003). The Single 
Target Implicit Association Test (STIAT; Wigboldus, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 
2004) partly avoids this problem by presenting only a single target category. In addition, 
a STIAT is independent of whether the target of interest has an immanently meaningful 
contrast category or not. Huijding and de Jong (2006a) applied a STIAT in the context 
of nicotine dependence (target category: smoking, attribute category: positive, negative) 
and found that nicotine-related associations were positive in smokers but negative in 
non-smokers. 
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The Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST; De Houwer, 2003) is another example of 
a categorization task assessing associations towards one target concept. During the EAST, 
participants sort attribute stimuli (e.g., positive and negative) by meaning, making use 
of two response keys. Given these instructions, it is assumed that the response keys 
become extrinsically associated with the meaning of the attribute stimuli assigned to 
them. As a result, an extrinsically positive and an extrinsically negative response key 
are created. In contrast, target words (e.g., spider-related words) have to be categorized 
by means of a task irrelevant feature, (e.g., color), using the same two response keys. 
Following this, the associative strength is defined via the RT difference between giving 
an extrinsically negative response to the target versus giving an extrinsically positive 
response to the target. To illustrate, in research on fear of spiders, Huijding and de 
Jong (2005) found evidence that the EAST tends to differentiate between individuals 
scoring high and low on spider fear (for similar results, see Huijding & de Jong, 2006b). 
Other examples of IAT variations are the Personalized Implicit Association Test, the 
Uniploar Implicit Association Test, the Go/No-go Implicit Association Test (Nosek & 
Banaji, 2001), and the Affective Simon Task (De Houwer, Crombez, Baeyens, & Hermans, 
2001). 
Approach Avoidance Tasks
Dysfunctional approach avoidance associations are characteristic features of both 
addictions and anxiety disorders. A paradigm to assess such associations is the Approach 
Avoidance Task (AAT; Rinck & Becker, 2007). During the AAT, participants are instructed 
to pull a joystick toward themselves and to push it away from themselves in response to 
pictures presented on the computer screen. Given this operationalization, pulling 
represents an approach and pushing an avoidance movement. The time participants 
need to fully execute these valenced movements provides an index of their spontaneous 
behavioral tendencies towards a particular picture category. Most AATs make use of 
a ‘task irrelevant feature’. That is, the push and pull movements are not determined by 
the pictures’ contents but by the pictures’ format or tilt (e.g., push landscape vs. pull 
portrait pictures). These instructions are stimulus-independent and therefore might 
direct participants’ attention away from the research aim. In order to support the visual 
illusion of approach avoidance and to disambiguate the movements, the AAT employs a 
zoom function. That is, pictures increase during pulling and decrease during pushing. 
The study of Wiers, Rinck, Dictus, & van den Wildenberg (2009), for example, showed 
that hazardously drinking students were faster to pull than to push the joystick in 
response to alcohol pictures.
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Another variant of an approach avoidance task is the Stimulus Response Compatibility 
task (SRC; Mogg, Bradley, Field, & De Houwer, 2003). During this task, participants 
are instructed to move a manikin figure on the computer monitor towards and away 
from a picture. That is, participants are executing symbolic approach avoidance re-
sponses instead of actual motor responses like the AAT requires. The time to initiate 
the manikin’s movement is used as an index of participants’ approach avoidance 
associations towards the particular picture category. To illustrate, the study of Mogg, 
Field, & Bradley (2005) applied a SRC task to examine nicotine-related approach 
associations. Results showed that smokers with lower levels of nicotine dependence 
showed faster symbolic approach responses to smoking-related cues than smokers 
with moderate levels of dependence. 
Priming paradigms 
There are two priming paradigms that have been used frequently to measure associa-
tions, namely affective priming tasks (APT; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 
1986) and semantic primings. During a typical APT, participants are asked to categorize 
target words into two categories, e.g., palatable food vs. unpalatable food. Before a 
target word appears, however, a valenced prime is presented (e.g., a positive or negative 
word). These primes are presented very briefly and participants are instructed to not 
react to them. It is assumed that the primes either facilitate or aggravate the target’s 
categorization, i.e., a categorization should be faster for valence congruent prime-target 
trials than incongruent ones. The APT has been frequently used in research on food 
associations. However, it has not always revealed the expected results: Roefs et al. 
(2005), for example, found that anorexia nervosa patients did not show more positive 
associations towards palatable than unpalatable food. However, unrestrained controls 
did show such a preference. When comparing an obese sample with unrestrained 
lean controls, results showed that the former but not the latter group exhibited more 
positive associations towards low- than high-fat palatable food. 
Semantic priming tasks are based on the same principle, i.e., a prime is presented which 
is supposed to affect a target’s categorization. Hill and Paynter (1992), for example, found 
that alcohol-related but not alcohol-unrelated primes facilitated the categorization of 
alcohol-related targets words in alcohol-dependent drinkers but not in non-dependent 
drinkers.
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INTERPRETATIONS
Questionnaires
Various questionnaires have been developed to assess interpretation processes, all 
making use of the same principle: Participants are presented with ambiguous infor-
mation, e.g., a sentence or a scenario, and are supposed to interpret this information. The 
act of interpreting can include many forms. A very common way is to ask participants 
to rank order different interpretations according to their interpretational fit with the 
ambiguous information. One of these interpretations always involves the disorder-
congruent one. By making use of such an approach, results of McNally and Foa (1987), 
for example, showed that patients suffering from agoraphobia and panic disorder more 
often assigned a high ranking to threat-related interpretations of ambiguous panic-
related scenarios than treated agoraphobia/panic patients and healthy controls did.
Recognition tests
Classical recognition tests usually involve two phases. During phase one, participants 
are presented with an ambiguous scenario and are simply instructed to read (or listen) 
to it. During phase two, possible interpretations are provided and participants have to 
indicate whether these interpretations are similar in meaning to the previously pre-
sented ambiguous information by means of a rating scale. Using such a recognition test, 
Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews (1991), for example, found that currently 
anxious participants were more likely than recovered anxious participants and normal 
controls to interpret ambiguous sentences in a threatening rather than in a nonthreat-
ening manner, respectively.
Completion tasks
Presenting participants with open-ended ambiguous scenarios and requiring them to 
generate an ending for these scenarios is a frequently used operationalization of a 
completion task. For example, Hertel, Brozovich, Joormann, and Gotlib (2008) used 
such an approach to asses interpretation (and memory) biases in Generalized Social 
Phobia (GSP). Individuals diagnosed with GSP and controls were asked generate con-
tinuations for ambiguous nonsocial and ambiguous social scenarios. Results indicated 
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that the former group produced more socially anxious and negative interpretations 
for ambiguous social scenarios than did the latter group. 
Sentence stem completion tasks are another operationalisation. In a study by Stoler 
and McNally (1991), symptomatic agoraphobics, recovered agoraphobics, and healthy 
controls had to complete a set of ambiguous and unambiguous sentence stems that 
had either a potentially threatening or a nonthreatening meaning. Results showed that 
symptomatic agoraphobics generated more threat-related interpretations compared 
to healthy controls.
Word association paradigms
During word associations tasks, participants give their first spontaneous interpretation 
to an ambiguous cue, i.e., a homograph. A homograph is a word for which the written 
form has more than one meaning, for example, a disorder-related and disorder-unre-
lated meaning (e.g., ‘shot’: an alcoholic drink or a gunshot). Hence, it is expected to 
find a positive correlation between the number of disorder-congruent interpretations 
and levels of symptomatology. To illustrate, research has shown that individuals with a 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) showed a greater tendency to give a threat-related 
interpretation to homographs than individuals without PTSD (Amir, Coles, & Foa, 
2002). In research on alcohol abuse, results have repeatedly demonstrated that indi-
viduals with high levels of alcohol consumption generate more alcohol-related inter-
pretations on ambiguous alcohol-related cues (e.g., Ames & Stacy, 1998; Stacy, 1995; 
1997). Here, also ambiguous situations (e.g. ‘Friday night’) or phrases including affective 
components (e.g. ‘feeling good’), as well as compound cues using a combination of 
ambiguous situations and affective components (e.g. ‘Friday night – Feeling good’) have 
been used, all revealing the expected positive correlation between levels of alcohol 
consumption and number of generated alcohol-related interpretations.
Word Sentence Association Paradigm (WSAP; Beard & Amir, 2009)
During the WSAP, participants decide whether or not a word (e.g., threat-related or 
benign) is related to an ambiguous sentence. Given that the word precedes the ambig-
uous sentence, the type of word thus influences the interpretation of the ambiguous 
sentence. The decision time as well the endorsement rates of the relatedness between 
word and sentence are used as interpretation indices. By means of the WSAP, Beard 
and Amir (2009) showed that socially anxious participants were significantly faster to 
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endorse than to reject threat interpretations, and, compared to controls, socially 
anxious participants endorsed more social threat interpretations and fewer social 
benign interpretations. 
Lexical decision tasks
The basic procedure of lexical decision tasks involves the measurement of how quickly 
participants classify probes as words or non-words, in combination with presented 
information related to the probe. Either the probe or the presented information is 
ambiguous. Calvo, Eysenck, and Estevez (1994), for example, applied such a lexical 
decision task whereby ambiguous sentences (ego-threat, physical-threat, or non-threat 
events) were presented to high- and low-test anxiety participants. Sentences were 
followed by either a disambiguating word or a non-word. Results showed that anxious 
participants were biased towards an ego-threat meaning, i.e., they were faster to classify 
ego-threat confirming word than ego-threat disconfirming word compared with low 
anxious participants. In Richard and French’s study (1992), high and low-trait anxious 
participants were presented with ambiguous probes (threat-related or neutral) that were 
followed by threat-related, threat-unrelated or neutral targets. Results demonstrated 
faster responses for threat-related compared to threat-unrelated targets in the high-
anxiety group (but only for longer SOA’s), providing evidence of a threat-related inter-
pretation bias in the high-anxious group. 
Word blends
Word blends are an acoustical blend of word pairs that, optimally, differ by only one 
phoneme (e.g., cry – dry, sad – sand). Hence, the result of the blending is an auditory 
ambiguous stimulus. In case participants are not informed about the fact that two words 
are presented, they are instructed to simply write down what they heard. If participants 
are informed about the nature of the stimuli, they are instructed to select the word 
they think they had heard out of 2 or more provided response options. The study of 
Dearing and Gotlib (2009) used such a word blend task to study interpretation biases 
in a sample of daughters of depressed mothers following a negative mood induction. 
It included negative-neutral, positive-neutral, depressotypic-neutral, and social-threat 
blends. They applied the forced-choice answering format. Results indicated that 
daughters of depressed mothers, compared to daughters of never-disordered mothers, 
interpreted ambiguous word blends more negatively and less positively. 
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Homophones
A homophone is a word that is pronounced the same as another word but differs in 
spelling and meaning, e.g., ‘die/dye’. Mathews, Richards, and Eysenck (1989) used such 
homophones to study clinical anxiety. The homophones involved either a threatening 
or a neutral meaning. Results showed that clinically anxious participants identified 
the threatening spellings relatively more often than controls. Participants who had 
recovered from their anxiety were in-between. 
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